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The thesis explores the role and impact of the internet on Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora 
political activism, focusing on both the experiences of political activists and on an 
analysis of web content related to diaspora activism. The central argument of the thesis 
is based around the relationship between political agents and cyberspace. The thesis 
argues that the political strategies and tactics adopted in the Tamil diasporan political 
sphere have changed with an increased dependence on the internet changing with it the 
politics and lives of individual activists. Cyberspace is presented as a site of power 
struggle with power as both an objective and source in micro-political struggles. The 
thesis also highlights the double sense of space attributed to cyberspace, both as a space 
facilitating political activism and as a qualitatively new space for politics. It traces the 
manifestation of violence in cyberspace based on its extensive reach and the collateral 
damage it can cause in political conflicts. Also the thesis argues that these intense web 
engagements for domination and resistance within the diaspora communities cause the 
emergence of new political priorities in Tamil diaspora politics. These do not parallel 
political developments in the conflict back in Sri Lanka. 
 
The thesis is based on research conducted from 2005 to 2008 during heightened rivalries 
between supporters of the LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) and dissident Tamil 
diaspora political activists which involved the extensive use of cyberspace for political 
purposes. The empirical research consisted of an integrated framework of online and 
offline research. The offline research was based on eight months of fieldwork in London 
including interviews with Tamil diaspora political activists across the spectrum from 
pro-LTTE to anti-LTTE dissidents. The online research was based on the technique of 
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Figure 3 Map of Sri Lanka which presents the shift in the conflict zones from 2005 – 2008. 
This is significant as it shows the rapid changes within the conflict zones during the time period of my 
research. The map is from nationalpost.com. Available on 





The Sri Lankan Tamils are widely dispersed across the Western world and have been a 
key life line for the Tamil secessionist movement, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
(LTTE/Tamil Tigers) in Sri Lanka. The Tamil Tigers claim they are fighting for a 
separate state for the ethnic Tamil people in the North and East of Sri Lanka. This is a 
case study of diaspora politics linked to an ongoing ethno-nationalist conflict in a state, 
making the analysis of Tamil diaspora, politically important in transnational nationalistic 
activities. The Sri Lankan ethnic conflict has triggered two physical flows of Tamils out 
of their traditional homes. Firstly, an internal displacement leading to inward migration 
and secondly an outward migration to many international locations. These flows, 
especially in the early 1980’s and 1990’s, have created significant Tamil diaspora 
communities and diaspora centres across the globe. My research takes place nearly two 
decades after the major influx of Tamils reaching London, the colonial hub where Tamil 
diaspora politics is a well entrenched phenomenon. Diaspora centres such as London and 
its extensive diaspora communities have become sites of extensive political activity. For 
the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in particular, the diaspora centres have 
become important bases for international presence. They have become the virtual nodes 
of LTTE international operations attracting multiple researchers to study dynamics 
spanning from diaspora formations to political engagements.  
 
Tensions between the Sri Lankan state and Tamil militants were mounting in the late 
1970s and this time was marked with occasional confrontations. By the 1980s the civil 
war was a reality and the conflict was marked by four stages of military warfare that 
commenced between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan armed forces. These phases are 
periods of intense confrontations which are identified as Eelam Wars I, II, III and IV. 
The anti-Tamil riots which marked the early 1980s created a massive exodus of Tamils 
out of Sri Lanka. The exiled Tamils settled in various locations in the Western world and 
in some regions of Asia. This exodus created significant Tamil diaspora centres.  
 
The Tamil diasporans, especially in areas of high concentration of Tamil communities 
such as London and Toronto, were able to establish and run various organizations, 
ranging from businesses to charities. The LTTE managed to manipulate and gain a 
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strong grip of these diaspora communities making them a part of the LTTE’s struggle 
against the Sri Lankan state. The LTTE transformed the diaspora landscapes converting 
them to international strongholds and made LTTE’s presence felt in these centres as a 
powerful force.  
 
In 1986, the LTTE was able to set up its funding network that has up to now kept on 
churning the millions of dollars needed to keep the war machinery operational (Smith 
2003: 8). It enabled the LTTE to procure weapons that were capable of challenging the 
military might of the Sri Lankan armed forces. The money also enabled them to run local 
military and munitions production facilities with explosives and expertise bought from 
the international black market. The LTTE’s military and political operations are 
sustained by economic support within the diaspora. To maintain the brand of Tamil 
nationalism and the Tamil nation the LTTE was representing, it organized diasporic 
activities including many cultural and fundraising events. The cultural and religious 
practices were key factors that maintained the geographical imagination of Tamil Eelam 
alive in the minds of every Tamil diasporan.  
 
The mid 1990s to early 2000 was the peak of the military advantages of the LTTE and 
its rise to power. The 1996 attack on the military camp at Mullaitivu was the first 
success of the LTTE as a conventional military force. The success of the Mullaitivu 
battles led the LTTE to transform into a more conventional force (Smith 2007). With the 
battle successes the LTTE also managed to set up web operation through pro-LTTE 
elements in the Tamil diaspora and sympathisers of the organization. The most 
successful was the Tamilnet.com launched in 1997. The web operations began to spread 
with the proliferation of hundreds of web sites and web forums dedicated to the Eelam 
War. The mid 1990s saw the LTTE making massive amounts of money pumped from 
diaspora centres and through their own businesses and investments made within these 
locations (Gunaratne 1999; Fuglerud 2009.) 
 
The Tamil diaspora communities have become centres of influence and an important 
audience of the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict. Academics looking at diaspora formations, 
and specifically into diasporan politics in cyberspace, have constantly mentioned the 
importance of studying the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora (Braziel and Manur 2003; Karim 
2003). They have stressed its importance in theorising future trajectories of diaspora 
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studies. It will be crucial to analyse schematically the role of cyber technology and the 
World Wide Web within such ideological and political formations. As Braziel and 
Mannur ask, ‘for example, do supporters of specific organizations such as the PLO and 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (Sri Lanka), who are committed to posing a different 
version of the homeland, use cyberspace to promote alternative visions of the home and 
homeland, while also moving capital across such divides?’ (2003:11). 
 
The web was extensively used by the LTTE to reinforce the common identity of the 
Tamils in the diaspora. It was also used continuously to keep the discourse of the two 
key claims of the LTTE alive within the Tamil diaspora. These two key claims were that, 
firstly, all activities of the LTTE within the diaspora were to ensure the future life of the 
Tamils in a liberated state. Secondly, that the LTTE was the only organization that has 
the legitimate right and authority to uphold the right to create the Tamil homeland or 
Eelam state (Fuglerud 2001: 198). 
 
This thesis investigates the phenomenon of the internet in diaspora and its political 
implications. My thesis temporally sits in a significant conjuncture of changing political 
landscape in the Tamil diaspora with the rise of the Tamil dissidents’ challenging the key 
claims of the LTTE. This intense political activity has generated extensive political 
engagement between the pro-LTTE and the dissident groups. In this thesis I explore the 
political use of the internet by both camps and the political implications of the internet in 
the context of intense inter-group rivalry within the Tamil diaspora.   
 
Diaspora discourse has proved attractive to scholars because it is one of the best fields 
for studying political transnationalism. For Vertovec (1998) and Cohen (1997), the 
modern gurus of transnationalism, diaspora have formed the locus of their research. With 
diasporas marked frequently by the flows that are transnational, ideological, financial 
and political, such flows demand a rethinking of diasporic spaces in relation to 
ideologies of nationalism and transnationalism. My thesis is based on research into 
actual diasporan politics in cyberspace and the perceptions of diaspora political activists 
on what cyberspace means for their political actions and when and why they actually 
occupy this space. These newly emerging areas of political engagement in cyberspace 
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will contribute to the current literature on cyber politics especially politics of nationalism 
and the mobilization for such projects using the internet. 
 
My thesis investigates the dimension of cyberspace and its use in Tamil diaspora 
politics. I engage with Tamil political activists in a quest to understand the actual impact 
of online political processes in their lives to decisions determining political strategies 
and action. The research is an attempt to piece together personal experiences of political 
activists in using cyberspace for political participation and political mobilization, and 
assess such impacts from the view point of these activists.  
 
The time line in my research is 2005 – 2008, which was a period of constant and 
significant transformations in the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict in both ‘internal’ 
dimensions and ‘external’ dimensions. The key internal dimension was the split within 
the LTTE organization in Sri Lanka, where the Eastern military leadership defected to 
the side of the Sri Lankan government in 2004. This split sent ripples throughout the 
LTTE and the conflict at large contributing to changes of the external dimension, which 
is mainly the Tamil diaspora community and the political field within the Tamil diaspora 
community. The significance of researching this time period from 2005 – 2008 was that 
the flux and rapid changes in the political and conflict landscapes in Sri Lanka had a 
profound effect on diaspora politics. By engaging in an online research project I was 
able to observe and grasp these changes rapidly as each event unfolded. From the 
perspective of diaspora political activism, the importance of the split within the LTTE 
symbolised the shattering of LTTE’s image as an indestructible organization. The 2004 
split created opportunities for the Tamil democratic activists and reinforced within them 
the belief that the LTTE could be critiqued, challenged and even changed.  
 
Cyberspace, Information Communication Technologies (ICT) and the emergence of 
Computer Mediated Communication (CMC) have been studied and interpreted by social 
theorists such as Castells (2000, 2001, 2004), Fortier (2001), Haraway (1985, 1995) and 
Grey (1997) from various disciplines. These issues have been analysed and critiqued 
from marxist, post marxist, post modernist, post-structuralist and feminist viewpoints. As 
a political scientist I am venturing into a study which is multi-disciplinary in form but it 
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inherently possesses political significance as the focus is on political engagement with 
newly constructed spaces that are social and technological in nature. Currently there are 
many theoretical discussions of the importance of space and place in shaping cultural, 
social, economic and political life. There is a significant interest in many disciplines in 
understanding spatiality of all the above macro categories in human life. The belief of 
theorists such as Lefevbre (2000), Massey (2005) and Soja (1989) is that such critical 
discussions will undoubtedly help shape debates about space and place and their political 
significance in the immediate future. 
 
A key dynamic running throughout this thesis is the political tension and contestation 
between pro-LTTE activists and dissident political activists as they attempt to dominate 
and resist each other. This leads to a classic scenario of a hegemonic and counter-
hegemonic duel in a political field dominated for nearly two decades by a single 
hegemonic project. These rivalries, which date back since the inception of the conflict, 
saw a surge during the period of the research because of the ‘internal’ and ‘external’ 
dynamics of the conflict explained earlier, which led to the focus of my research on the 
dissident dimension in Tamil diaspora politics. The decision to focus on the Tamil 
dissident diaspora activists in my research was itself a break from the existing literature 
of research on Tamil diaspora and Tamil diaspora politics, which is dominated by 
accounts and analysis of LTTE led configuration of diaspora politics (McDowell 1996; 
Gunaratne 1998; Fuglerud 1999; Sriskandarajah 2004; Guha 2003). This thesis captures 
intense rivalries and tensions between these two groups through interviews and online 
research on web operations. These contestations generate opposing approaches to the 
politics of cyberspace among these two groups, with the LTTE analysing it as a single 
space that needed to be dominated under a homogenous political strategy, while 
dissidents approached it as a space of multiple opportunities. The dissidents’ take on web 
sites on Tamil political affairs and the political potentials of web operations, focuses on 
cyberspace as a space for political action, meaning both the expansion of opportunities 
for political activism and a claim that this is a qualitatively new site for politics. These 
opportunities, according to dissident activists, are created through the mediated spaces in 
cyberspace where dissidents can place themselves strategically at different levels from 




The structure of the thesis is constructed around three key sections effectively engaging 
in three main strands of enquiry into the use of cyberspace for political engagement 
among Tamil diaspora and its effect on the lives and strategies of activists. The three 
main sections of the thesis look broadly at three larger questions which the thesis overall 
attempts to respond to.  
 
The first section is an introduction to the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka, the formation of 
the Tamil diaspora and the use of internet, but the key question generated in this section 
is: ‘how can I research the impact of cyberspace on the politics of the Tamil diaspora?’ 
Section One is made out of three chapters, with Chapter One devoted to outlining the 
history and events leading to the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka and focusing on drivers of 
the ethnic conflict. I argue that the increased use of information technology in the 
conflict is an important factor in shaping diaspora activism. The technologies of 
computer mediated communication (CMC), as pointed out above, have become a centre 
piece in politics and political mobilization of diasporas. In my research I focus on the 
micro politics and political agents rather than larger flows of diaspora mobilization and 
through this micro political analysis explore the use of cyberspace for political purposes. 
 
In Chapter Two, I engage with my research field, and introduce the challenges in 
making contacts and finding respondents, and the themes I used to guide my 
interviews. I also bring out the importance of London as a diaspora centre and 
explain why I selected it for my fieldwork. I trace the stories of two diaspora 
activists, their line of flight from Sri Lanka, and their current political activities. 
Through their stories and political actions I aim to introduce the importance of 
dissident political activism and the relevance it has in altering the diaspora political 
space that was dominated by one political ideology championed by the LTTE. Some 
of the respondents in my research are identified by pseudo names. These respondents 
wanted to be identified in my thesis through pseudo names. The respondents that are 
identified using pseudo names are Raj, Nallu, Sutha and Kumar. The rest of the 
respondents are identified by their real names. I carried out several interviews with 




Chapter Three is devoted to engaging with existing forms and methods of researching 
social phenomena online, and the weaknesses and strengths of these methods. In this 
chapter I introduce my preferred method of web research, the model of ‘Web Sphere 
Analysis’. It is contrasted with some popular online research methods currently in use 
while I argue that Web Sphere Analysis is important for researching scenarios of 
political activism.  
 
I adopted Web Sphere Analysis to research the web operations of the Tamil diaspora to 
overcome problems with other popular methods such as network analysis and virtual 
ethnography. One of the key limitations in online research is scope, as a researcher can 
only focus on a limited of number of web sites or extensively research one web site. 
Political engagements online cannot be captured in such limited analysis, but when a 
series of web sites are analysed under one single framework this framework becomes a 
distinct unit of analysis and this is one of the key advantages of using Web Sphere 
Analysis. Web Sphere Analysis was originally used to understand and analyse web 
developments like electoral processes and significant events like the political response to 
the 9/11 attacks. In my methodological chapter, I analyse further the analytical tools 
included in the framework of Web Sphere Analysis that aid the researcher to look at an 
array of web sites irrespective of their form and format. But the most important aspect is 
the facility it has to investigate the inter-linkages of the sites as well as their producers. 
In the case of the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora there are two significant pools of web sites 
in the web sphere, one is the pro-LTTE web sites, and the other the dissidents which the 
web sphere enables to capture as one single unit of analysis. 
 
Thus Section One situates both political actors and web sites, or both the online and the 
offline, and looks at the challenges of developing a research framework to include and 
integrate both these dimensions. Chapters Two and Three introduce these two 
dimensions of offline and online as an integrated research framework that enables the 
capture of actual involvement of political activists in cyber political activities. This 
framework illuminates the manner in which cyberspace or the internet technologies have 
affected political activists, altering their political practices, strategic planning and 




I adopted a two tiered research framework that can capture data from both ‘offline’ (the 
political activists) and ‘online’ (the web operations) simultaneously with the capability 
to fuse the two dimensions in an analysis process. As my respondents were not web 
masters, but were mostly political activists, some of whom had been in politics for nearly 
three decades thus very much preceding the internet. The offline research was based on 
interviews with these activists and these interviews brought out the key thematic 
arguments that I develop in the next two sections of my thesis.  
 
The analysis made on web sites captured through Web Sphere Analysis forms the second 
key question and Section Two in my thesis: ‘what is the significance of the internet in 
the political strategies of Tamil diaspora activists and the LTTE as an organization and 
to what extent does it define their political actions?’ Chapter Four is one of the two 
chapters which make up the analysis of my online research. It is presented in Section 
Two to illuminate the intense online political rivalries between the two Tamil diasporic 
groups. These rivalries are important in displaying the working of cyberspace and its use 
for struggles played out in a new battlefield and as a strategic determinant of power.  
 
Chapter Five brings together certain dynamics of online politics, analyzing the content of 
web sites captured during my research period. The importance of this chapter is to 
illuminate the new dimensions for political action that have opened up with the use of 
the internet. I argue these findings are politically important as they form an integral 
component of greater political strategies adopted by the LTTE during the period of 2004 
to 2008, to deal with challenges it has faced. The chapter deals with the use of 
‘deception’ as a cyber political tactic as opposed to accurate information based 
mobilization tactics adopted by the Zapatista movement used in its web campaigns. The 
chapter encapsulates the discursive production of the LTTE, projecting the constant 
advancement of its military machinery by incorporating military jargon into the texts 
produced for websites that inform the diaspora on achievements of the LTTE. These new 
political tactics are observed during 2004 - 2008 and I argue that the LTTE is depending 
far more on the internet for strategic political positioning of the organization. Such 
dependence on web-based technologies has made customised political strategies using 
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websites uniquely distinct from those adopted in the 1990s. I further argue that these 
differences alter the purpose the internet was used previous to these rivalries and 
political engagements. 
 
The responses generated in my interviews form the third key question and Section Three 
of my thesis: ‘what are the political consequences of using the internet in diaspora 
activism and why is it politically different?’ These interviews exposed an array of 
dynamics that cyberspace has effectively influenced and imposed on the political 
activists. These included cyberspace being used and perceived as a site for politics rather 
than a mere information passage. Some activists called it a ‘democratic space’ in the 
context of the hegemonic struggle within the Tamil diaspora. ‘Space’ is understood both 
as a space for political opportunities and as a place for enabling the constitution of 
political agency. Such responses came from both spectrums of opposing nodes 
representing pro-LTTE and dissident activists. I was driven to explore the workings of 
power within cyber political engagements based on information from my respondents on 
their perception of cyberspace functioning as a political sphere. These observations 
included terms such as ‘domination’ and ‘resistance’ along with texts and images used in 
virtual struggles. These concepts set up the Section Three, comprised of Chapters Six to 
Eight, that investigates the working of a discourse of power.  
 
By forming a research problem into the notion of power and its relationship with spatial 
properties in cyberspace, this thesis provides new insight as to why political activists 
take their operation to cyberspace. Jordan (1999) attempts to theorise a notion called 
‘cyberpower’. His understanding grows from virtual reality and the emergence of cyber 
societies. There is no well planned offline fieldwork evidence in his work to back up his 
assumptions as it is limited to analysis of certain behaviours of individuals. Jordan also 
fails to look at a particular political sphere thus his research is scattered across multiple 
areas from cultural aspects to economics of cyberspace which fails to provide robust and 
clear findings. In my field research one of the key issues I was exposed to was the actual 
perception of diaspora political activists of cyberspace and their experiences in the 




The cleavage in studies on politics in cyberspace can be traced to the use of 
communication as the key element in online political mobilization. From Castells 
(2000), Fortier (2001) to Jordan (1999) the core argument for politics shifting to 
cyberspace is attributed to its superior use as a communicative medium and recurring 
cost effectiveness. In my research I tend to understand the notion of cyberspace as a site 
more than a medium as explained in Chapter Six where I discuss the key questions 
driving my thesis. This is the key reason why I intend to introduce theories on politics of 
power, space and internal contestations within the Tamil diaspora political project. I 
perceive this as a new dimension in exploring online political activity, which needs more 
attention in the discourse of politics and political mobilization in cyberspace. 
 
Chapter Seven traces change of political strategies in the wake of online political 
engagements gaining momentum and attracting a higher online interaction among 
activists and diaspora communities. Online interactions have significantly increased in 
the new millennium and with the political rivalries between pro-LTTE and dissidents 
coming out in the open after 2004. Cyberspace has become a key battle ground with both 
parties reiterating the need to maintain a ‘higher level of presence’ online and improve 
‘effectiveness’ of online strategies. The chapter investigates the forms of Tamil diaspora 
politics online, mainly looking at my respondents’ claims that it opened political 
opportunities in cyberspace for diasporan political activists. I also look at the claims 
made by respondents about shifts in political strategies in dealing with cyberspace, 
which is qualitatively different and requires different expertise.  
 
Chapter Eight focuses on the changing nature of cyber conflict mainly based on the 
experiences of political activists. In cyber politics, cyber attacks and cyber conflict is 
focused on attempts to disrupt web services and hacking into web sites or defacing them. 
These political tactics of conflict in cyberspace were also utilized by the LTTE. 
According to Vatis (2001) they are the first terror outfit to launch a cyber terror attack. In 
this chapter I focus on changing strategies of the LTTE, from adopting new strategies of 
cyber attacks which focuses not only on attacking rival web sites but deploying 
personalised attacks on political activists. The chapter also focuses on the intense web 
attacks and battles waged between the LTTE and dissidents. I highlight that the dissident 
response to LTTE attacks are becoming more similar to that of the attacks used by the 
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LTTE on disssidents. This chapter along with Chapter Seven argues that a change of 
political strategies have effected a shift in political priorities among diaspora activists 
from being totally focused on developments in Sri Lanka to more immediate issues 
created  in the process of intense cyber rivalries.  
 
Both in sections Two and Three I discuss an issue the activists raised in the interviews 
and that was evident in web sites captured through Web Sphere Analysis. The crux of 
their argument was based on their experiences and observations on the extent to which 
violence or dynamics of actual conflicts can be transplanted in mediated environments 
such as the internet and its real life effects as they unfold in cyberspace. The respondents 
spoke of ‘cyber conflict’ and accused the LTTE operatives of carrying out ‘cyber terror 
campaigns’, by which they meant the targeting of dissident activists in web campaigns 
that have expanded into personal spaces such as ‘family and ‘home’. My respondents 
claimed such internet generated violence made them adopt added measures to evade 
being targeted and develop counter measures such as identifying LTTE operatives and 
attack them online. These online engagements have triggered issues based on personal 
rivalries to dominate political priorities among political activists. In Section Two, I 
explore this issue in Chapter Four in the sense of its importance as being part of a power 
struggle within cyberspace and in Chapter Eight I discuss the role of such individualized 
cyber attacks, as an effective ‘dirty tactic’ in diaspora politics, which has far reaching 
effects in comparison to pre the internet dirty political strategies. These political tactics 
have complicated the political priorities among Tamil diasporans as the internet with its 
reach and speed has the effect of creating new issues based on personal scandals. These 
personal scandals dominate the political battles rather than issues pertaining to the ethnic 
conflict. This was captured in ‘web storms’ which are introduced in Chapter Four over 
issues such as the European Union Ban on the LTTE and LTTE air attacks. I show that 
these political issues generated using web space was not related to the EU ban or the air 
attack, but were muddled with political action in the context of the ban. I explore these 
issues in an attempt to respond to the larger question this thesis raises, such as how 
internet politics has affected the lives of Tamil diasporan politics and what difference 





My research was specifically looking at online web developments between 2006 to 
middle of 2008. From late 2008 to early 2009 there was a sharp rise of web activity 
among all parties involved in the Sri Lanka ethnic conflict, especially through the 
blogosphere or blog based web interactivity. These included, blogs exclusively setup 
for discussing the developments in the ethnic conflict such as 
www.defencewire.blogspot.com, www. ellalanforce.blogspot.com and www. 
puligal.blogspot.com. Citizen journalistic blogs such as www.groundviews.org/ saw 
an increased participation of bloggers later towards 2008. There was a rise of 
bloggers and blog activity at the height of the Eelam War Four or the ongoing phase 
and as many speculated, to be the final phase of the military engagement in the Sri 
Lankan ethnic conflict. In my research this aspect of web activity is not discussed, as 
my field work and online research was carried out prior to this period of increased 
blog based web engagements. There were blogs during the time of my research. 
Some web sites such as Tamilaffairs.com that I discuss in this thesis are based on 
blog formats, but the rapid increase of bloggers and blog visitors is seen later in 2008 
and 2009.  
 
This thesis seeks to respond to the three key questions I have raised in this introduction 
while bringing out the complicated nature of web politics drawing from the experiences 
and observations of my respondents backed by online research conducted periodically 








Sri Lankan Tamil diasporan political engagements in cyberspace are the key focus of this 
thesis.  The thesis explores the impact of cyberspace and online technologies on the lives 
of Tamil diaspora political activists in the process of political engagements, exploring 
the possible dimensions of cyberspace, from being a mere communication medium to 
becoming a point of struggle with a possibility of it being a resource for political 
mobilization. This chapter, along with chapters Two and Three forms the key launching 
pad of the thesis situating the history of the ethnic conflict and introduce Tamil diaspora 
politics and research methodologies used in the research design of my thesis. These 
chapters explore developments of online politics of Tamil diaspora from information 
gained from my fieldwork in London and based on online research into Tamil diaspora 
politics. This chapter introduces three key things: the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka; the 
formation of the Tamil diaspora parallel to the conflict; and finally a short literature 
analysis of theories on diaspora studies mainly of diasporan politics, to understand which 
theory is best suited to analyse Tamil diasporan political activism. It also introduces 
current research into online politics and diaspora politics online, while situating my own 
research and underscoring distinct features embedded in its form and process 
 
1.2 Ethnic conflict 
 
Literature on the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict from the rise of Tamil nationalism and its 
transformation into militant nationalism covers a wide spectrum of academic writing 
from anthropology to political science. In a general synthesis these analyses of the 
conflict tend to be focused either on the rise of Tamil nationalism and its systematic 
radicalization as a symptom of crisis within Tamil society or as a reaction to an 
oppressive Sinhala dominated state (Wickramasinghe 2006: 253).  
 
Bose (1994) claims that the state making process was flawed in Sri Lanka as the state did 
not create the necessary capacities to accommodate Tamil aspirations. The national 
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identity forged in this process of being a Sri Lankan was not satisfying the Tamil people. 
He also identifies the Sri Lankan conflict as a modern problem where ethnic identity was 
mobilized by political agents representing modern political institutions. These included 
political forces such as political parties that emerged with the introduction of liberal 
political institutions. Bose points out: 
Sinhala – Tamil polarisation far from being the continuation of an ancient 
conflict rooted in ‘primordial’ ties, is in actuality a development peculiar to the 
second half of the Twentieth century (1994: 47) 
 
Bush (2003) argues that the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict cannot be understood using a 
primordial lens, as such analysis would disregard changes that take place over time on 
culture and identity of ethnic groups. The ethnic group identities that are in contestation 
are modern categories of social and cultural expression of identities. The analysis of 
Tamil nationalism and ethnic conflict has several dimensions which range from issues of 
problems of democratic institutions, lack of political will to post colonial state making in 
Sri Lanka. 
 
Neil DeVotta (2004) locates the conflict roots in the context of Sri Lanka’s transition in 
early 1950’s from a traditional to a modern society. He claims that the Sinhala language 
was used as a political tool and a policy to empower and unite the Sinhala communities 
polarizing Sinhala and Tamil relationships. DeVotta claims: the ‘Sinhala only’ 
movement led to the formation of an ethnocracy and ‘ethnic outbidding’, which led to 
the marginalization of the Tamil minority and undermined Tamils’ confidence in state 
institutions (2004: 4). DeVotta’s (2004) argument of linguistic nationalism and its 
manifestation in culture and in modern institutions illuminates that the Tamils were 
deprived of the ability to adapt to the changing social and economic structures in Sri 
Lanka where community empowerment was critical in the transition to an industrial 
society.  
 
Following on from these analyses of the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka I approach it as a 
conflict for space. I use the term space both in the sense of space as a political location 
and space as the power and ability for human agency to function with the ability for 
political expression, political mobilization to developing social relationships. I argue that 
Tamils in Sri Lanka lost a space for politics when the majoritarian Sinhala politics took 
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over the realm of the control of social, political and cultural spaces since independence 
in 1948. The current arguments for the rise of Tamil and Sinhala nationalism are based 
on the polarization of political power, social control, control of the economy and the 
modern institutions that empowerment of individuals and the community. The 
importance of the arguments from Bose (1994), Krishna (1999), DeVotta (2004) and 
Rotberg (1999) is the focus on the rise of tensions between the Sinhala and Tamils as a 
production of modern forces. They locate their arguments in the processes of social 
polarization between Tamils and Sinhala through modern politics and political 
institutions of representation and its failures to accommodate the plurality of the Sri 
Lankan society.  
 
Thus I claim these polarizations have occurred as a result of intense contestation and 
desire to dominate spaces of political power and space for empowerment in the Sri 
Lankan polity. The Sinhala mobilization, the ability for the Sinhala political forces to 
dominate spaces of power and institutions of power, has given the Sinhala dominated 
state the ability to restrict and control the lives of Tamils. Restrictions were imposed on 
Tamils’ access to means and tools for their upward mobility in the society, creating a 
control mechanism to filter them from gaining higher positions in the new post-colonial 
society. 
 
1.2.1 Ethnic categories  
 
I would like to introduce the ethnic categories in Sri Lanka as this identification deals 
with where my respondents came from originally. The main distinction in Sri Lanka 
between the ethnic identities is constructed through a linguistic divide. This is between 
the Sinhala and Tamil speakers. Tamil is also spoken by the majority of Muslims in Sri 
Lanka forming the second minority group apart from the Tamils. Minorities such as 
Malays, and Burghers1 speak Sinhala and Tamil as well. The population in Sri Lankan is 
divided mainly according to ethnicities. According to this ethnic division the Sinhala 
community makes 74% of the population constituting the main ethnic group. The Sri 
Lankan Tamils are mainly located in the North and East of the country and make out 
11.7% of the population and Indian Tamils represent (19th century migrants for work on 
                                                   
1 A minority community in Sri Lanka mainly consisting of  a lineage originating from the intermarriage of 
colonials with local women during all colonial periods which include Portuguese, Dutch and English  
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plantations) 5.6% of the population. The Muslims constitute the third largest ethnic 
group in Sri Lanka at 7%.2 The ethnic differences and tensions have now evolved into a 
full blown ethnic conflict where ethnic Tamils are fighting for a separate state in Sri 
Lanka.  
 
1.2.2 Colonial technologies of governance 
 
The pre colonial Sri Lanka, until around 17th century, had three political centres and 
these three political spaces were autonomous regional powers. One of these kingdoms 
was under Tamil rulers and was located around Jaffna in the North of Sri Lanka. Bose 
argues: ‘These medieval states often had diffused boundaries, marked by zones of 
intermittent influence. All that had become history by the nineteenth century’ (1994: 43). 
He is trying to bring out the significant difference in governance and political identities 
of the Sri Lankans in pre-colonial and colonial times. These methods of governance were 
instrumental in pitting newly created political identities against each other in competitive 
political spaces such as representative political institutions.  
 
Many of the tensions that arose between the ethnic categories are attributed to the 
colonial technologies of governance, especially during the British rule (1815 – 1947). 
Though the colonial policies of political representation paved the way for the 
polarization and solidifying of ethnic identities, it is widely accepted that the British did 
not have a plan to divide the communities in the initial setup of institutions of political 
representation in Sri Lanka. But such technologies of governance eventually became a 
solid division among communities and political elites based on ethnic identity, which the 
colonial rulers exploited. The ethnic identity division between the Sinhalese and the 
Tamils based on a political power struggle was harnessed by the colonial rulers based on 
a policy of divide and rule for the ease of governance.  
 
This process was initiated in 1833 by the introduction of a legislative council composed 
of British and Sri Lankan representatives. The key aspect of the form of representation 
for these councils was that it was based on ‘communal representation’ and it was the first 
                                                   
2 Sri Lankan ethnic groups http://countrystudies.us/sri-lanka/38.htm; more information on statistics on Sri 





time the term was used in the political jargon related to Sri Lankan politics. This form of 
representation had long term impact in the community which later on led to political 
polarizations of ethnic identities. A salient feature of colonial rule was its constant 
expansion of administration and also attempts to get these administrative areas under one 
central mechanism. Bose observes that the British used coercive power in this process of 
expansion and unification of areas in Sri Lanka and it also led to the local sovereignties 
being replaced by what he called: ‘a single monolithic, impersonal, indivisible and alien 
sovereignty’ (1994: 43). 
 
This system of distribution of political power and the importance of ethnic category as a 
necessary qualification to become a politician created the platform for the emergence of 
a breed of politicians who were hardcore representatives of ethnicities and ethnic 
interests. This resulted in the polarized representation of the legislative body introduced 
through the reforms of 1930, which will be discussed later in the text. Local 
representatives for the legislative council introduced in 1833 were made up different 
races. These nominations were attributed to the colonial view of Sri Lanka as a multi 
ethnic and a pluralist society. The 1833 reforms which fundamentally remained un-
changed for nearly a century facilitated a significant political division among the 
ethnicities and political elites. Colonial rulers strategically started playing ethnic 
identities against each other by the early 20th century. The rift between the Sinhalese and 
the Tamil leadership surfaced in the aftermath to the elections for the reformed 
Legislative Council in early 1921, which returned thirteen Sinhalese from territorial 
constituencies as against three Tamils. In 1923, then Governor Manning made certain 
reforms to the representation of the Legislative Council which brought in 8 Tamils and 
16 Sinhalese, an obvious stark misrepresentation of the communities, where Tamils 
represented 11% of the population with the Sinhalese 67%. In this case Manning was 
responding to the emerging nationalist movements namely the Sinhala Buddhist 
movement.  
 
In 1931 a major constitutional reform came as a result of the Donoughmore 
Commission; it was responsible for the creation of the Donoughmore Constitution which 
came into effect from 1931-47. This reform paved the way for abolishing communal 
representation which earlier was introduced and sustained through reforms of 1833. The 
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1931 constitution introduced representation from a realm of equal citizen to a 
numerically proportionate representative of all ethnic groups, in other words devising a 
system of political and economic power matching the numeric proportion of ethnicities. 
Krishna (1999: 51) criticizes the liberal ideal of representation and the postcolonial 
manifestation of it in Sri Lanka. These reforms of 1931 were met with suspicion and 
disappointment by the minority ethnic groups who believed the constitution would 
ensure the dominance of the Sinhala majority; they argued, at the least, for constitutional 
safeguards for the rights of minority ethnic groups. However, the constitution was 
enacted in the face of minority protests and their fears turned into fact when the first 
board of ministers under the new constitutional system was made solely out of the 
Sinhalese representatives.  
 
As ‘being Sinhalese’ became an important political identity and a battle cry for political 
activists, this was powered on by the emerging and powerful religious revivalist 
movement. The Temperance movement in 1903 – 1905 was a key driver in mobilizing 
the Sinhala Buddhist identity. One of the key leaders of this movement was Anagarika 
Dharmapala. DeVotta (2004) claims Dharmapala played a key role in fusing Buddhism 
with Sinhala ethnic identity and popularizing this hybrid identity as the most superior in 
the country. DeVotta also notes that by creating this superior identity Dharmapala was 
able to equate Buddhism and patriotism (2004: 31). Buddhism also became a strong 
counter-measure to Tamil nationalism and deterred policy decisions to rectify the 
grievances of Tamil people. The rapid popularization of Buddhism came in the form of 
collective practices such as the Vesak3 celebration and it generated the ‘othering’ for the 
Sinhala psyche, the ‘others’ included the British and minorities such as Christians and 
Tamil Hindus (Wickramasinghe 2006: 87). Spencer points out, Buddhism and its ability 
to bring out the revival of the Sinhala as a race was an ideal symbolic tool for politicians 
since 1931, used to address a Sri Lankan society riddled with caste, class, regional 
matrix (1990: 20). This is the key reason why even now the arguments of Sinhala 
majoritarianism still center on the necessity to protect Buddhism and the Sinhala people.  
 
                                                   
3 This is the most important date in the Buddhist calendar in Sri Lanka and many other Buddhist countries; 
it commemorates the Lord Buddha's birth, enlightenment, and death (attainment of nirvana). It is celebrated 





The tensions between the majority Sinhalese and minority Tamils grew in the post 
independence governance of Sri Lanka, as each government since 1948 engineered 
policy changes affecting the Tamils in Sri Lanka (Wilson 2000). The earliest were the 
colonization movements, massive irrigation projects, where Sinhala families were 
resettled in traditionally Tamil and Muslim communities disturbing communal 
relationships brought through sudden changes of people movement and settlement.  
 
1956 was a critical year in the history of Sinhala Tamil tensions as an ultra nationalist 
government was brought to power through a majority Sinhalese vote. This government 
in June 1956 introduced the Official Language Act, declaring Sinhala to be the sole 
linguistic medium of administration and education to be implemented over a five year 
period. DeVotta (2004: 69) suggests that as soon as the state moved away from a 
traditional society with the establishment of development structures and state policy 
exercised through multiple layers of bureaucratic structures, language became an 
important medium. It gave the Sinhala the priority and dismissed the Tamils’ capability 
to negotiate these structures. Devotta (2004) also observes that sidelining of the Tamils 
from new political and social institutions facilitated by linguistic nationalism mobilized 
the Tamils for the ethnic conflict. The Sinhala language act made the Sri Lankan state be 
the sole guardian of the Sinhala language, Bush points out that with the Bandaranaike 
rule ‘the protection and maintenance of sinhala cultural identity shifted from the realm of 
non state cultural institutions (Sangha-order of the Buddhist monks, schools) to the 
realm of state.’ (2003:186). 
 
Though this Act was later reviewed to accommodate Tamil in 1958, the politico-
ideological change that occurred in tandem with this language shift was perceived by 
Tamil political leadership as a pre-calculated and well planned political act of isolating 
and alienating Tamils from all political and administration functions of Sri Lanka. The 
Sinhala language movement influenced policy reforms seriously affected the day-to-day 
social life of Tamil people. It curtailed the spaces available for negotiating their lives and 
triggered a continuous shrinking of opportunities towards upward mobility in social 
status and access to higher echelons of public life. The Sinhala only policy not only was 
symbolic in creating hegemonic spaces for the Sinhala nation it also enforced the 
insecurities that were being garnered by political leaders of the Sinhala nation. Bush 
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(2003) identifies this as a siege mentality which has effected the Sinhala nationalists. 
Bose (1994) points out contradicting views on ethnicity and identity between the 
Sihalese and the Tamils manifested into competing chauvinisms that drove the two main 
political parties in Sri Lanka. Both parties did tried to out gun each other inorder to 
represent their abilities to champion the requirements and playing into the fears of the of 
the Sinhala community.  
 
Thus the quest for nation building in Sri Lanka, or securing the nation, is premised on 
practices that generate multiple insecurities (Krishna 1999: 209). This has driven the 
state to a problematic situation where inconsistencies between nation building and social 
integration were never resolved. Tambiah (1986) locates this as a product of 
modernization, and a result of mature colonization based on Victorian racial theory of 
world divided into distinct races or kinds of people (Spencer 1990: 8). Representation in 
colonial institutions, the system of representation and elite formation all contributed to 
the creation of a divide.  
 
The fissure widened between the two ethnic groups, with a widening gap between the 
Sinhala state and the Tamil leadership, and further constitutional changes saw the 
aggravation of the tensions and the polarization of the two communities. The Sri Lankan 
state itself became increasingly politically authoritarian throughout the 1970s. This was 
reflected in the republican constitution of 1972 introduced by the SLFP4 government, as 
it removed all safe guards entrenched in the previous constitution protecting minority 
rights, while making Buddhism the official state religion. To add more injury to the 
already insulted Tamil psyche, a policy of education standardization was carried out 
which adversely affected young people from areas such as Jaffna. State policies began 
shrinking spaces available for the Tamil community for emancipation, state initiated 
disempowerment strategies of Tamils reached its peak with the 1973 University 
admission based on population of the province. Northern Tamils suffered tremendously 
                                                   
4 The two main political parties that have dominated and still dominate Sri Lanka are the UNP, the United 
National Party and the SLFP, the Sri Lankan Freedom Party. These two parties have swapped power 
between them in government. In the recent past these two parties have lost significant voter bases to lesser 
parties but still have managed to be in power through alliances stuck with minority or lesser parties. There 
are some significant differences in policies between the two but that is not explored in this thesis as its not 




with highly educated Tamils missing out on University entrance, as only a lesser number 
could get in because of this provincial quota system.  
 
In the early 1970s, several Tamil political groups, including the Tamil Congress and the 
Federal Party, formed the Tamil United Front (TUF). This conglomerate adopted a 
demand for an independent state in 1976, calling for a ‘secular, socialist state of Tamil 
Eelam,’ and renamed itself as the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF). The general 
election of July 1977 saw TULF winning eighteen seats in the legislature, including all 
fourteen seats contested in the Jaffna Peninsula in the Northern Province of Sri Lanka. 
The electoral platform for their victory was the pledge to support an autonomous Tamil 
state. 
 
In 1977 the United National Party (UNP) came into power with the leadership of J.R. 
Jayawardene. Though this new leadership positioned itself as the epitome of democracy 
and liberalism, the positioning of the nation building process became more exclusive. 
J.R Jayawardene introduced a constitution consolidating power around the executive 
presidency. The enactment of the Prevention of Terrorist Act 1979 introduced draconian 
and inhumane treatment of both Sinhalese and Tamils. J.R. Jayawardene’s vision of a Sri 
Lankan society was to be the ultimate guardian of Buddhism and the Sinhalese heritage 
which transformed the state’s outlook shifting it to become a garrison state in the 
Laswellian5 sense. Thus post 1977 violence unleashed on Tamils was not regarded as a 
crime against the citizens of Sri Lanka. These policies and actions led the tensions 
between the Sinhala state and the Tamil political activists to spill out in the form of an 
ethnic conflict by early 1980s. 
 
 
In response to the fortification of a Sinhala state in the name of nation building in Sri 
Lanka and the failures of the mainstream Tamil political parties to persuade the 
government to look into the grievances of Tamil people, militancy automatically became 
the next best alternative to fill this vacuum. As Wilson argues, these new militant 
                                                   
5 Harold Laswell, an American political scientist, introduced the concept of a garrison state in the Sixties to 
explain the structural mechanics of the Soviet Union and its client states in east Europe during the Cold 
War. The garrison state hypothesis was used in different contexts to identify from explaining militarized 
dictatorships to powerful regimes in East Asia. I use this in the context of the  
Sinhalization of the state apparatus during early 20 century Sri Lankan polity 
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formations were expressions of preserving Tamil nationalism. He claims, ‘the 
nationalism of Tamils is defensive and reactive against Sinhala exclusivism, they 
essentially wanted to preserve what they had. Their territory, their culture what they 
always wanted was to maintain their status quo, as it existed in British times, the 
qualitative differences in nationalism’ (2000:12). Thus by the late 1970s there were an 
assortment of Tamil militant organizations some in nascent form, all bearing abbreviated 
names: LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam), EPRLF (Eelam Peoples 
Revolutionary Liberation Front), PLOTE (Peoples Liberation Organization of Tamil 
Eelam), TELO (Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization) and ENDLF (Eelam National 
Democratic Liberation Front). They could be distinguished by their geographic support 
bases and certain significant political ideological differences. For example the Uma 
Maheshwaran-led PLOTE was an overtly Marxist organization. The LTTE, a key 
organization, had its support base in Jaffna in the Northern Province, while Eastern 
province support was mainly expressed to the EPRLF.  
 
In 1976 the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) was formed by Velupillai 
Prabhakaran, the LTTE’s precursor was the organization named as Tamil New Tigers 
formed in 1972. State relations with minorities worsened throughout the 1980s and the 
Northern Province became a virtually militarized zone. In a short span of time during the 
80’s, the LTTE (Tamil Tigers) gained the upper hand among the militant organizations, 
after a series of bloody turf wars and internal feuds in which they successfully eliminated 
rivals and emerged as the powerhouse of the Tamil militancy movement. The LTTE 
ascendancy materialised as an attempt to break free from the Sinhala dominated Sri 
Lankan nation state which was stifling the Tamil community. The Tamils were losing 
the political space in Sri Lanka to locate themselves and be accepted as equal citizens 
and they were being deprived of spaces of political, social and economic engagement. 
Thus Bose argues that the rise of the LTTE amidst this was a sign of the ‘changing in 
social relationship and power relationships within the Tamil society’ (1994: 34). The 
LTTE put forward the most potent way of breaking free from the hegemony of the 
Sinhala dominated Sri Lankan state by introducing the need to fight for a separate state 
for the Tamils. It enabled the LTTE to register their authority over the state of affairs of 
the Tamil community by introducing a social program which Bose claimed was 
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‘subordinate and secondary to the central and overarching goal of national 
liberation’.(1994: 35). 
 
In July 1983, the LTTE demonstrated that they could challenge the Sri Lankan state by 
successfully ambushing and killing thirteen Sri Lankan government soldiers in the North 
of the country. This was the first large scale ambush on the Sri Lankan armed forces. 
This ambush triggered a violent social backlash in the South of Sri Lanka Sinhala 
dominated communities, the coercion Sinhalese community could exert to subjugate the 
ethnic Tamils were demonstrated when organized mobs under the direction of certain 
ministers in the government began descending on the capital city and other main cities in 
the country and left behind a spate of killings. Their victims, Tamil civilians, were 
ruthlessly murdered, their belongings looted and their assets burned. Tambiah (1986) 
describes this as an orgy of violence, unleashed against the ordinary Tamil civilians in 
Sri Lanka. The aftermath of 1983 riots intensified and internationalized the ethnic 
conflict and created a massive Tamil exodus out of Sri Lanka. The most important fall 
out for the Tamils from this event was that it clearly confirmed what the Sri Lankan 
nation state’s sovereign space could not guarantee safety for its Tamil citizens.  
 
Thiruchelvam (1999) points out that since the 1950s with the state becoming more 
monolithic and representing more and more of Sinhala nationalist agenda there were 
periods of what he called ‘collective violence’ unleashed against the Tamils in 1958, 
1977 and 1981. Thiruchelvam categorises the 1983 violence as the most distinct of them 
by claiming: ‘neither time nor space has helped to ease pain, the trauma and the bitter 
memories’ (1999: 191). The riots signified the final phase in the de-linking of ethnic 
Tamil people from the political place of the Sri Lankan state, or severing of the umbilical 
cord of citizenship and the liberal rights of a citizen from the state. The riots 
demonstrated that there was no safe space for the Tamils and as Bush (2003) observes 
created the conditions for an unprecedented shift into a rapid militarization of the 
conflict.  
 
The final political uprooting of the Tamil claims came in the form of the Sixth 
Amendment to the Constitution (introduced in the aftermath of the 1983 riots), which 
basically demanded an oath of allegiance to a unitary state from all Members of 
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Parliament if they were to continue with their elected post as MPs. The amendment 
which sailed through the Sinhala dominated legislature was certified on 8 August 1983 
inflicting a mortal political wound on the Tamil community who had suffered violently 
at the hands of Sinhala mobs earlier. The Sixth Amendment successfully ejected the 
largest Tamil composition of MPs in the history of Sri Lankan democracy from the 
legislature. This eviction dislocated the Sri Lankan Tamils’ political ambitions of self-
determination, self-rule and Tamil voice from the pivotal political power structure of the 
Sri Lankan state. 
 
The riots and the Sixth Amendment took away from the Tamil people their right to 
inherit a political space, through social violence and the sheer brute force upheld through 
a constitutional sanction. This led to the radical departure from democratic politics by 
certain Tamil organizations which wanted to claim their own state within Sri Lanka. 
Although the notions of self-rule and homeland were accepted by Tamil politicians in 
early 1970s, military struggle was not on the cards. These two incidents sealed the need 
for a military struggle and establishment of a Tamil nation state independent from Sri 
Lanka, which was termed as ‘Tamil Eelam’ or ‘Tamil homeland.’ The LTTE attacks on 
military personnel and installations gathered pace during 1985 – 1986. 
 
The Indian factor is extremely important in the analysis of the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict. 
At the early stages of the Tamil militancy the South Indian state of Tamil Nadu was the 
haven for most militants. Though not overtly but covertly the Indian state was nurturing 
these militant movements. After J.R. Jayawardene came to power in 1977 the Indian 
government was wary of his pro-Western outlook especially at a time of the cold war. 
DeVotta (2004) argues that the Jayawardene regime, by taking a pro-Western stance in 
acts such as supporting in principle the British government’s involvement in the 
Falklands war, opposing the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, trying to enter into defence 
pact with Britain and trying to lease the strategically important Trincomalee oil farm to a 
US interest and agreement with the US to host transmission station for Voice of America 
made Indians deeply concerned about its neighbour (2004: 156). He highlights the 
government’s security network linking with the Israeli secret service Mossad and using 
ex-British special forces to train Sri Lankan military which may have affected Indian 
uneasiness over the strategic presence of too many western security organizations. Bose 
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(1994) points out that Indian backing to the militants was channeled through its external 
intelligence agency Research and Analysis Wing (RAW). The principle beneficiary was 
TELO. He claims this was because the Indian government was cautious about the 
strength and the threat the LTTE could pose and thus it nurtured an organization which 
could be deployed to counter the LTTE. In the same time it is clear that the Indian 
government used the LTTE as a tactical ploy to destabilize the Sri Lankan government 
and its repercussions expanded beyond this tactic. DeVotta (2004) argues that Indian 
support gave the Tamil militancy the ability to be a lethal and formidable force.  
 
In August 1985 India managed to broker peace talks between key Tamil militant 
organizations and the Sri Lankan government. These talks were held in the capital of 
Buthan, Thimpu. The LTTE used the time of the talks to purge many other opposition 
militant groups. The peace talks did not yield a substantial outcome. By 1986 the Sri 
Lankan armed forces started actively engaging the LTTE and the culmination of this was 
a massive military operation codenamed ‘Operation liberation’. The big push by the Sri 
Lankan armed forces commenced on 26 May 1987 with the objective of pushing out the 
LTTE from their key strongholds. The technologies of military hardware were greatly 
improved as it was the first time the Sri Lankan army was deployed to quell an armed 
uprising of this magnitude, which was far higher than the Marxist JVP (Janatha 
Vimukthi Peramun /Peoples Liberation Front) uprising in 1971. This assault and the 
impact it had on the civilian population in Jaffna the key Northern city, made India get 
involved in Sri Lankan internal affairs by attempting to airdrop food supplies to the 
population of Jaffna. Failing such attempts to end the Sri Lankan military offensive India 
exercised an aggressive diplomatic manoeuvre by intervening actively in the conflict. 
Smith points out ‘Delhi sent clear signals that it would not stand by to see Jaffna fall to 
the security forces’ (Smith 1999: 19).Through this intervention, India declared itself a 
facilitator of a political settlement to end the conflict. The facilitation brought in the 
package of a peace process and devolution proposal. In July 1987 Indian Premier Rajiv 
Gandhi and the Sri Lankan President J.R Jayewardene signed the Indo-Lankan Accord. 
The Accord was designed to provide an end to all hostilities and the surrender of arms. 
Under this Accord the conflict affected North and the East would be made into a single 




The Accord was met with significant mistrust and opposition from the Sinhalese public. 
As a direct result of the pact the Indian government sent the IPKF (Indian Peace Keeping 
Force) to institute the Indo-Lankan Accord in the North and East of Sri Lanka. The IPKF 
was soon seeing battle by the end of 1987 with the LTTE. The IPKF goverend in the 
North and East through alliances with militant organizations which were against the 
LTTE, mainly EPRLF, PLOTE and TELO. The IPKF failed to dislodge the LTTE and 
also sustained heavy casualties in the process. The military intervention was counter 
productive in the context of the conflict as it enabled the LTTE to garner the support of 
the Tamil population (Smith 1999). Bose, in an detailed criticism of the manner in which 
India handled this situation, claims the Indian state failed miserably to take the political 
forces and mass appeal of Tamil nationalism seriously (1994: 171). He goes on to 
identify the high handed tactics of the IPKF which instead of winning over the people 
lost both the support for India of the Tamils in Sri Lanka and strengthened the LTTE. He 
brands it as a totally ‘counter productive intervention’ (1994: 172).  
 
Ranasinghe Premadasa6 who succeeded J.R.Jayawardene as the president struck a 
strange alliance with the LTTE in 1988 and successfully forced the Indian peace keeping 
force to withdraw in 1990 with the assurance of peace talks directly between him and the 
LTTE. This withdrawal created a power vacuum in the North and the East enabling the 
LTTE to systematically wipe out its enemies, especially the collaborators of the IPKF, 
the Tamil National Army which was made up of TELO and ENDLF members. This 
purging of dissent by the LTTE was done simultaneously while engaging in peace talks 
with the Sri Lankan government.  
 
The 1990s saw the LTTE growing beyond a terrorist outfit, by becoming more of a 
conventional military force, introducing a military hierarchy and different regiments in 
its ranks. At the same time it actively established institutional networks in the areas it 
controlled by gradually building up the infrastructure required to be declared as a 
separate state. The peace talks between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government in 
                                                   
6 President Ranasinghe Premadasa was the second executive President of Sri Lanka and he came to power 
through the Presidential election of 1989 succeeding J. R. Jayawardene. He was the long standing Prime 
Minister to Jayawardene. President Premadasa had his early roots in politics embedded with the Labour 
movement but gained strong nationalist political stance when he openly opposed the Indo Lanka deal stuck 
in 1987. He was quite vociferous in attacking the Indian regime and had the IPKF removed as soon as he 
came to power and brokered a cease fire with the LTTE. He was involved in a controversial arms supplying 
acheme to the LTTE to battle the IPKF. 
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1990 broke down in 1991, with the LTTE attacking a Muslim village, massacring 
civilians and killing over 700 policemen who surrendered to them under a false 
assurance of safety. The 1990s were the most successful time for the LTTE in the history 
of the 30 year old conflict. in this time line they became famous for ruthlessness with the 
assassination of former Indian premier Rajiv Gandhi in 1991 using a suicide female 
bomber. In 1993 the LTTE assassinated President Premadasa deploying another suicide 
bomber. The assassination of Premadasa led to the formation of a caretaker government 
in the country until the 1994 general election. The 1994 elections heralded the end of 
UNP power in government after 17 years and brought in a SLFP led ‘Peoples Alliance’ 
(PA) into power under the leadership of Chandrika Kumaratunga.  
 
President Kumaratunga introduced a peace package which was aimed at solving the 
ethnic problem and putting an end to the conflict. The LTTE came back into negotiations 
but broke off talks in 1995. The devolution package proposed by the PA government 
was shot down by ultra nationalists and the UNP. This type of political sniping at each 
other between the two major political parties has been a key factor since the inception of 
the conflict, as such political discontent could not respond to the needs of the Tamil 
people. Such signs of political inability of governments in the South have made the 
LTTE thrive, gaining trust among the Tamil people and at the same time justifying its 
struggle against the Sri Lankan state. 
 
LTTE used suicide attacks on two naval vessels in 1995 and withdrew from talks with 
the government. The government responded with a massive military operation once the 
LTTE pulled out of the talks. After this military operation, the LTTE lost control of 
Jaffna, but they responded with counter military operations with equal force which saw 
the government losing control of strategic locations in the North and the East. With these 
military gains, the LTTE assumed virtual control of the regions. They started 
establishing the contours of a nation state while setting up a nascent administrative 
apparatus which steadily grew over time. 
 
The LTTE international network grew out of nascent arms smuggling operations using 
South India as a logistical back bone. Soon the LTTE developed a self-sustained 
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international network funded by illegal maritime operations, diaspora funding and 
investment in assets such as real estate in Western countries. Smith argues that the initial 
reason for the LTTE to go global was to establish an arms procurement network (1999: 
32). This network, Smith (1999) points out, expanded from Singapore to Cambodia and 
Burma and, with the fall of the Soviet Union, to Ukraine, Bulgaria and Slovakia. The 
LTTE international network also tapped the diaspora communities in the West. The 
LTTE established front offices and proxy organizations which were at their disposal for 
channeling funds, arms procurement and lobbying western governments. Bush (2003) 
claims, that the LTTE international networks had a large amount of influence in the 
Western world with a well organized diplomatic lobby. He brings out two classic 
examples to back this argument. The first is the LTTE hiring a top US law firm run by 
Ramsay Clarke, a former attorney general in the Lyndon B. Johnson administration, to 
challenge Washington’s 1997 decision to label the group as a terrorist organization 
(2003: 63). Secondly, in May 2000 an LTTE fund raising event succeeded in having the 
Canadian Minister of Finance and Minister for International Cooperation attend a 
fundraising dinner in Toronto (2003: 64). 
 
The mid 1990s to the early 2000’s saw the LTTE performing the role of a state as they 
began regulating and controlling the resources and population of the land under their 
control. They viewed these methods as tools for effective governance. These included 
establishing a central information collection agency thus enabling them to implement a 
successful tax regime. Wilson argues that these methods were the concrete manifestation 
of a Tamil state (2000: 159). These included the establishment of Eelam police service, 
courts, a Tamil Eelam bank in 2003 and job centres. These establishments and the ability 
to link them not only with the Tamil population under the LTTE control but with the 
diaspora brought them recognition as a de facto regime along with diaspora generated 
funding. Gunaratne claims in the 1990s LTTE revenue peaked at $100 million, of which 
$60 million was generated from overseas (Gunaratna 2003:210).  
 
The LTTE strategically displayed its ability to resist the Sri Lankan state militarily while 
building the physical architecture of the Eelam state that they were fighting for. In these 
aspects the 1990s were the most successful period of the LTTE from its rise from a rag a 
tag militant outfit to an organized state machinery. They achieved this with a blend of 
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strong military victories and international campaigns to entrench themselves strongly in 
the Tamil diaspora. The LTTE was successful in tactically extracting resources from the 
Sri Lankan state and augmenting with its own international funding. This mode of 
capture and securing of state and international image was a very successfully sustained 
strategy for the LTTE both in combat and governance.  
 
The dawn of the millennium saw the LTTE exploiting its successes in the 1990s and 
expanding its range of military attacks as a ploy to apply pressure on the government. In 
May 2000 the LTTE launched an attack on one of the largest Sri Lankan bases the 
Elephant Pass camp complex and took control. In June 24, 2000 they deployed a suicide 
squad to storm the only international airport and cause of heavy damage to the Sri 
Lankan airlines fleet.  
 
The UNP led coalition UNF came into power in the 2001 general election with a 
mandate for peace and negotiations with the LTTE. The government led by Prime 
Minister Ranil Wickremasinghe headed for negotiations with the LTTE and with 
Norwegian mediation signed a Cease Fire Agreement with the LTTE. The result of the 
2001 December election created a unique situation in the balance of power in Sri Lanka 
it brought in a legislature from the UNP whilst the executive remained SLFP led 
People’s Alliance (PA) as the two institutions had separate election processes. This in 
theory was possible in the constitution of 1978. 
 
The political rivalry between the UNP and the SLFP and the periphery parties, especially 
Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (People’s Liberation Front) JVP/PLF and Jathika Hela 
Urumaya (National Heritage Party) JHU, led by nationalist agendas scuttled such 
cohabitation, once again leaving the LTTE to thrive on political instability in the Sinhala 
dominated south. President Kumaratunga by 2004 took over many portfolios in the 
cabinet and went for a snap election in April 2004 as the rift widened between the UNP 
and PA.  
 
Unlike the 1990s the LTTE was facing internal turmoil in its organization just prior to 
the 2004 general election in Sri Lanka. The Eastern commander of the LTTE , 
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Vinayagamoorthi Muralitharan, alias Colonel Karuna, announced a split with the 
Northern command and acted independently. This was met violently by Prabhakaran as 
the LTTE supremo sent in troops to attack his one time most trusted battlefield 
commander. The split caused wide ranging and lasting repercussions in the LTTE 
continuing to the present with significant loses in later battles with the Sri Lankan armed 
forces as well as loss of territory. This split in the LTTE will be exmamined closely at 
various instances of my thesis later on. 
 
The Sri Lankan conflict which was driven by the continuous failure of the state to 
organize itself to respond to the needs of the Tamils was further exposed when it failed 
to deliver on the Post-Tsunami Operational Management Structure (PTOMS), a 
mechanism which was proposed to facilitate a fair distribution of Tsunami aid in 
aftermath of the Boxing Day Tsunami in 2004. Though six months after the tsunami the 
government and the LTTE agreed on a mechanism it did not come into practice. 
 
These consistent failures by the state to deliver on what some saw as the most recent 
opportunity of reconciliation between the LTTE and the government was a sign of the 
intrinsic problem of the Sri Lankan state. These failures provided the necessary impetus 
for the conflict to continue. The LTTE claimed that the Tamil people had to gain status 
of independence in the form of Eelam for their rights to be realized. In August 2005 the 
LTTE assassinated the Sri Lankan Foreign Minister and in December 2005 a new 
president was elected. The new President Mahinda Rajapaksa vowed to crush the LTTE 
militarily and fresh offensives indicate the state turning to a purely military solution to 
disarm the LTTE while accepting a political solution for the grievances of the Tamil 
people. 
 
1.2.3 Conflict drivers 
 
The Sri Lankan ethnic conflict is driven and fueled by the competing conceptions of 
nationalism (Rotberg 1999: 7) that have plagued the Sri Lankan polity. Its central 
characteristic is that the assertion of one ethnic identity is always foreseen as the denial 
of the other and the relationship between them is antagonistic, uncompromising and 
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incompatible. The force that is driving this conflict has been shaped by colonial 
encounters and colonial legacies in the post-independence era. The contestations have 
become galvanized in the perceptions and beliefs of both ethnic identities in Sri Lanka 
through the uncompromising historical and territorial imaginations that have become 
attached to it. 
 
The last three decades solidified ethnic tensions and crystallized the polarization. The 
root of the conflict may be attributed to modernization and colonialism but it should not 
be the excuse. Tamil militancy rose in the 1980s nearly four decades after Sri Lanka 
gained independence. The lack of political will on the part of political authorities in the 
country, and the entrenched Sinhala biased political institutions and leadership 
successfully became a midwife for the militant Tamil nationalist movement. As Spencer 
(1990) points out, these antagonisms were not the divisions that were represented in the 
pre colonial Sri Lanka, which reinforces belief in divisions among communities in Sri 
Lanka engineered by colonial rulers. From the early 1980’, a political system was 
created which thrived on these divisions; even Tamil politicians made their political 
programme a nationalist project. Politics in Sri Lanka from independence onwards began 
significantly drifting towards issues of identity and nation. This resulted in extreme 
polarization while creating a space for ultra nationalists. Thus the dialectic between 
nation and its various ethno nationalist fragments was critical for the production and 
reproduction of both entities (Krishna 1999: 209) the vicious cycle continued as the 
nation building project failed. 
 
Krishna (1999) provides a powerful account of the transformation of the ethnic tension 
into a conflict. His take on the whole conflict is as a ‘production’ rather than a natural 
process or ethnic antagonism that evolved into a conflict. He brings out the use of 
Sinhala and Tamil narratives of history by respective political structures to create 
extreme polarized views in the Sri Lankan civil society.  In practice the ‘Sinhala’ State 
formulated a narrative to create a powerful nation which developed this asymmetry in 
ethnic relationships. The fragmentation of ethnic ‘others’ is inevitable as parameters of a 
nation are not applicable. It came to a point when the Tamils in the North East, 
especially the youth, who were deprived of the right to education and others deprived the 




The conflict has also seen internal divisions within the two main ethnic identities as a 
factor that has contributed to violence. Bush (2003) identifies this as a critical hurdle 
which has caused many peace efforts to fail. He argues that the ethnic conflict in Sri 
Lanka is not just dominated by intra-group or intra-ethnic relations and contestations 
between these groups. These ‘inter group’ or ‘inter – ethnic arenas’ contributes to 
complicating the conflict. He claims: 
 
The pattern of communal conflict is not simply determined by the interaction of 
communal groups like the action reaction dynamic of billiard balls, it is also 




The importance of Bush’s analysis is that he locates the complicated nature of the 
conflict and the number of groups that are involved in it. He talks about the Tamil 
paramilitary organizations which are allied to the Sri Lankan government: some of them 
had been fighting the LTTE since the beginning of the conflict. The paramilitary 
organizations such as the EPDP and PLOTE have substantial following and the latest 
addition is the breakaway LTTE faction led by Karuna named as the TMVP (Tamil 
Makal Viduthali Pulikal). One key reason for the breakup in the LTTE was the 
geographic division affiliated with status in the Tamil community. LTTE cadres from 
Eastern province in Sri Lanka led by Karuna had little or no voice within the LTTE at 
decision making levels. Bush identifies them as ‘primary and secondary social 
boundaries according to which individuals define themselves, and distinguish themselves 
from others’ (2003: 14). Bose (1994) mentions this in his analysis of the conflict where 
he claims that the main two ethnic identities which are in contestation are not 
homogenous collectivities and possess entrenched internal differentiation.   
 
The conflict in Sri Lanka is further driven by the fact that the country’s constitutional 
framework is continuously failing to accommodate the key guarantees to the Tamil 
minority. Contesting forms of nationalisms could not be addressed in any constitutional 
reform in the post colonial Sri Lankan state. Edirisinha (1999) points out that even the 
current constitution, which came into force in 1978 and saw the enforcement of 
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fundamental rights, concentrates too much power in the executive. He claims that the 
notion of the supremacy of the constitution is not an acceptable factor to the lawmakers 
of the country (1999: 171). He nevertheless argues that supremacy of the constitution is 
important for the preservation of pluralist values in Sri Lankan society if different 
communities are to coexist peacefully.  
 
The weaknesses of the constitution and its ability to accommodate all communities are 
evident from the events seen from 1980 to present. They demonstrate the failure of the 
state to take solid policy decisions towards ending the conflict.  Thus the weak 
governments that came into power thanks to the Proportional Representation (PR) 
electoral system (introduced with the 1978 constitution) have failed to forge ahead and 
the periphery nationalist and extremist political parties have had the power to influence 
national decisions. The workings of this representation system have given much power 
to Sinhala nationalism and the extreme agents of it, to influence national policy 
decisions. These influences have seeped into policy decisions concerning land and 
education, services which are central to every community is prioritized through ethnicity 
and religion. Thiruchelvam argues that this is a sign of a fundamental flaw in all Sri 
Lankan constitutions because of the problem in the definition of the Sri Lankan state as 
it is embedded in the discourse of majoritarianism (1999: 191). He claims that such 
constitutional flaws need to be radically overhauled and the relationship between the 
regions and the central government needs to be redesigned through constitutional 
amendment in order to find a long lasting solution to the conflict  
 
Darini Rajasingham-Senanayake (1999) exposes another dimension to the ethnic 
conflict, especially in the post 1983 scenario, that is contributing to driving and 
sustaining the conflict. She claims: ‘Lanka’s post 1983 armed conflict has generated a 
hidden economy and new identities which provide the war with its internal momentum’ 
(1999: 58). Her analysis is based on the reconfiguration of economic relationships within 
the conflict zones and the war remittance for different political and paramilitary groups. 
She argues that the massive displacement of people as a result of the conflict leads to the 
destruction of former modes of coexistence and this leads to the emergence of new 
patterns of social and political organization (1999: 59). The Tamil paramilitary 
organizations which are funded by the military, the assignment of conflict zones to 
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paramilitary organizations with the power to charge taxes at points of entry to these 
zones and the LTTE’s own system of taxation are all evidence of this new style of 
economic relationship in the conflict theatre. Her argument can be analysed in the 
context of the expansion of the Sri Lankan armed forces and its transformation into a 
massive job creator. A classic example is the new layers of the armed forces such as the 
‘Civil defence force’, raised in April 2006 out of home guards, or village protection 
schemes introduced in the late 1980’s to protect border villages from LTTE attacks by 
arming village youth. These economic relations and shaping of social and political 
modes of life based on them may prove hard to remove and may be another factor that is 
fuelling the conflict. 
 
The conflict has entered a new phase with heightened confrontation between the Sri 
Lanka forces and the LTTE since 2006. Uyangoda (2007) views this as an endemic 
feature of the conflict where it has become self sustained and reproductive. He focuses 
on the view of power between the state and the LTTE where the LTTE is war-making in 
essence as a state making process. He makes this argument focusing on the approach to 
the conflict by the new president of Sri Lanka, Mahinda Rajapaksa who came to power 
in 2005. Rajapaksa has given total backing for an all out military push to dislodge the 
LTTE from power. Uyangoda argues, this is a process of viewing the war as, ‘a space in 
which the two sides actually negotiate their competing state formation goals’ (2007: 10). 
 
The technologies of warfare and investment in the military machinery by both parties is 
an area which have been less prominent in academic research. From the mid 1990s the 
Sri Lankan military has spent billions of rupees to upgrade its arsenal and training and 
expand military divisions. The LTTE has resorted to similar tactics and strategies by 
working on developing its ability to wage both conventional and guerrilla battle tactics. 
These technologies of warfare and the dependencies on constant military advancement 
have widened the conflict. The LTTE engineered suicide bombings, naval raids and air 
raids, making the Sri Lankan state resort to military tactics as the best option to counter 
the LTTE. Thus the technological advances are no more mutual deterrents. On the 
contrary they are the mutual accelerators of conflict, as demonstrated by the increasing 
faith in military responses from both the Sri Lankan state as well as the LTTE. The 
diaspora funding mentioned above adds up to this as the LTTE finds an abundance of 
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cash to fund its war. Similarly, the government through its allies such as Pakistan, China 
and Iran are constantly being supplied with arms and new military technology. The state 
is also buoyed by the ease of shopping around for military hardware in the Czech 
Republic, Ukraine and Slovakia thus driving the conflict forward. This has seen the 
recent spending on military continuously increase. Kelegama claims the expenditure was 
between 4.2 – 4.5 percent of the GDP and from 1995 it rose to 5.4 percent of the GDP 
(73: 1999). Military spending stands at $1.7 billion for the fiscal year of 20097; this is 
around 5% of GDP or 20% of the government’s total budget. 
 
Finally the various drivers which are fuelling the conflict and have become dynamics in 
themselves are reproducing the changes that the Sri Lankan political space has 
undergone. The spaces of life of individuals who are living through the ongoing struggle 
are shaped by their responses to the conflict. Some of these individuals form the Sri 
Lankan Tamil diaspora. Though not experiencing the conflict directly their lives are 
again shaped by the activities the LTTE has been able to carry out in many diaspora 
communities. The LTTE were able to fortify and control spaces for politics of the 
diasporans with remarkable efficiency. I am investigating the impact cyberspace in this 
context and its role in shaping politics in the Tamil diaspora. As always, people who are 
in conflict zones or in zones of control by a dominant power, transform such dominated 
spaces to suit their own needs. Especially at the time of research for this thesis, as Smith 
points out, the LTTE ‘is emerging as an enemy of populism and plurality no less than the 
forces that began the conflict in the first place’ (Smith 2007: 85). 
 
Diaspora politics is a critical sphere for the LTTE to dominate; and it required a 
spatial architecture which linked Eelam to the diasporans while integrating the 
diaspora communities into one coherent unit. They achieved this through cyberspace 
and it was not just a connection between homeland and diaspora communities. It was 
a larger space with which diaspora communities could be converged, transcending 
the barriers of the host state they were confined to.  
 
                                                   





1.3 The Tamil diaspora 
 
The Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora was the result of the historical and spatially uprooting of 
Tamil citizens from legitimate spaces of occupation. As the same conditions of the 
conflict created the Tamil diaspora, it has become an integral stake holder in the conflict 
itself. Out of the nearly two million Tamils of Sri Lankan origin, nearly one third forms 
the diaspora. The statistics and figures are mostly estimates, as no host country possesses 
exact number of Sri Lankan Tamils living within them.  
 
Recent, diaspora politics was dominated and shaped by the LTTE. The Sri Lankan Tamil 
diaspora is strategically important for the LTTE. Their presence in the diaspora is 
important for the internationalization of the conflict. The international presence of the 
LTTE is felt through the diaspora activities, as the spatial stationing of the diaspora 
community is an important access point for the Tigers to maintain their global presence. 
The diaspora is also a field for the LTTE to dominate and as the diaspora community 
forms an integral part of the Eelam the LTTE is claiming it is fighting to create. For the 
LTTE, the concept and structure of Eelam served a dual purpose, one as a mobilization 
point and secondly as the authority to exert power and domination over the diaspora. The 
LTTE while fighting for a separate homeland also had in place a nascent state.   
 
The key focus in this section will be the political potential of the Tamil diaspora and the 
nationalistic political agenda and action which the Tamil diaspora constantly reverted to. 
The actual distribution of Tamils is a contested issue. In recent research sponsored by the 
Berghof Foundation (2004) the numbers which Tamil diaspora are as follows, Canada 
(approx. 800,000), Great Britain (approx. 110,000), Switzerland (approx. 40,000), 
France (approx. 40,000) and Norway (approx. 10,000). However according to UNHCR 
statistical figures (Ganguly 2001), there are more than 800,000 Sri Lankan Tamils living 
overseas, in Canada (400,000), Europe (200,000), India (67,000), the United States 
(40,000), and Australia (30,000), with the rest (80,000) spread mostly in a dozen other 
countries. This is a similar figure provided by Venugopal (2003) where he claims the Sri 
Lankan Tamil diaspora spread out in Canada, United Kingdom, Norway and Australia 




The origins of the Tamil migratory movement are to be found in the emigration of Tamil 
professionals, workers and students in mid 1950s ,1970s and early 1980s, not only to 
Europe and North America, but also to the Middle East and South-East Asia (McDowell: 
1996; Daniel & Thangarajah 1999). Daniel and Thangarajah see the Tamil migrant 
arrivals in London falling into three phases. Phase I arrivals were drawn from elite 
families who enjoyed a cultural ease with western values. The second phase was made 
up of Tamils who were looking for educational and employment opportunities not 
available in Sri Lanka as a result of the government policies mentioned within the 
history of conflict. The third phase was made up of asylum seekers who were escaping 
the violence unleashed against Tamils in the aftermath of the 1983 riots and also during 
the different stages of the separatist war. Fuglerud (1999) points out that in the early 
1990’s when the Sri Lankan state was waging war on the LTTE, many Tamils who fled 
the war were taken care of by members of early Tamil emigrants as these new diasporans 
had to cope with the tightening asylum controls of the western states.  
 
Tamil diasporans who came in from the early phases of migration provided the social 
infrastructure required to arrange the departure of asylum seekers following the outbreak 
of the civil war. As the number of Tamils making their way to Western Europe and 
North America increased, that infrastructure grew stronger, thereby facilitating further 
asylum migration. This sequence of events provides a neat demonstration of the 
demographic principle identified by Douglas Massey, ‘once the number of network 
connections in an origin area reaches a critical level, migration becomes self-
perpetuating, because migration itself creates the social structure to sustain’ (1998).  
 
1983 is a significant point in the evolution of the conflict to a larger scale high intensity 
war and the beginning of dispersion of Tamils out of Sri Lanka on a massive scale (the 
incident behind 1983 was presented in the above paragraphs). If 1956 was the 
conjuncture of polarizing tensions, 1983 was the rupture. Post 1983 Sri Lanka saw a 
massive exodus of Tamils out of the country with a huge migratory movement to the 
West. The Tamils fleeing Sri Lanka landed in UK, Canada, and Australia and in all 
Scandinavian countries. This post 1983 exodus created the modern Sri Lankan Tamil 
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diaspora. The West at that time accepted these Tamils as asylum seekers creating a 
Tamil Asylum diaspora (McDowell 1996).   
 
Almost all of the Tamils coming out from Sri Lankan had experienced some form of 
discrimination from the state, with the post 1983 Tamils being subjected to persecution 
and violence. A significant parallel to this exodus was the development of the LTTE 
international presence and its operational strength overseas. The LTTE through its own 
international cells and other front organizations launched campaigns internationally after 
1983 on Tamil issues, while positioning their movement as a Tamil liberation struggle. 
The initial international campaign by the LTTE maps these dispersed Tamils located 
them as ‘Victim Diasporas’, even before this term was given scholarly currency through 
Cohen’s (1997: 31) work more than a decade later.  More than one third of the Tamil pre 
- war population settled outside Sri Lanka.  
 
Fuglerud (2001) argues that the cultural survival of the Sri Lanka-Tamil society to a 
larger extent relies on exile dynamics. Many diaspora association bodies have been 
formed in order to publicize the plight of Tamils in Sri Lanka and lobby host 
governments. Most of these organizations spreading from United States, United 
Kingdom, France, Norway and Australia were formed in the aftermath of the anti-Tamil 
riots in Sri Lanka. These include the Ilankai Tamil Sangam, the most active political 
group representing Sri Lankan Tamils in the United States; the Standing Committee of 
Tamil Speaking Peoples (SCOT), a London-based group concerned with providing relief 
to Tamil areas; and the Ceylon Tamil Association (Australasia) (renamed the Eelam 
Tamil Association [ETA] in 1982), a prominent Tamil community organization in 
Australia.  
 
The newly set up lobby and advocacy groups managed to mobilize within their host 
countries as well as in transnational spheres. The classic example is a London-based 
Tamil activist addressing the United Nations General Assembly in 1978 pretending to be 
the Sri Lankan foreign minister (Rajasingham 2002). The impersonator managed to 
highlight the violence unleashed on Sri Lankan Tamils before the real foreign minister 
could take his position. Sriskandarajah  points out, ‘Two decades on, perhaps the best 
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demonstration of the diaspora’s influence on Sri Lankan politics was the presence of two 
diaspora Tamils among the four official LTTE delegates to the first session of direct 
negotiations with the Sri Lankan government in September 2002’ (2004:498). 
 
There is no doubt that the activities of the LTTE are important in upholding a sense of 
common identity in exile. The LTTE seeks to suppress all internal controversy among 
the exile population and claim to be the sole representative of the Tamil people 
(Fuglerud 2001). A.C Shanthan, head of the British Tamil Association (BTA) in July 
2006 addressing a crowd in Hyde Park commemorating July 1983 events in Sri Lanka, 
said ‘We are gathered here today to send a message to the international community: you 
cannot split the Tigers and the Tamil people. They are united in their cause of 
liberation.’8 The unique feature here is that the LTTE did manage to set up a 
comprehensive international network, even before the diaspora began to take shape 
especially in the post 1983 situation (Gunaratne 1999). This is why Johnson (2003) notes 
that the Tamil diaspora is a creation of the LTTE, which I perceive as a far fetched 
analysis but signifies the organic link between the LTTE and the Tamil diaspora and the 
level of control the LTTE had on the diaspora till very recently.  
 
Thus by establishing a certain sense of working relationship with the diaspora, LTTE 
developed a huge diaspora support network among the new diasporans. It found many 
allies, while people come to accept LTTE as the main representative of the Tamil people. 
LTTE positioned itself among the diasporans as the key organization fighting for the 
establishment of a separate Tamil homeland. The network involves a huge fundraising 
arm for the acquisition of sophisticated military hardware (their arsenal includes 152mm 
and 130 mm howitzers, and suicide speed boats) and fund raising for charity work in Sri 
Lanka for Tamils affected by the conflict. The LTTE drive to establish itself as the sole 
representative of Sri Lankan Tamils was enforced most of the time through violence and 
threats to rival organizations. The internal war in Sri Lankan was extensively used by the 
LTTE to suppress the controversies of the situation, as it was the only Tamil rebel force 
fighting the Sri Lankan government. Jane’s Intelligence Review revealed in its August 
2007 edition, that the LTTE has managed to raise $ 200 to 300 million through 
                                                   
8 ________ ‘Thousands gather in Hyde Park remembrance’ 
http://www.tamilnet.com/art.html?catid=13&artid=18920 July 25 2006  
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international fund raising. These funds were made out of its international operations 
spanning from investments in businesses in the West to voluntary donations from Tamil 
diasporans and money acquired by coercion from rich Tamil businessmen and 
professionals in the diaspora.  
 
The Tamil nationalistic project among the diasporas were dominated by political 
activities organized by the LTTE; these drew in large crowds all over Europe, North 
America, Australia and South Africa. There are significant days in the diaspora calendar 
on which cultural and political activities take place every year. The July 1983 events are 
remembered and the uprising of the Tamils is celebrated; these are called the Black July 
campaigns. These range from awareness campaigns to large LTTE front office organized 
cultural events and fund raisers. November 27 is named as Heroes Day, Maveerar Nal 
where global events are held to remember the LTTE fighters who sacrificed their lives 
for rights of the Tamil people. These celebrations throughout the globe are an ideological 
attempt to link all Sri Lankan Tamils irrespective of their differences to demonstrate 
their support for the struggle. In this light LTTE until recently was the success story of 
how a movement which fights for a separate state in this tiny island country has 
developed into a major transnational player.  Krishna highlights the magnitude of this 
widespread well organized network for scholars researching on the LTTE: ‘An 
ethnographer studying the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), a militant group at 
the fore front of the Sri Lankan Tamil movement for self determination, would have a 
hard time demarcating and entering the field of her proposed ethnography: the guerrillas’ 
walkabouts now span Jaffna and Geneva, Sudumalai and Sydney’ (Krishna 1991: xxi). 
The evolution of the conflict and LTTE strategies coupled with growing dissent among 
members of the diaspora community pushed the LTTE to expand its role as dominator 
and the representative of Tamils simultaneously. 
 
Apart from these set events, the Tamil diaspora engages in other forms of nationalistic 
social and political activities, from sports festivals organized solely for Tamils to 
educational establishments in Europe which specialise in teaching Tamil culture and 
building aspirations towards a homeland (Guha 2003). These diaspora driven activities 
lead to the assertion of a strong national identity and the yearning towards a homeland. 
The researchers on Tamil diaspora formation and politics point out that the LTTE was 
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not interested in just framing the image of the victim diaspora, as they later began to 
position the Tamil diasporans as part of a larger heroic identity. As Cheran points out, 
‘in the current incarnation of the nationalist discourse, the Tamil is no longer a 
“paraiyah” Tamil. S/he is a Pulithamil (tiger Tamil)’(Cheran 2001 : 4). I analyse this as 
not just a change in nationalist discourse of Tamil militancy, but it is a shift of LTTE 
policy from being representational to domination of the diaspora. The conditions which 
created the diaspora enabled the LTTE to develop an organic relationship with the 
diasporans as their representatives The LTTE has succeeded in its objective of 
radicalizing the Sri Lankan Tamils overseas (Wickramasinghe 2006 : 266). This 
remained the case until the dissident phenomenon became a force and effectively 
challenged the LTTE hegemony. The next section will locate the Tamil diaspora in the 
context of existing theories on diaspora formation and also locate its political features in 
an appropriate diaspora theoretical analysis.  
 
1.4 The notion of ‘Diaspora’  
 
The term ‘diaspora’ according to Cohen, is derived from the Greek verb speiro (to sow) 
and the preposition dia (over): ‘When applied to humans, the ancient Greeks thought of 
diaspora as migration and colonization’(1997: 2). What Cohen implies is that all 
diasporic communities settled outside their native habitats, perceive their ‘homeland’ as 
represented in their language, culture, religion, irrespective of their current territory of 
occupation. Dufoix (2008) claims that the term ‘diaspora’ used signify any form of 
dispersion from a place to any non territorial space where exchanges do take place. He 
claims:  
 
“Diaspora” has become a global word that fits the global world. It has been a 
proper noun, in the Septuagint Bible, and a quasi proper noun-that is, a closed 
category – for Armenians, Greeks, Africans and others. Today it is a common 
noun it “speaks” for itself. (2003: 108) 
 
What Dufoix (2008) is trying to bring out by engaging with modern usage of the term 
‘diaspora’ is to expose its multiple meanings and multiple usages. The term diaspora 
now possess the meaning of referring to a national, ethnic or religious community living 
far from its native land, or place of origin, or being dispersed in several foreign 
 
 54 
locations. Dufoix claims the static term diaspora originally used to identify population 
movements, presents a more inclusive meaning making itself increasingly dispersed 
(2008: 54).  
 
A premier driver behind the revival of diasporic studies seems to be the changing nature 
and explanation of contemporary migration flows. According to Vertovec, the 
emergence of ‘transnationalism’ as a central concept in understanding how global 
identities are constructed ‘from below’ and ‘on the above’ has been a key feature of the 
contemporary efforts in theorizing diaspora (Vertovec 1998). Braziel and Mannur state 
that ‘Theorizing diaspora is a process of unveiling the “critical spaces”, which modernity 
has created in forms of creating new spaces of being and exploration, the transformation 
of identity and belonging’ (Braziel and Mannur 2003 : 3).  But again due to the diverse 
nature of these interpretations there is discontent as well, as highlighted by the works of 
Sheffer. There is no agreement among politicians and academics regarding the precise 
point at which migrants cross the rubicon of immigrant and form new diasporas or join 
existing ones. Clarification of this issue may not only have major theoretical 
implications but also practical effects (Sheffer: 2003). James Clifford (1994), a pioneer 
in the notion of diaspora formation in the modern context, talks of formation of diasporic 
consciousness in the sense of being oriented towards and organized around an eventual 
return to a place of real or mythic origin. This is a point where later studies on diasporas 
see the widening of the sphere of diasporic politics. 
 
Clifford, Safran and Scheffer identify the concept of diaspora as a framework to describe 
any population which is considered de-territorialized or ‘transitional’. The rebirth of the 
notion of diaspora has stemmed from academics using it to characterize transnational 
ethnic groups who have found in the expression a positive way of constituting a ‘hybrid’ 
cultural and political identity (Vertovec 1998; Cohen 1997). Diasporic engagement 
cannot be understood in most of current theorizations of diaspora from Clifford (1994) to 
Scheffer (1996) as their theorization is concentrated on the forms and shaping of 
diasporas. Even analysts such as Vertovec (1998) and Scheffer (2003) who are focused 
on diaspora politics, locate diaspora as a totality or a well defined entity. In research 
focused on transnational diaspora they examine various nodes connecting diaspora 
networks. This is an extremely structural approach to the study of diaspora politics. 
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Current theorization of diasporas as networks has reached a level of saturation. The 
positive thing emerging from positioning diaspora as a transnational political entity is the 
study of their politics on new media spheres (Karim 2003; Mitra 1997). 
 
Brubaker (2005) in a recent article introduces these theoretical positions while engaging 
them critically; this leads to a more pragmatic interpretation of a diaspora activity as a 
category of practice rather than normative definition of diaspora as a category of 
migration. From Cliford, Safran, Scheffer (1994; 1991; 1996) Brubaker draws three core 
features of any diaspora; they are dispersion, homeland orientation and boundary 
maintenance. Brubaker’s fundamental problematising of this framework lies in the actual 
political action of a diaspora. In a significant critique of Scheffer’s (2003) recent work, 
Brubaker notes the impossibility in quantifying a diaspora, as in a temporal framework. 
He argues that not everybody in a diaspora wants to maintain a boundary, nor a home-
land orientation. Brubaker uses a classic diachronic deconstruction on the theorization 
and categorization of diaspora. He raises the question: is ‘multi generational staying 
power’ being taken into consideration in forming these frameworks?     
 
To overcome these problems Brubaker introduces a working understanding of the 
diaspora phenomenon. He states, ‘I want to argue that we should think of diaspora not in 
substantialist terms as a bounded entity, but rather as an idiom, a stance, a claim. We 
should think of diaspora in the first instance as a category of practice, and only then ask 
whether, and how, it can fruitfully be used as a category of analysis’ (2005:12). His 
understanding is that rather than speak of ‘a diaspora’ or ‘the diaspora’ as an entity, a 
bounded group, an ethnodemographic or ethnocultural fact, it may be more fruitful, and 
certainly more precise, to speak of diasporic stances, projects, claims, idioms, practices, 
and so on.  
 
Brubaker’s framework provides a pragmatic method of analysis for diaspora studies. 
Brubaker looks at diaspora as a process oriented dynamic rather than a more static 
political entity. In this thesis I similarly analyse Tamil diaspora in times of its political 
practices, online political engagement of the Tamil diaspora as well as impact of 
cyberspace on their politics. The thesis also explores the shaping of the Tamil diaspora 
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political field through the practices of diaspora political activists. This focusing is 
informed and enhanced through Brubaker’s analysis of diaspora politics, although there 
is a significant contribution to diaspora theories from theorists in the lights of Scheffer 
(1996), Safran (1994), Cohen (1997) and Vertovec (1998), and their focus on the notion 
of transnational diaspora which I will also refer. In the next section I will discuss the 
literature around cyber politics and its implications for the analysis of global diaspora 
politics.  
 
1.5 Politics of the internet 
 
This is a brief introduction to the literature on cyber politics and research on online 
diaspora political engagements. While engaging with them I draw out the distinctions 
my research and analysis generates in the context of this existing knowledge, especially 
concerning the diaspora use of cyberspace for political engagement. Chadwick points out 
that since its inception from the early stages with the rise of the ARPANET9 in the 
1960s, the internet has had a significant impact on politics and he claims that the 
importance of internet politics is based on the fact that political actors of all sorts have 
become more closely involved in the production, consumption, and regulation of 
information communication technologies than they were when the internet first emerged 
(2006:2). 
 
The first generation of publications which emerged in the mid to late 1990s concerning 
the politics of cyberspace mainly focused on the role of politicians such as Waye Rash’s 
Politics on the net (1997), Richard Davis’s The web of politics (1999), Elaine Kamarck 
and Joseph Nye’s democracy.com? (1999) and Anthony Wilhelms Democracy in Digital 
age. (2000). Later publications showed a sign of shift in focus and research. The 
publication, Politics as usual by Michael Margolis and David Resnick brought out the 
dimensions, or key areas, of politics that the internet can be and is being used for. This 
provided an expanded horizon for research and analysis on net politics. Jordan’s (2004) 
                                                   
9 ARPA stands for Advanced Research Projects Agency, a major research agency of the U.S. Department 
of Defense established mainly as a knee jerk reaction of the USA to the launch of the Sputnik orbiter by 
Soviet Union in 1957. This later developed a research project looking at networking of computers 
especially focusing on the development of interactive computing for resource sharing. These initiatives 
triggered primary research and funding and collaboration with Universities such as Stanford which brought 
out ARPANET, ‘Advanced Research Projects Agency Network’, the immediate precursor of the internet. 
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Hacktivism and Cyberactivism provides a multitude of perspectives on online activism, 
and looks at macro and micro aspects of political mobilization and the use of cyberspace.  
 
There is a massive growth in literature exploring the evolving nature of politics online, 
which is widely expanding from research on national politics, political organization, 
political institutions, social movements, democratization, and governance to conflict 
politics. Chadwick (2006), referring to Argre’s (2002) research, broadly identifies eight 
key areas where the internet has had a significant political impact. These political topics 
include decentralization, participation, community, globalization, post industrialization, 
rationalization, governance and libertarianism. My thesis focuses overtly on a micro 
political facet as it is concentrated on the impact the internet has on diaspora politics, and 
especially its impact on political agents. 
 
The Media of diaspora (2003) edited by Karim, brings out the media dimension to 
diasporic politics, and mainly the use of different medias, including the internet, while 
the more recent publication by Landzelius (2006), Native on the net focuses on minority 
politics online in the transnational context. Such literature as Karim’s and Lanzelius’s 
work on online technologies and the link with politics of protests is quite relevant to my 
research as well. I argue that there is still a lack of in-depth research studying the impacts 
of cyberspace on the lives of political activists, and vice versa, and on the spatial 
dimension of transnationalism, and the notion of ‘place’ and ‘location’ for political 
activism in cyberspace. Thus I look into the impact cyberspace has on the lives of 
political activists with my research engaging directly with the views and personal 
experiences of Tamil diaspora activists.  
 
The literature on online diaspora politics arose from studies on transnationalism where 
the concept of diaspora is increasingly used as a point of analysis, especially the manner 
in which diasporas develop connections and the political possibilities arising from these 
connections. Diaspora, is positioned as a historical condition of displacement but in 
which people can be uprooted yet keep in touch. As Landzelius (2006) points out, it 
looks at people who have homes in a ‘host country’ and yet simultaneously consider 
themselves homeless. These new possibilities mainly mediated through communication 
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technologies make the displaced of today ‘stay connected’ in ways that were 
inconceivable for their forebears. 
 
In the context of diasporas online and diaspora politics online, Laguerre points to an 
external tension between the virtual world and the real world/visible world, which he 
identifies as a ‘dialectical tension’. According to Laguerre, ‘Virtual diasporas are not 
identical to real diasporas because they inhabit distinct, although connected conceptual 
universes and because their identities display different characteristics ‘(2005:131). As 
Calhoun (1992), Laguerre (2005), Hannerz (1996) and Karim (2003) point out, 
Information Communication Technologies (ICT) have enabled diasporas to make regular 
physical or symbolic connections. In their view, ICT has given an unprecedented 
technological edge to quests to ‘maintain, revive, invent’ connections to an actual 
homeland. Landzelius sums up the importance of cyberspace in the modern context of 
diaspora dynamics when she notes that: ‘Cyberspace not only assists but it maintains the 
diaspora ideology alive’ (2006: 21). 
   
The current research on online diaspora spread across themes such as indigenous cyber 
presence, virtual diaspora and cyber relationships that keep the diaspora alive, but there 
is less focus on diaspora politics online. Helen Lee’s (2006) analysis of the Tongana 
diaspora mainly focuses on discussion forums and thus the research looks at diaspora 
connections and re-imagining diaspora identities, similar to Gibb’s (2006) analysis of 
Harari youth who are displaced from Ethiopia. Karim in his edited volume the Media of 
Diaspora looks at cyberspace and online technologies as overcoming hierarchical 
structures of traditional media for the diasporas to stay connected and use online services 
such as Internet relay chat, email, Usenet, Listserv (2003:15). 
 
The literature explored above has two key drawbacks. The first is that the analysis of the 
internet as a kind of new technology of connection and the importance for diasporans to 
stay connected remains the key focus. This lacks analysis to the importance of politics 
amongst diasporan agents. The second weakness in the research and literature on 
cyberspace and diaspora politics has been its focus on certain websites and forums. The 
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analysis is mainly limited to the observation of limited political participation or focusing 
on few websites randomly selected.  
 
Existing literature on Tamil diaspora politics such as Wayland (2004), Ranganathan 
(2002) and Whitaker (2006, 2007) is heavily focused on the dominance of the LTTE in 
cyberspace and the cyber operations and networks it has fostered. Political developments 
in cyberspace are analysed through the LTTE’s effort to create the notion of a ‘virtual 
Eelam’ (homeland)’ and the support diaspora mobilization from LTTE fronts. Tamil 
diasporic web sites run by LTTE fronts identify the notion of nation as the primary focus 
for their activity10. The website www.Eelamnation.com carries this mission statement: 
 
Our mission is to focus on political, social, cultural, and economic events that 
affect our vision of an “Eelam Nation” while encouraging cultural exchange and 
information among the Tamil Diaspora, a service we hope to support by 
providing Tamils all over the world with an opportunity for manifesting their 
talents, knowledge, and experience in our pages. 
 
These web efforts reconfigured the idea of Tamil nation or according to Pradeep 
Jeganathan ‘Imagi nation’, which has emerged within the context of cyber space 
(Jeganathan: 1997).  
 
Cheran brings this observation in an argument tracing the origin of Tamilnes through 
analyzing the classical literary texts of the Sangam period. He claims the concept of 
Thinai (landscape) as defined in Sangam literature are cultural sites which form the basis 
of Tamilness. There are five landscapes introduced in the Sangam age literary text 
tholkaapiyam. Cheran claims the two above mentioned thinais are his addition to the 
existing five landscapes which form the core pillars of Tamilness, or Tamil identity. 
Cheran points out: ‘with the growing of the Tamil diaspora and the emergence of 
thousands of Tamil cultural web pages, I argue that two more things can be added to this 
classical Sangam age classification. Aaraamthinai,sixth genre (exile and diaspora) and 
Earlaam thinnai the seventh genre (cyberspace)’ (2001: 9). 
                                                   
10 It is not just Eelamnation.com that presents this notion of nation but all the premier Tamil Diaspora sites 
carry this message like Eelam.com, TamilEelam.com, www.Eelamthugz.cjb.net/  other than these all Tamil 
and Tamil Diapsoric sites mostly use the phrase ‘our land’ and ‘our people’. The recreation is supported by 
maps depicting the Eelam. The Tamil Diaspora is attempting to achieve a cyber nation be created within the 




Tekwani sums up the online LTTE presence and its implications for online politics: 
 
It is apparent that the online network is primarily used for propaganda purposes 
serving up a dynamic and vibrant Tamil presence, offering emotional and 
cultural sustenance to Diaspora Tamils and an outlet for political discourse they 
may have otherwise been denied, the online network is also a symbol of a 
parallel network that runs on more subterranean lines, channeling funds, recruits 
and arms to the LTTE (2006:21). 
 
Thus the thesis looks specifically at the politics of diaspora, exploring the phenomenon 
of web politics beyond the focus of a single web site or a forum. I focus more 
empirically on the actual impact of cyberspace on political engagements of the Sri 
Lankan Tamil diaspora. The case study looks at the impact of cyber politics on the lives 
of political activists and decision makers and the perception of these activists on 
cyberspace. This thesis focuses not only on LTTE web operations but it also represents 
the Tamil diaspora political activists who are opposed to LTTE operations and are 
actively opposed to the LTTE domination of diaspora spaces. This provides an 
alternative insight into the cyber politics of Tamil diasporans with new dimensions that 
open up when research is conducted across the Tamil diasporan political spectrum 




The LTTE virtually nurtured the politicizing of Tamil life. They successfully fused the 
identity of being Tamil diasporan with allegiance to the struggle for national liberation to 
carve out a separate state for Tamils. This was backed up until very recently with a 
promise of possibility of return to a Tamil homeland. The split in the LTTE has had 
significant impact among the diaspora Tamils with dissident groups gaining power to 
challenge the international operations of the LTTE. The Tamil dissidents and the 
political struggle between the pro-LTTE elements and the dissidents will be introduced 
at length in Chapter Two; the struggle has a major influence on this research.  
 
This chapter mainly introduced key background issues that affected my research and 
themes of knowledge that it bases on. Earlier research on diasporan politics and 
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particularly on Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora politics, has primarily concentrated on 
cyberspace as a medium of communication. In this research the thesis explore the own 
views of political activists of it. Chapter Two will look closely at who my respondents 
are and where I carried out my research. It will also introduce the theoretical framework 
for the research and its design; based on the responses of Tamil diasporan political 
activists, setting the key theoretical arguments of this thesis concerning issues of 






Chapter 2: Research methods 
 
2.1 Introduction  
 
Chapter One reviewed the literature on the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict, the formation of 
Tamil diaspora and diasporic politics in cyberspace. This chapter relates my research to 
current knowledge into online diaspora politics, while investigating new dimensions of 
Tamil diaspora politics which have informed the design of my fieldwork strategy. Thus 
this chapter introduces the research design, in-depth analysis of my field and the 
respondents. As a social science researcher, it is inevitable that one has to make a lot of 
choices in defining one’s own research area. I selected the Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora as 
Sri Lankan Tamils can be identified as one of the most dispersed diasporic communities 
in the globe. The fact that these diasporans are engaged in politics on cyberspace 
provides a researcher with a diverse but rich set of data. 
 
2.2 Research Framework 
 
My research design is basically made out of two components. The first component is the 
fieldwork aspect of my research (the offline phase) where I made contact with 
respondents who make up the political leadership in Tamil diaspora politics in London. I 
had already identified key Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora organizations based in London, 
especially in central London and south London. These were later used as locations where 
I conducted in depth interviews with political activists who are chief organizers of 
Diaspora activities in London. I will be introducing my field, the respondents and the 
reason why I selected them later on in this chapter.  
 
The second component of the research framework, my online research and analysis will 
be presented in Chapters Four and Five. This second component is purely a web based 
research on Tamil diasporic websites (the online phase). The online analysis is based on 
the methodology known as Web Sphere Analysis (Foot 2004); this approach is discussed 




2.3 Methodological Practice 
 
There is existing research on various dynamics of the Tamil diaspora from various 
researchers. Gunaratne (1998) and Fuglerud (1999) have completed extensive research 
on the politics of Tamil diasporans. Both these researchers have focused on LTTE 
influence and domination of the political realms of diaspora mobilization. Fuglerud has 
concentrated on diaspora politics in Norway, while Gunaratne has done some extensive 
interviews with some key LTTE operatives in London. There is no existing research 
involving political activists focusing on the emergence of cyberspace and their reaction 
to such new developments. This vacuum itself was a challenge in organizing my 
research and devising themes to be discussed in interviews. 
 
The respondents in my fieldwork are all members of the Sri Lanka Tamil diaspora and 
most importantly they make up the leadership or decision-making units in diaspora 
politics as individuals or as groups. There are pro-LTTE activists and leaders also in my 
pool of respondents but the majority are dissidents. A broader introduction to dissident 
Tamil political activists is provided later in the chapter prior to introducing my 
respondents. In simple terms the dissidents are opposed to the Tamil nationalist project 
of the LTTE. The key reason for focusing on the dissidents is the increase in political 
activity carried out by dissident groups. There has been a significant surge in dissident 
politics and a lack of research done on this emergent phenomenon on Tamil diaspora 
politics.  
 
As a method of data gathering, interviews ensure coherence between the research 
question and the methods, using ‘conversations’ with a purpose (Lewis 2003). I hoped to 
unearth a number of critical issues pertaining to diasporic mobilization from these 
individuals. In this context good in-depth interviews have the potential to combine the 
structure with flexibility as emphasized by Legard et al (2003). The in-depth interviews 
will try to look at the Diasporan politics in cyberspace through the experiences of Tamil 
diasporan political leadership and its impact on political decision making.  
 
By scheduling a significant number of preliminary interviews, and spending some 
considerable time with Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora political activists in London from 
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2006 to the end of 2007, I was able to develop confidence with my respondents and to 
engage with them on discussions generally about politics. This investment of my time 
with potential respondents contributed to organize proper interviews and also use the 
snowballing technique to gain acces to more potential respondents pertaining to my 
research. 
 
My fieldwork, and the questions I posed to my respondents, were mainly based on my 
experiences gained from the pilot fieldwork I carried out in London from April – June 
2006. In this fieldwork I was mainly looking at the dynamics of online diaspora politics, 
the impact of such online politics on diaspora politics and the attitude of diaspora 
political activists towards cyber politics as a serious mode of political engagement. In 
my main fieldwork, which started in May 2007, the process of interviewing was made 
simple and clear to avoid any unnecessary complications for the respondents. The 
interview questions were based on some key themes that I outlined and presented to the 
respondents, this helped my inquiry while making it easier for the respondents as it was 
loosely structured rather than maintaining a rigid set of questions. The key themes within 
my interviews were: 
 
• The impact of cyberspace on Tamil diaspora politics 
• The role of cyberspace and online technologies in political mobilization 
• The communication and information dimension of cyberspace. 
• The advantages of online politics 
• The types of political action that were preferred to be carried out online 
• The political processes cyberspace generated 
• Possible new dimensions that cyberspace opened up for politics among diasporan 
politicians 
 
The interviews flowed more like discussions, but they were guided by the themes of my 
research agenda. There were instances in interviews with pro-LTTE activists where they 
subtly tried to position themselves as moderate political activists. They did sometimes 
talk of involvement with the LTTE but they used cryptic language to indicate where their 




The field research which I had to undertake posed several key challenges. The primary 
challenge was how I could position myself as a researcher. This was mainly due to the 
sensitive nature of the issues that I was investigating and also it was a time of heightened 
political activity within the Tamil Diaspora. I was aware that my role as a researcher 
among the Tamil Diasporas had certain inherent challenges. These included being from a 
Sinhalese background and having had a previous affiliation to the regime in Sri Lanka 
which was waging a military campaign with the LTTE. The Tamil community in 
London, irrespective of which side they were on politically, tended not to trust anyone 
affiliated with the regime of President Rajapaksa. These were the challenges I had to 
negotiate using a series of strategies. However, the position and political views I held on 
the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict placed me in a favourable position when approaching the 
Tamil political activists. I was one of the key individuals in the Rajapaksa regime who 
always advocated a political solution to the ethnic conflict and openly worked towards 
its implementation. These included the efforts I took to enlighten President Rajapaksa 
when he was Prime Minister during the Northern Ireland peace process, coordinating 
visits to Northern Ireland and meeting delegations of all political parties in Belfast and 
Londonderry. I also developed links with democratic Tamil activists and journalists, 
listening to their democratic voices despite my strong disagreement with the idea of a 
separate homeland for Tamils in Sri Lanka. This reputation aided me when I started my 
PhD.  
 
I laid the ground work for the interviews early at the beginning of my PhD programme; I 
was able to make contacts with pro-LTTE activists through two key sources. The first 
was through a web master from the most viewed pro-LTTE website www.Tamilnet.com. 
I had affiliations with Tamilnet.com even as a researcher in Sri Lanka as I closely 
associated with the late Dharmeratnam Sivaram, popularly known as Taraki who was the 
chieft editor of Tamilnet.com until his death in April 2005. The webmaster of Tamilnet 
introduced me to some key pro-LTTE Tamil political activists in London. However, 
these introductions were not smooth affairs and I had to build up trust with these 
respondants by attending casual meetings from early 2006 onwards prior to being 




The second opportunity came in January 2006 when I attended a workshop organized by 
the Centre on Migration Policy and Society (COMPAS) at the University of Oxford. The 
workshop brought together researchers on Sri Lankan Tamils in London. I was able to 
establish links with some academics and researchers who were involved in Tamil 
diaspora studies. One of the participants, Councillor Paul Sathianesan introduced me to 
Tamil political activists in London who represented the pro-LTTE lobby. Sathianesan is 
a politician with aspirations to establish himself in UK politics and political institutions, 
but his political activities caused him to interact with pro-LTTE activists and to develop 
a good rapport with them over the years of his political career.  
 
I spent the first year of my PhD preparing for my field work and this primarily involved 
making contacts and visiting them in London. The routine visits and meetings with 
potential respondents paved the way for prolonged associations with them and helped 
break down barriers and inhibitions, particularly amongst Tamil dissidents who might 
otherwise have been wary of talking to me. This meant that discussions could eventually 
be steered toward political matters which allowed me to introduce fundamental aspects 
of my research. Such long term associations with the respondents at an early stage of my 
PhD research proved fruitful in the long run. I was able to develop confidence over time 
and this confidence building exercise matured into a collection of good empirical data 
and set the momentum for reaching out to new respondents. 
 
One might feel that access to the Tamil dissidents compared to the pro-LTTE activists 
was much easier. This was not the case. The dissidents, though categorized in the 
common identity of being anti LTTE, do not form a unified group, nor are they centrally 
linked compared to their rivals. The only thing they shared in common was animosity 
towards the LTTE, based on diverse reasons, from antagonisms which went a long way 
back to the inception of Tamil militancy in Sri Lanka and the LTTE’s ruthless execution 
of its rivals, to very recent rifts within the LTTE. Thus the dissidents included members 
of other Tamil political parties, militant groups which the LTTE violently put down, and 
ex-LTTE members who harboured personal grudges with its leadership. This matrix of 
differences complicated my attempts to make contacts with these dissident political 
activists. I had some relatively easy access to some activists based on personal 
affiliations, and the others I had to formally contact through email addresses and phone 
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numbers which the other dissidents passed on, where the best they could do was provide 
me contact details of other dissident activists.    
 
Making contact and making appointments for initial meetings were difficult and 
challenging as I had to provide explanations of my research in very short periods of time 
to secure even initial meetings. I also used very short one page bullet formed texts as an 
email attachment which I forwarded to these potential respondents as further reference 
for them concerning my research prior to conducting the interview. These meetings were 
challenging as they needed to be confident in revealing their ideas and becoming part of 
my research. Unlike the LTTE, some of them were politically not very visible when 
compared with LTTE members in London, as they tended to operate more underground. 
They were also afraid of Sri Lankan government intelligence agents operating in 
London. 
 
I carried out nearly fifteen interviews during the period of eight months and these were 
lengthy interviews with diaspora political activists. I was able to interview almost all the 
decision makers in the dissident Tamil diaspora sphere based in London. These 
dissidents included Tamil activists, who were in London since the early 1970s to second 
generation Tamil diasporans. Such a cross section does help to identify significant 
changes of politics, types of preferred spaces for politics and political strategies for the 
inception of online politics. There were lengthy interviews with the few pro-LTTE 
activists and leading lobbyists that I was able to contact and remain in contact with them 
throughout my fieldwork research period.  
 
The respondents I selected were not web masters but most of them were actively 
engaged in offline and online politics in London. The online politics ranged from content 
contribution to websites to email campaigns. Thus the importance of these fifteen 
individuals was that they were exposed to online politics and also played a major role in 
the Tamil Diaspora political activities in real world scenarios. The empirical data that 
were featured from these interviews was analysed along with the online research, from 
this the clear impact and consequences of online politics on actual political agents could 




Though there is a significant diaspora presence in London, the political leadership and 
decision making is in the hands of a limited number of people. These political activists 
have the ability to easily influence the diaspora as Sriskandrajah points out:  
 
While only a small part of the diaspora may be actively involved in overtly 
political activities, .. almost all Tamils are aware of and interested in political 
developments at home. The ongoing conflict and the plight of family and friends 
still in Sri Lanka mean that many members of the diaspora have a real and direct 
connection to events in their former home. As a result, the spaces, events, and 
initiatives produced through Tamil nationalist political discourse are some of the 
most important factors in the life of the Tamil diaspora (2004:497). 
 
This is why I argue that the social and political positions of my respondents are critical 
to understand the actual impact of online politics. These key respondents have the 
agency to dictate and shape the political flows of the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora. The 
reason that the number may seem quite small compared to the estimated diaspora figures 
in London is that the political organization and leadership in the diaspora community is 
through a small number of political activists who are the key figures of Tamil diaspora 
mobilization.  
 
2.4 The respondents 
 
This section will do three things. First, it will expand on the concept of a dissident Tami 
diasporan political activist because, as I mentioned above, the majority of my 
respondents are representatives of the dissident Tamil identity. Also as mentioned, there 
is no significant research on this new turn in diaspora politics, although dissidents did 
exist from the early formations of the Tamil diaspora. Secondly, this section will include 
the life stories of two respondents, exploring the phenomenon of becoming diasporan 
and of becoming a Tamil diasporan political activist. Finally, it will introduce my field 





2.4.1 Dissident factor 
 
The University Teachers for Human Rights Jaffna (UTHR[J]) group pioneered human 
rights based activism starting in the early days of the conflict. The group was made out 
of academics mainly from Jaffna University, Sri Lanka and was formed in mid 1988. 
They came out both against state suppression of Tamils and the violence unleashed 
against Tamils by Tamil militant organizations. The key objective of the organization in 
its own words  
 
To challenge the external and internal terror engulfing the Tamil community as a 
whole through making the perpetrators accountable, and to create space for 
humanising the social & political spheres relating to the life of our community. 
11: 
 
The group’s first achievement was to publish The Broken Palmyrah a book which 
resulted from extensive reports and research conducted by the UTHR(J) on various 
issues surrounding developments in the conflict. These included the immediate events 
that took place after the entrance of the Indian Peace Keeping force (IPKF) in 1987 to 
Sri Lanka. The Broken Palmyrah also included the Sri Lankan government’s war 
strategies and its effect on the Tamil civilian population in the North and East of Sri 
Lanka and the alarming dictatorship of the LTTE which was evolving into a powerful 
military force.  
 
The LTTE assassinated one of the core authors of The Broken Palmyrah and one of the 
founding members of the UTHR(J) Dr. Rajani Thiranagama the head of the Department 
of Anatomy in the University of Jaffna and a human rights activist. In the early 1990s 
more UTHR(J) members were abducted and were reported killed by the LTTE which 
made the remaining members flee Sri Lanka. The UTHR(J) still manages to report on 
human rights violations in the context of the ongoing conflict committed by all parties 
through their website www.UTHR(J).org. The UTHR(J) remains one of the oldest 
efforts of dissent challenging the domination of both the LTTE and the Sri Lankan state.  
 
                                                   
11 Http://www.uthr.org/history.htm  
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I will also look briefly at the dissidents in London who were active against the LTTE. 
This early dissident activity revolved around two different sections of Tamils living in 
the diaspora community. One of them represented the various Tamil militant 
organizations in Sri Lanka which were subjected to a violent purge by the LTTE. These 
militant operatives who fled the LTTE, and also the Sri Lankan government’s anti 
militant operations, established their organizations in London. These included the 
EPRLF, PLOTE and TELO, all had opened party offices in London. The other segment 
included individuals who were unaffiliated with the Tamil militancy but were concerned 
of the suffering of Tamil people within the situations created with the rise of Tamil 
militancy. The Tamil Times, the English weekly started publication in 1981 is an 
example of the work by such individuals.  
 
Rajanayagam pioneered the use of print media in the early 1980s when he started the 
English journal Tamil Times in 1981 from London. Rajanayagam told me that the rise of 
Tamil militancy, the violence unleashed against Tamils in mid 1980’s and killing of 
political activists in Sri Lanka led to launch of the Tamil Times. The Tamil Times ceased 
its publication in 2005. Tamil Times took an independent view point on the Tamil 
national question thus it was not favoured by the LTTE and pro-LTTE operations. The 
LTTE operations tried to take over this journal and when it failed started publishing 
alternative English publications to counter the Tamil Times. Tamil Voice International 
(TVI) is one such example. Thus Tamil Times represents long term defiance against the 
LTTE within the Tamil diaspora. Rajanayagam said that the current web politics has 
been able to expand the reach of the dissidents and that the LTTE is feeling the pressure 
brought upon it by dissident web publications.   
 
My thesis traces the development of the dissident political actions among the Tamil 
diaspora in the last five years, especially in the context of cyber politics. I asked a 
dissident political activist what makes her a ‘dissident Tamil’ and she told me, ‘I mean 
as dissenting from Tamil nationalism, that means I am no longer analysing the ethnic 
conflict from the view of a Tamil nationalist point of view. Earlier I could not escape 
from Tamil nationalist movement, now I am opposed to the movement. This means now 
I am consciously dissenting from or opposed to secession and find no real meaning in 
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Tamil nationhood.’ And she further said, ‘At the beginning we were of a minority 
“lonely voices of the wilderness” in the Tamil community.’ 
 
Though this was an interesting definition, some of the other dissidents I interviewed had 
different views on it. Some still identified themselves as Tamil nationalist and 
representing the rights of Tamil people. The common factor which bound them together 
was the fact that they were fiercely opposing the LTTE along with its rigid political 
ideology.  
 
The best analysis of a Tamil dissident comes from the website operated by UTHR(J), In 
one of their reports, paying tribute to one of their slain members, they defined what 
makes a Tamil dissident, 
 
In fact all Tamil dissidents are products of the same rotten society that gave birth 
to the LTTE and its bloodstained politics…. Dissidents were often persons who 
had flirted with the mainstream of a decadent Tamil nationalism, and had their 
hands dirtied in its cause. Others, whose political convictions gave them far 
greater clarity about the malign trends in Tamil nationalism, dirtied their hands 
protecting themselves from the LTTE’s murderous wrath. Through experience 
and crises in their lives, many of them came to a point where they were horrified 
with what they had been associated with. Where they had opportunity and time 
for reflection, they put themselves on the line and took the position that the 
Tamil people could regain their freedom and dignity only through a commitment 
to the higher values of democracy and human rights (UTHR 2006).  
 
The role of dissidents and their diasporic politics do have a significant impact on this 
thesis as they provide a kind of spark that generates an alternative view of politics within 
the Tamil diaspora in general, and of diaspora engagements online. They have also 
become a catalyst in putting the politics of diasporans into flux, changing and removing 
established fields of practices.  
 
2.5 Stories of flight: becoming diasporan  
 
This section traces the political life of two political activists and their journey from Sri 
Lanka, to Tamil Nadu, to London, and the ideological transformations they underwent in 
this journey of becoming the diaspora political activists that they are now. This piece 
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provides a snapshot into the lives of two Tamil diaspora political activists who are 
interviewed in my fieldwork. It brings out the turbulent but politically charged lives of 
Raj and Keeran, the former a founding member of the LTTE, and in his time in the 
LTTE a close associate of Prabhakaran, but currently a leading member of the dissident 
Tamil activists based in London, the latter a former member of the PLOTE and currently 





2.5.1 Raj: From predator to prey 
 
Raj is a leading political activist. He is a former member of the LTTE and was part of 
the first thirteen members which formed the LTTE. Explaining his political history Raj 
said he got involved in politics when he was in the 9th standard (grade) in school. The 
1970s like the 1950s were a turbulent time in the history of Sri Lanka. It was the decade 
prior to the full blown conflict, but the political developments in the 1970s led to the 
rapid change of political engagements of the Sri Lankan Tamils. In 1970 a new 
government came into power, led by the SLFP founded by S.W.R.D Bandaranaike, the 
architect of politically institutionalized Sinhala nationalism. The alliance which came to 
power in 1970 sought a mandate for constitutionally establishing a republic, as Sri Lanka 
was still under the dominion rule of Britain. In the aftermath of the victory, the new 
constitution was drafted and enacted in 1972. The constitution demonstrated the 
hegemonic project of the Sinhala government over whole of Sri Lanka, as it declared 
‘the the republic of Sri Lanka shall give to Buddhism the foremost place and accordingly 
it shall be the duty of the state to protect and foster Buddhism’. The constitution further 
endorsed Sinhala as the official language of Sri Lanka. This was met with protests in 
Tamil dominated Jaffna in the North of Sri Lanka. Thus developments in the North and 
East saw more and more Tamil agitations and the drift towards the notion of a separate 
Tamil nation settling in among many Tamil citizens. These were reiterated by constant 
changes in policy from education standardization to the Prevention of Terrorism Act 
(PTA) backed by periodic violence unleashed by Sinhala politicians as mentioned in the 




By 1976, the leading Tamil parties including the Federal Party, the Tamil Congress of 
G.G. Ponnampalam, and Thondaman's Ceylon Workers Congress (CWC) representing 
Plantation Tamils, and Prof. C. Suntheralingam, a prominent Tamil nationalist, had 
combined to form the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF). The TULF adopted the 
Vaddukoddai resolution which put forward an independent state of Tamil Eelam as 
being the solution to the problems of the Tamils in 1976. This state was to be won by 
non-violent means. The Vaddukoddai resolution made a deep emotional impact on 
Tamils, both locally and abroad. But it took the 1977 anti-Tamil violence to give it life. 
 
This was the background from which Raj entered into politics, especially inspired by the 
student movement in Jaffna, which started organizing in parallel with various nationalist 
movements of the time, and by Tamil students movement, including the Tamil Students 
League (TSL) and Tamil Youth League (TYL), which organized street protests against 
education standardization and the 1972 constitution. Later he was drawn into 
Prabhakaran’s LTTE and became a senior cadre. Raj joined the LTTE in 1974 (he rarely 
mentions the term LTTE or Tigers, instead he always uses the term ‘organization’), and 
he went to India as an LTTE cadre against the backdrop of certain disagreements with 
the LTTE leadership and later left the organization. Raj was involved in the famous 
Pondi Bazaar12 shooting incident in May 1982 where Prabhakaran and Raj were 
involved in a shoot out with Uma Mashewaran, ex theoretician of the LTTE who split 
with the leadership and formed his own party in 1980.   
 
Raj left the LTTE in April 1984, and joined a group of militants from various 
organizations, including TELO, PLOTE, EROS. The post LTTE world for Raj was 
interesting. As he said, ‘I was in the organization for ten years and suddenly it was so 
strange.’ He said that he could not explain the feeling which he had experienced. ‘I 
joined the organization in 1974 and was in it till 1984, and it was like my life, and when 
I was out of it I felt life was suddenly meaningless and it took a time to come to terms 
with my life outside the organization.’ In the aftermath of leaving the LTTE Raj made 
                                                   
12 Pondi Bazaar is a main shopping area, stretches for around a kilometer on in the large commercial 




contacts with people he knew from other organizations who were also living in Tamil 
Nadu and who were also disillusioned with their own militant groups. 
 
The LTTE has a reputation for violently putting down deserters, branding them as 
traitors. They tried to track and harm deserters outside of Sri Lanka as well but they did 
not go to extremes at this particular time period, especially in India as they did not want 
to make India their enemy. The LTTE was not just after dissidents from its organization 
but members of rival Tamil political, militant groups. Raj said, ‘The LTTE did not have 
resources to pursue us at that time and they did not risk much in India’, but they killed 
one of their friends, ‘comrade Ruban went to Vedaranyam, a border village, which was 
an operational and logistics hubs used by the LTTE.’ Raj told me, ‘Ruban was abducted 
and taken on a boat in this village and murdered. We heard that his body was dumped in 
the sea and he was never found.’ 
 
Life in Tamil Nadu for Raj was not that difficult.  As a member of the LTTE for 10 
years, and with extensive travel between Jaffna and Tamil Nadu for various reasons 
within this period, from training to taking LTTE cadres to India, Raj had established a 
wide network of contacts, especially among the fisher folk in certain coastal villages. 
These coastal villages were of strategic importance for the LTTE in its first decade of 
activities. From Vedaranyam to Coimbatore the LTTE has established support networks 
among Tamil sympathizers and local politicians and these were used as points of 
logistical importance from sending cadres from training, to hiding caches of arms and 
ammunition. Raj stressed that he had a significant support network, ‘but I and my other 
comrades were mostly living semi underground in the village of Thiruvoppiyur, again a 
coastal village where the fisher folk lived and we were helped by locals.’ 
 
Raj spoke extensively about his efforts to form a political group which represented a 
larger voice of the Tamil people in Sri Lanka. Explaining his relationship with members 
of other political organizations, in his post LTTE life as a Tamil political activist Raj 
said ‘Initially people who came out of the various organizations wanted to form a 
democratic group, but this did not work out practically as they had different objectives 
while some wanted to form independent groups and did not want to be under one 
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organization.’ The problem had a significant effect on Raj’s decisions about his own life 
and its future, and also he pointed out apart from significant disagreement, India always 
intervened in such political set ups and sponsored groups in which it had vested interests. 
Raj pointed out, ‘India supported nurturing of such organizations TELO was one such 
organization.’  
 
This period still contained Cold War tensions as the geopolitics of the region dominated 
by both American influence on Pakistan and Soviet influence on India and the Pro 
American foreign policy of the Sri Lankan government under the presidency of J. R. 
Jayawardene made India and Sri Lanka uneasy neighbours. India was actively using 
militant groups to intervene in Sri Lankan affairs. There was significant diplomatic 
tension until the end of the Cold War between the two countries. The height of this was 
the infamous, ‘Operation Poonalai’ (operation garland) on 4 June 1987, where four 
Mirage 2000 fighter jets of the Indian Air Force escorted 5 AN 32 military transport 
planes with supplies and rations, violating Sri Lankan air space to drop their payloads of 
relief items to people in Jaffna. This was in the wake of a large military operation against 
the LTTE by the Sri Lankan government forces. 
 
Raj suggests that the failure to establish a democratic organization was a blow to his 
political operations and a depressing factor to deal with, ‘I was a marginalized voice in 
this type of political setup and did not know what to do.’ Raj said he kept on talking to 
the Indian officials who were directly involved in setting up these organizations. He said 
he was desperate to be part of it but it was a serious let down. ‘Thus when I wanted to be 
part of this democratic organization and the Indian sponsoring of new organization I 
pleaded with officials in the central government and even had discussion with local 
government members, and it did not work out as I kept on complaining but no one took 
it seriously.’ 
 
Raj’s journey had still not ended, as his next major leap was to enter the UK. Raj was not 
clear about his intentions on choosing to come to the UK but he indicated, among many 
reasons, his disappointment with the political failures in India was a key reason why he 
fled to London. Ever since Raj left the LTTE, he seemed to be trying to open up political 
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spaces and establish relationships with people of similar interests. But his efforts to 
spatially liberate people from the shackles of petty political ideologies failing, he sought 
to locate himself somewhere else and joined the diasporic flows, westbound from the 
region of South Asia. 
 
When Raj entered the UK, there was no need for a visa as political asylum in the UK 
was not discouraged. Raj pointed out ‘as there was no need for a visa at that time for 
citizens of Commonwealth countries to enter the UK, I was able to get an Indian 
passport and fly to London.’ Raj was able to get advice from other political activists who 
earlier made it to London how to handle British immigration officials. Raj said, ‘In 
September 1986 I landed in London and I was able to convince the immigration officer 
the reasons why I came to London and was granted entry to the UK.’ 
 
Raj found the situation in London politically discouraging, so he chose to stay away 
from politics and focused his energies on adapting to life in London. However the 
political animal in Raj could not be contained for long as he found his kind of political 
needs being catered within certain Tamil circles. Raj revealed, ‘Since I came to London I 
wanted to be involved in politics but it was very difficult. Even in London a minority of 
people discussed matters of human rights, they were mostly from the Tamil literary 
groups, consisting of writers, poets and journalists.’ Raj went on, ‘This difficulty for 
democratic voice was a result of the LTTE’s ban on all other organizations in Jaffna 
from 1986. The LTTE cut the democratic space in the North and East, people had to flee 
the LTTE rule, as those remaining were killed by them.’ The LTTE launched a bloody 
campaign to wipe out other rival organizations in April 1986, with the virtual 
extermination of TELO, the Indian-backed militant organization. This caused the Tamil 
political activists and militants opposed to the LTTE to flee the North (flee the country) 
or be absorbed into government forces to operate as pro-government paramilitaries for 
their own safety.  
 
The dissident political spaces in London and in other diaspora centres, were very 
insignificant; according to Raj these circles formed pockets of activity for a long time. 
He emphasized, ‘There was no major political force till early 2000 for dissident politics, 
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and we were involved in little activities which were insignificant at that time.’ While 
describing the minor political activities which were opposed to the LTTE Raj pointed 
out, ‘These origins of the dissidence, at least the earliest dissident political activities, 
should be credited to Tamil literates who fled to Germany and France.’   
 
These Tamil literates13 were also under significant LTTE threat, especially in Paris, in 
the so called ‘little Jaffna’ located close to the Gare du Nord train station in Paris and the 
cultural centres which revolve around the two Hindu temples located near la Chapelle, 
where there was significant LTTE dominance. The LTTE has proved to be more ruthless 
in its violent operations in Paris. Raj revealed that the rise of the dissidents in Paris was 
mainly done to the unprecedented levels of violence unleashed by the LTTE against any 
Tamil opposing the organization. He said,  
 
There were few a significant events which spurred the dissident movement, in 
1994 LTTE assassins shot and killed Sabalingam in Paris, he was a founding 
member of the Tamil militancy and was famous for his escape from the Sri 
Lankan authorities, he literally jumped from the fourth floor (the notorious 
interrogation section of the Criminal Investigation Department [CID] or the 
secret police in Sri Lanka .The CID complex is located in the ultra high security 
zone in Colombo). Sabalingam was living in France and was critical of the LTTE  
 
Raj also referred to an incident where a LTTE hit squad killed another Tamil literate and 
historian in France, ‘He was shot at his house where the French authorities failed to 
respond.’ These incidents had triggered a chain reaction among the Tamil literates, 
journalists, political activists in the diaspora community, setting the scene for the 
dissident movement to gain much needed momentum. According to Raj and many other 
dissident activists, the watershed of the dissident movement came in the back drop to the 
signing of the Cease Fire Agreement (CFA) in 2002 between the Sri Lankan government 
and the LTTE. The LTTE launched a systematic tactic of executing dissidents in Sri 
Lanka, using the CFA as a cover. Raj explained ‘This led to us becoming more and more 
concerned and we saw that we needed to organize to counter this and people began to 
care less about consequences when they started opposing the LTTE.’  
 
                                                   
13 Raj uses the word Tamil literates to identify Tamil academics, poets, journalists and any educated Tamil 
who is actively engaged in politics among the diaspora. 
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The dissidents gained significant strength following the split in the LTTE in 2004, which 
significantly depleted its military strength in the East of Sri Lanka. The split reflected the 
social tensions within the Tamil society between the communities of Tamils of Eastern 
and Northern origin. There was suppressed friction between the Northern command of 
the LTTE and the Eastern command which goes back to the class, caste and social 
divides entrenched in Sri Lanka Tamil society. This depletion of the LTTE military 
strength and the shrinking space of control of the LTTE in Sri Lanka, shattered its 
appearance of ‘invincibility’.   
 
Raj told me these internal problems within the LTTE have weakened some of its 
organizational abilities in diaspora communities. He saw it as a restriction of the LTTE 
and also its capabilities to supress of dissenting diasporans. But he also acknowledged 
that it still was not safe as the LTTE used to kill opposing Tamil politicians and activists 
in the diaspora communities. Raj said, and ‘It was alarming as LTTE was given 
recognition by other states and the Norwegian government’s recognition was the most 
serious.’ 
 
2.5.2 Keeran: The prophet unarmed 
 
Keeran belongs to the dissenting Tamil diaspora political community based in London. 
He was born in Nelliady in Vedamarachchi a hotbed of Tamil militancy and an area 
which has seen some of the bloodiest battles between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan 
armed forces. Nelliady was the site of the first suicide bombing mission by an LTTE 
suicide bomber. This area belongs to the electoral division of Udupitty in Jaffna, a 
stronghold of the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) in the late 1970s and the 1980s, 
which campaigned for Tamil self determination. Keeran said, ‘I got involved in politics 
after the Jaffna library was burned and I was in the first year of my A’L class. At that 
time I was politically supporting TULF. My electorate was represented by Rajalingam. 
He was from a low caste background and we wanted to ensure he won’. He went on to 




These were the points of departure of his chosen path from education to politics. Like 
many youths of his age and their families, he dreamt of doing well in his studies and 
getting into University, as education was seen, as Keeran said, to be the key or the only 
way of emancipation for Tamils living in Jaffna. 
  
Keeran’s dream was shattered with the events in 1981 and especially the burning of the 
Jaffna library, a symbolic centre of education in the Jaffna society. Post-1977 Jaffna was 
a hotbed of violence and state aggression which culminated in 1981 and this pushed 
Keeran to join a political organization. He said he developed a sudden yearning to join 
the youth movement that was making headway in the Tamil political realm and the 
organization he joined was TELO. I asked him why he joined TELO. With a big smile 
Keeran said, ‘Well they were the ones who contacted me first, and I did not have any 
idea of what I should join but just wanted to join some organization which was agitating 
for Tamil rights.’ 
 
Keeran’s political journey started against this backdrop when he joined TELO, the Tamil 
Eelam Liberation Organization. TELO was named as the political wing to the militant 
organization Tamil Eelam Liberation Army (TELA) founded by Nadarajah Thangavelu 
alias Thangadurain in September 1977. Thangadurai set up his organization inspired by 
the IRA and he made the TELO function similar to that of the Sinn Fein (Swamy 1994: 
36). TELO was a leading militant organization formed in the mid 1970s by pioneers of 
early Tamil militancy which started in the 1960s, where Thangadurai was a member of 
underground militant groups of the Democratic Tamil United front, the key Tamil party 
which had Tamil representation in the legislature. Keeran joined TELO in 1982 and was 
sent for military training in India. TELO was widely known to be the darling of India out 
of all the militant organizations then, and drew strong support whilst being heavily 
funded by the Indian military.  
 
Keeran talked about his life in the organization and the Indian link with the Tamil 
militancy in Sri Lanka. He told me, ‘In 1982 I went for military training to India, we 
were trained in a location in Anna Nagar. At that time the Indian government did not 
support us openly, there were 24 of us, this was the first batch, our leader Thangadurai 
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was in prison at this time and we were led by Sri Sabaratnam who joined us in the 
training.’ The Indian military operations were quite covert at that time; the Indian 
involvement became more open after the1983 riots. Keeran told me, ‘We were trained by 
a retired Major of the Indian army, he was an Indian Tamil, and the camp had 82 trainees 
including LTTE cadres.’ 
 
1983 saw the largest diaspora flow out of Sri Lanka and it also created a more politically 
active Tamil militancy which received generous support from India, and TELO benefited 
significantly until it was decimated by the LTTE. Keeran described the strong 
relationship TELO had with India: ‘I came to Jaffna in 1983 was working for the TELO 
and I was mainly involved in recruitment. In the aftermath of the riots, our leader Sri 
Sabaratnam went to India and held talks with Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. He 
negotiated with india to train our members and three to four batches were recruited by 
the Indian army and were trained in India.’ 
 
This phenomenon is explained by Hoole et al, ‘The July 1983 riots and the adoption by 
India of the militant groups changed all this. With material help from India, the militant 
groups became purely military organizations, accountable to the RAW and not the Tamil 
public. The latter became everyone’s plaything’ (1992:31). Keeran returned to Sri Lanka 
in 1983 and was arrested in a crack down on Tamil militants by the Sri Lankan military. 
Badly tortured in army interrogations Keeran still carries these scars of militancy. The 
imprisonment saved Keeran’s life as he escaped the purging of TELO by the LTTE in 
1986, while Keeran spent four years in prison. Keeran’s anger at the LTTE was 
heightened when he heard about the first suicide bombing LTTE carried out in 1987.  
 
Keeran recalled his capture and the events which unfolded in his foru years in 
imprisonment, ‘In October 1983 I was arrested by the Sri Lankan army and was kept in 
the Elephant Pass army camp, I was interrogated by Major Denzil Kobbekaduwa.’ 
Keeran recalled how this Major who later became a mastermind in military strategy and 
a respected general, who died in a landmine explosion, treated them during their 
confinement in Elephant Pass military base,  
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We were all treated as Tigers, the soldiers called us Tigers. From Elephant Pass I 
was transferred to Colombo and was taken to the 4th floor four for questioning, 
and the questioning went on for months. I was held in detention at the Harbour 
police station in Colombo, then I was transferred to Welikade, where I was 
housed in a new wing which was earlier used for women prisoners. 
 
Describing the prison facility Keeran said, ‘This was used specially for detainees under 
the PTA, I was held there for 2 years and then was produced in a court, I pleaded guilty 
and was given 5 and half years imprisonment. The magistrate ordered me to be released 
in December 1987 as I had already served two and half years in prison by 1985.’ Apart 
from this, prison life helped Keeran to become a changed man, he decided that violence 
could never achieve what he believed in earlier. Prison enabled Keeran to make new 
friends, as there were militants from all organizations in his prison cell; and they still 
remain useful contacts in his current political activities. ‘In prison I met and made 
friends with lots of leaders of other militant groups, especially Roberts of EPRLF, and in 
1988 after I was freed, I decided to head to the UK.’ 
 
When Keeran was finally released he said he was a changed man and he had totally 
given up violence or militarism for the sake of Tamil nationalism. On 5 July 1987, 
Vallipuram Vasathan known in LTTE ranks as Capt. Miller became the first suicide 
martyr for the LTTE when he rammed a truck filled with explosives into a heavily 
fortified army garrison in Jaffna. His target was a well-respected high school in Jaffna 
(the Nelliady high school) that had been garrisoned by the army with the heightening of 
the conflict. The impact and subsequent attack killed 18 soldiers but structurally 
destroyed the whole school. Nelliady high school was where Keeran studied till he 
joined the TELO and this has had a drastic effect on Keeran’s psyche.  
 
Though Keeran wanted to go to the UK, he did not have an idea of what his life would 
be like there. The diasporic flow, plus threats from LTTE, made his decision easier as 
the LTTE pursued remaining TELO members. ‘I acquired a Sri Lankan passport and 
with some money I went through the immigration officials. After I arrived in UK I did 
not have any idea or money and was not involved in any political activity’, Keeran said 
recalling his entry into the UK. After he moved, Keeran had to face severe hardships in 
life, ‘Life was hard. I worked in various supermarkets in London for two to three years 
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and also did work in a garage as a mechanical hand.’ In London Keeran started to 
publish a Tamil magazine, titled ‘Thaham’ (Thirst) for the Tamil community. The LTTE 
vigorously opposed this and Keeran’s Tamil publication was forcibly shut down. ‘I 
started publishing a Tamil magazine called “Thaham” in 1994. It was completely 
criticizing the LTTE and even I condemned the attack on the Mullativu army base. The 
LTTE threatened me and also threatened all shops that sold my magazine and I had 
simply to shut the operation under fear, threats and intimidation.’ 
 
With the failure of his first attempt to be a diaspora political activist, Keeran turned to 
the private sector to make a living. ‘Then I sought employment at a Korean computer 
company and worked on the hardware component of the business, this was the time 
when 28614 was hitting the market. I specialised in assembling computers and then 
started my own computer assembling business in 1999.’ Keeran re-entered the political 
field when he finally made contacts with other Tamil activists, who were mainly anti 
LTTE and with whom Keeran developed a close association. ‘By this time I was 
associating with Tamil activists who were associated with forums such as Tamil 
performance arts, this involved people who were politically criticizing the Tigers. This is 
where I met some of my friends who have formed the vanguard of the Tamil dissident 
movement in London.’ 
 
This section has traced the political life stories of two individuals who currently form the 
vanguard of Tamil dissident diaspora politics. It is not merely a story-telling exercise but 
an introduction to two unique individuals who are part of the diasporic flow that has 
realigned political identities to spearhead a reform diasporic political movement free 
from the grip of the LTTE. The story traces the incidents that made them militants and 
the spatial context of the unmaking of these affinities to become a total opposite to what 
they represented in the beginning. Their stories display individual struggles to break 
through spatial limitations and hegemonic ideologies which are spatially enforced. This 
is not a story of fleeing but it is a story of flows, mobility and new territory as the 
diaspora activist always looks for new spaces to be heard in. In short, these are stories of 
                                                   
14 The 286 was launched in 1986 in the USA by IBM the leader in PC manufacturers then and was seen as a 




minoritarian struggles in the face of majoritarian oppression. These stories lead to 
introduction of other respondents involved in my thesis and set the tone as to why these 
individuals are important in my research. They demonstrate that these are individuals 
who have committed their lives to politics and are key political agents in the Tamil 




2.6 The location 
 
There are two locations in the Western world where the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora has 
concentrated and established operations: Toronto in Canada and London in the United 
Kingdom. Tamil diasporans are spread throughout the rest of Europe, but significant 
numbers and political decision making are done in these two locations. London has a 
history of Tamil migration even before the exodus in 1983 (Daniel and Thangaraj 1995). 
The LTTE established its international head office in London and directs international 
political operations from London. The borough of Brent (North-west London) is home to 
the largest number of Sri Lankan Tamils, calculated to be in the region of 12,000. The 
Tamil population in London and Greater London is the largest in the UK and, although is 
predominately Sri Lankan in origin, it is a community that additionally supports Tamils 
from India, Mauritius, Malaysia, Singapore and South Africa. Other main settlements of 
Tamils in the United Kingdom are in East Ham, Merton, Surbiton, Tooting and 
Croydon.15  
 
According to Gunaratne (1998), the UK has always been the heart of LTTE overseas 
political activity. Since the riots of July 1983, the LTTE has expanded into Europe from 
London. To make its position secure, the LTTE has either established, absorbed, or 
                                                   
15 There is no single statistic of exact number Sri Lankan Tamils in United Kingdom, as there are 
undetermined number of illegal migrants as well. The figures have been given at various occasions by the 
UNHCR, research findings by Daniel and Thangarajah and the research done by Rohan Gunaratne reveal 
some figures. The most recent work by Nick Van Hear and revealed that there are 39,000 Tamil asylum his 
team from Centre on Migration policy and society (COMPAS) University of Oxford reveal the problem to 
have an accurate figure of the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora in UK, according to them a reasonable estimate of 
the UK resident Tamil population is between 70,000 and 100,000.  
(http://www.compas.ox.ac.uk/publications/papers/DFID%20diaspora%20report.pdf ). According to a 
labour party councilor I interviewed in my pilot study working with the home office seekers, 39,000 asylum 





infiltrated a number of Tamil organizations and Tamil community structures. They are 
mainly controlled through LTTE or LTTE-front organizations in the UK. Most 
prominent of these are the Tamil Information Centre (TIC) at Bridge End close, 
Kingston in London, The Tamil Rehabilitation Organization in Walthamstow in London, 
and the International Federation of Tamils (IFT) in Birchiew Close in Surrey. 
 
Interestingly, although there has been some research into the Tamil Diaspora in London 
comparatively with Tamil diasporas in Canada, Norway and Switzerland (Cheran 2001, 
Fuglerud 1999 and Mcdowell 1996), little research has been done into actual diaspora 
political engagements of Sri Lankan Tamils in London. Secondly, the active dissident 
group of Tamils propagating anti LTTE political operations is predominantly based in 
London. Interestingly, London has thus been site of most of my key research on Sri 
Lankan Tamil diaspora, especially on the growth of the diaspora and LTTE nexus. I was 
further interested in my research about the importance of London as a diaspora location. 
This question seem to be avoided by many researchers, who may have taken for granted 
explanations ranging from the colonial legacy, to easier access for asylum seekers in the 
1980s and early 1990s. I endeavoured trying to understand its impact as a major city on 
the lives of diasporans and its importance and implications for political engagement.  
 
The city is a spatial formation according to Pile (1999), who brings out three broader 
categories of spatial markers which he uses to distinguish cities as spaces. The first 
attribute is density, the concentration of people, things, institutions and architectural 
forms. Second is the heterogeneity of life they juxtapose in close proximity, and third is 
on city as a hub of various networks of communication that flow across and beyond the 
cities. 
 
Diaspora politics can be located in the context of identifying a city as a spatial entity and 
the spaces of political action that it provides. The spaces in modern cities facilitate 
different networks to operate, and these operations can be channeled in many directions 
with an inherent force which can create political effects. Massey identifies this as a kind 
of ‘spatial configuration generative’ as intense social effects resulting from ‘dense 




Sutha, a key pro-LTTE Tamil activist told me, ‘London is a diaspora centre and political 
engagement is much richer in London as it is the central hub of Sri Lankan politics. 
London is the thickest diaspora centre on Sri Lanka, and the information flow from 
London is critical as it is the international capital, politically important (unlike Toronto) 
for all Sri Lankan parties, even like the UNP, SLFP and the JVP.’ He further pointed out 
that ‘London is an international operational centre and it is key for academic and studies 
and Britain is a major player in the Sri Lankan context and all these factors can’t be 
separated from each other in the importance of London for us.’ This observation can be 
presented as an example to theoretical analysis of Massey on the generative aspect of 
city spaces, especially in the context of the LTTE network and its front offices which use 
London as a kind of space for generating significant political links to multiple locations 
globally. 
 
Nallu, a dissident political leader, responding to a question on the importance of London 
as a location for political activism told me ‘It is important because of several reasons, 
mainly London has a sizable diaspora population which is second only to Canada. The 
Canadian Tamil diaspora is more of a refugee diaspora while the London Tamils 
represents more of a social fabric made out of professionals, students, and even with 
organizations such as EROS and EPRLF which are founding members of the Eelam 
movement.’ Nallu also pointed out ‘London is an inspiring place, where activists from 
Nicaragua, El Salvador, can be found and have some offices. It is a breeding ground, and 
a fertilizer, and a cross fertilizer, as representatives of every bloody movement and office 
on earth are in London. It includes a variety of homo sapiens from the modern to the 
remotest tribe in the world.’ 
 
The views of Nallu are interesting, if one looks at Amin and Thrift’s viewed London in 
which they point out: 
 
The place called London, for example, has been fashioned and refashioned 
through commentaries , recollections, memories and erasures, and in a variety of 
media – monumental, official and vernacular newspapers and magazines, guides 
and maps, photographs, films, news reels and novels, street level conversations 
and tales. The naming, of course is highly selective, giving us London as the 
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signature of empire, of crowded streets, art galleries, pubs, and people from 
around the world, of silent trains, well trimmed suburban gardens, terraced 
houses. But somehow the fragments do come together into an enduring picture of 
London as a busy gateway to the world, a cosmopolis that is also homely (2002: 
2). 
 
Thus London is more of an amalgamation of multitudes of sites. Although it is one city 
the spatiality of the city has made it a container of a significant multiplicity of people, 
organizations and political actions.  
 
London was one of the most favoured destinations of the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora and 
apart from political reasons, being in London is a prestige thing as well.  In my 
interviews with political activists, Jeyabalan a dissident Tamil activist shared with me 
some recent experience of his visits to Jaffna. Jeyabalan is a journalist in exile from Sri 
Lanka and he is a key member of the Tamil dissident activists. He said ‘When I am back 
home, and visiting people I used to know, everyone has someone in the diaspora, but 
there are categories of treatment depending on the country you reside. Still the best 
hospitality and respect is for the people living in the UK.’ 
 
Keeran brought out his views on London, especially on its political importance. He told 
me ‘London is very important politically as there are three generations of Tamils living 
in London and they are with education levels, unlike total 1983 refugees, like in 
Canada.’ Jeyabalan brought out an interesting dimension into being a Londoner and its 
effect on diaspora politics when he said ‘London is important because it is central and 
the political engagements are through using English which is important in this struggle.’ 
He told me that ‘even in Sri Lanka and in Jaffna being in London gives you an elevated 
social status compared to disporans living in Canada, the USA or any other point in 
Europe.’ Thus for the Tamil diaspora activist being in London has multiple social and 
political connotations which echo even in his homeland.  
 
London has become an important location for dissident Tamil political activists 
compared even to other European sites of dissidents which had a significant dissident 
presence prior to London. It is mainly because of the spatial attributes of London and the 
multiple facets of spaces available in London as there are many different kinds of space, 
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not just one, and the smallest spatiality can have the largest social consequences (Amin 
and Thrift 2002: 40). This thesis explores the spaces that the dissidents acquired in 
political engagements through online cyber activities. These have mainly two critical 
attributes. Firstly, the ability to take over or infiltrate closed spaces in London over 
which the LTTE had significant control and, secondly, the ability to politicize the 
dissident voice in spaces which went beyond the spatial limits of London.  
 
Apart from being a geographically central location and having strong links with Sri 
Lanka from colonial times, there were a few other factors that were considered in my 
selection of London as the site of my research. There was clearly heightened Diaspora 
activity in London after 2002 which saw a surge in the developments that led to the 
LTTE’s internal split in 2004. Compated with Toronto, Paris and other diaspora 
locations, London was the centre for sustained activity by the largest number of Sri 
Lanka migrants. It was here too that the LTTE organized its online show of defiance in 
the aftermath of its internal political splits. Many of the political activists whom I 
interviewed claimed that London was a relatively safe place to live compared to other 
European and North American destinations, especially if you are a dissident political 
activist. Many LTTE operations are run by fronts such as Tamil Rehabilitation 
Organization (TRO), World Tamil Congress (WTC) and White Pigeon because it is easy 
to register them as charities in London. The UK charity law is comparatively flexible 
and enabled these political organizations to establish the tax-free institutional bases 
necessary for their operational, logistical and coordinating work. Finally, the dilemmas 
of operating across multiple time zones which has become a feature of globalised 
business enterpriseare also applicable in transnational political movements. There is a 
smaller time difference between Colombo and London than between Colombo and North 
America or Australia, this making it a highly practical base for globalised political 
activity. 
 
The importance of London as a political site is brought out through the voices of Tamil 
diaspora political activists themselves. I have not tried to provide my own interpretations 
on the importance of London for the diasporans but I have spatially located their 
arguments linking them with current analysis on cities. These spatial analyses includes 
the aspects of high mobility, the agglomeration of flows which define city life, and the 
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city as order, an ordering which is often exacted through the design of flows as a set of 
serial encounters which construct particular spaces and times (Amin and Thrift 2002: 
82). The notion of space which came up in many of my interviews bears a hall mark of 
how space has become an important aspect in their social and political lives. I will 
explore this and bring out a theoretical framework to understand the notion of space and 




This chapter has introduced the research framework of the thesis and locates the key 
theoretical argument based on the different approaches to politicizing cyberspace in the 
struggle between pro-LTTE Tamil diasporan political activists and the dissident groups. 
The respondents were introduced at length and it was skewed in representation as more 
dissident Tamils are featured. I argued that focusing on the dissidents and exploring their 
political activities adds and broadens the exisiting analysis of Sri Lanka Tamil diaspora 
political sphere. Theoretically engaging with two different political groups in the same 
diaspora provides the chance to develop an interesting theoretical framework where two 
versions of political ideologies clash and create new dynamics in the understanding of 
political space, political practices and political conflicts. This chapter is intrinsically 
linked with Chapter One, as both set out the mechanisms setting the thesis in motion and 
its basic foundations in respect of existing knowledge and the theoretical framework 
adopted. This chapter points to where the thesis can be located in terms both the contexts 
of research on Tamil diaspora politics and politics of cyberspace involving diaspora 








This chapter introduces the methodological dimensions of conducting research online 
and the type of framework I have applied for my research on Tamil diaspora web 
political engagements. The chapter also engages with key methodologies which have 
been used for understanding the impact of the internet on social relations and political 
engagements. I introduce Web Sphere Analysis as the preferred framework for analyzing 
the internet and trends in the internet with Tamil diaspora politics and Tamil politics of 
nationalism online. I critically engage with some existing research into the online 
politics of Sri Lankan Tamil political activists while trying to position my own research 
in contrast to the existing studies. This chapter discusses existing methodologies of 
online research and the strengths and weaknesses of these methodologies against my 
research objectives. It introduces Web Sphere Analysis, broadly discussing its role as a 
multi-dimensional research framework, and the importance of integrating it with a total 
research framework, which includes the fieldwork research introduced in the next two 
sections along with the online research. 
 
3.2 Research on Tamil diaspora politics online  
 
There have been previous studies of the online activities of the Tamil diaspora, from web 
content focused research in the form of Mark Whitaker’s (2006; 2007) study of 
Tamilnet.com to the security analysis of Shyam Tekwani (2006). Tekwani in a recent 
publication claims ‘The LTTE’s use of the Internet and other new media and 
communication technologies as an integral part of its campaign represents an emerging 
security issue in the region’ (2006: 12) and goes on to point out on the basis of huge 
websites such as Tamilnation.com and Eelamnation.com, that ‘The LTTE’s formidable 
online presence is a virtual Tamil Eelam online’ (2006: 14). The claims made in these 
studies and analysis are important for understanding the use of the internet and of web 
sites such as Tamilnet.com. What makes my research different is that it focuses on a 
number of web sites, not one or two, and also I analyse their content multi-dimensionally 
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in both discursive and structural terms. These websites are selected using a methodology 
adapted to study online political action. This minimizes the random selection of web 
sites as the sites are analysed in context as one research unit containing multiple 
websites. This responds to a key drawback in existing research work on the use of the 
internet for Tamil diaspora politics, which I will introduce briefly before engaging with 
the methodology I have selected for this research. 
 
Here, I engage with Maya Ranganathan’s (2002) study on the internet and Tamil politics 
and the problems encountered in making assumptions and claims about internet politics 
without a proper methodological framework for data gathering and data analysis. She 
investigates the use of the Internet to construct national identity. Using the example of 
the struggle of the Sri Lankan Tamils for recognition as a nation, her case revolves 
around a study of selected Sri Lanka Tamil diaspora web sites, and through this she 
claims one can predict the ability of a recreation of a virtual Tamil nation. She notes, 
‘For the members of stateless ethnonational diasporas, who have left their homelands 
due to an uncertain political climate, the Internet provides the most effective way to 
maintain cultural and emotional ties with the nation’ (Ranganathan 2002: 54). She makes 
this observation in her analysis of the use of the internet, the key drawback in deriving 
this conclusion concerns the ground of which her claims are made. Her hypothesis is 
built around the ability of the internet to connect and to communicate across significant 
distances. Ranganathan adopts a less robust empirical strategy when she randomly goes 
through certain web sites that support the LTTE. This makes her observations abstract as 
her analysis suffers from the lack of a solid framework equipped to capture web activity. 
Web Sphere Analysis makes a huge contribution by enabling the definition of this 
critical sphere prior to launching any kind of research. This was the key reason for 
selecting this method to guide my research application as it involves both online and 
offline research work.  
 
Ranganathan goes on to say, ‘The attributes of the Internet allow the Tamils to 
systematically construct national and cultural identities over time’ (2002: 59). The 
attributes she identifies in the Internet are with communication functions, informational 
exchanges and its making to cut across boundaries. There is little evidence apart from 
analysing the substance of few web sites to support the above conclusion. With random 
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analysis of web content in three web sites she attempts to enforce the notion of the 
construction of national identities. Ranganathan continues, ‘The seeming defiance of the 
Internet against any form of political control makes the medium a potential threat to the 
power of nation-states. It is an ideal tool of communication not just in the hands of 
nation-states, but also in the hands of aspiring nations’ (2002: 62). However, this is a 
statement which underlines most other forces within the context of nation state, global 
flows and dynamics of ethno-nationalist conflicts that have been internationalized.  
 
Ranganathan makes such assumptions based on an analysis derived from analyzing web 
content that has not been collected utilizing a proper research framework sutiable for 
online research. Ranganathan’s research furthermore does not look at the the offline 
dimension of political activities of the Tamil diaspora, which she discusses through 
observations of its online manifestations. It is important to work with a framework that 
allows both the offline and online to be engaged, to derive conclusions on the actual 
effect of the internet, like in Ranganathan’s case the construction of ‘national identity’.  
 
Earlier research has focused on the LTTE factor and its influence on web politics. Thus 
important factors such as the dissident Tamil political groups and individuals are not 
captured and analysed. These new dynamics have shifted the outcome of web 
engagements to different scenarios, unforeseen by agents who began using the web for 
political purposes. This is what has been revealed in my research on the Sri Lankan 
Tamil diaspora web sphere. I will engage with online research methodologies such as 
network analysis and virtual ethnography in the next section, prior to introducing the 
conceptual and operational aspects of Web Sphere Analysis. These methodologies are 
engaged to explain what added advantage Web Sphere Analysis provides for the 










3.3 Online research methods 
 
Studies based on the impact of cyberspace were conducted just a few years after its 
inception. Howard Rheingold’s research introduced the concept of ‘virtual communities’ 
(1998) opening up research into the social impact of web technologies. Steven Jones’ 
Doing Internet Research 1999 was the first comprehensive work that was focused on 
looking at incorporating research methodologies for internet research. Jones introduced 
theoretical dimensions of methodological applications and critical issues that arise in 
researching cyberspace. Christine Hine’s Virtual Ethnography (2000) added the 
importance of cultural dimension in researching cyberspace. She emphasised the 
importance of researching the internet in a cultural context and exploring cyber trends as 
cultural products. Another important work was Internet Communication and Qualitative 
Research (Mann and Stewart, 2000) which exposed the use of internet as a data 
gathering tool to be used in qualitative research 
 
I will briefly introduce certain contributions on internet research, prior to focusing on the 
main methodology that I have selected for drawing my research design. In the context of 
online research, some researchers have suggested the human experience of 
simultaneously inhabiting both offline and online environments results in understandings 
of the self as multiple (Turkle 1995). They claim that online participations create 
multiple personae and this shows a fluidity and multiplicity in online networks. The key 
draw back in this idea is that these researchers are unable to come up with a sustainable 
research framework to manage the fluidity of the virtual environment as it is not as 
straightforward as conducting research in a geographic setting. Web researchers need to 
look into a multiple number of web sites, producers of web content and the offline (real 
world) implication of them. Added to this complicated nature of web space are the forms 
of presentation of individuals, mainly the web producers and people who can interact 
online. In many cases such interaction is difficult to grasp for research purposes, with 
real world identities being substituted by new ones in cyberspace. Research on activists 
in cyberspace has to gauge the real world impact of such activism. These challenging 
research situations need to be managed using sophisticated methodological frameworks. 
This is the reason I use this chapter to engage with current research tools that are 
available for quality controlling cyberspace research practices, and what added benefits 
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my preferred methodological framework brings into the online research component of 
my thesis. 
 
The emergence of network theories in social sciences has had a tremendous effect up on 
methods of studying the Internet. Network analysis has diverse approaches from spatial 
analysis to observing nodes of connections of organizations. The fundamental issue is 
that the Internet is a manifestation of a matrix of networks and this has lead more 
researchers to carry out spatial network analysis. The premier researcher who has 
focused on this approach, Barry Wellman, states that analysis must go beyond single 
users as cyberspace is a networked environment (2003). Social network analysis, which 
focuses on patterns or relations between and among people, organizations and states, has 
shifted to cyberspace. This shift has made this approach a very valid one. The key draw-
back in analyzing the Internet through a network approach is that there is no clear 
framework for capturing both spatial and temporal dynamics of the network in network 
analysis as it concentrates mostly on the nodes of connections and the inter-relations 
between these nodes. Cyberspace is not just about space but the convergence of space 
and time, thus any political engagement in cyberspace needs to be analyzed temporally 
along with its spatial displacement.  
 
3.3.1 Virtual ethnography 
 
Apart from the key approaches, the most ground breaking approach in social science 
research on the Internet came from Christine Hine (2000, 2006) as mentioned above. 
Hine viewed the Internet as a cultural context best researched with the application of 
ethnography. Although there were more ethnographic style approaches on the study of 
life in cyberspace (Jones 1999), a comprehensive contribution came from Hine (2000) in 
her ground breaking work Virtual Ethnography. 
 
Ethnographers such as Reid (1995) and Nancy Baym (1995) have taken an interest in 
exploring the internet before Christine Hine introduced the notion of ‘Virtual 
ethnography’. Hine claims that communication technologies, especially the opening up 
of cyberspace, saw the internet conceptualized as ‘culture’ (2000). The cultural 
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dimension to cyberspace became the focus of attention, especially for anthropologists, 
sociologists and political scientists. According to Hine, they were interested in studying 
cyberspace to look at the social, cultural and political formations taking shape in 
cyberspace. She claims, ‘On-line ethnographers join their chosen field sites for sustained 
periods, interacting with their informants and building up a richly detailed picture of the 
ways in which the medium is used to create and sustain relationships’ (2000: 43). 
 
According to Hine (2000) virtual ethnography involves a challenging expansion of the 
parameters of ethnographic research where the researchers have to deal with mediated 
and distributed interactions online rather than the common face to face interactions or 
observations. The method is a combination of two methodological strategies, firstly a 
‘duplication’ of basic ethnographic standpoints to carry on the functions in the new 
space of cyberspace Secondly, virtual ethnography needs to tackle the traditional shift 
from a selected field site to accommodate a site that appears as a matrix of 
interconnected and mediated spaces. In this, it is related to the ethnography of networks 
(Newman 1998). While maintaining traditional value parameters in ethnographic work, 
virtual ethnography needs to adapt to new changes in location. It aims to sustain 
practices of ‘thick description’ (Geertz 1983), and to achieve this by paying attention to 
the perspective of the actors themselves (Ward 1999; Slater 2002). These shifts in 
methodological practices involved in virtual ethnography are claimed to make it distinct 
from other online research methods. 
 
According to Hine (2000) in investigating a case through a virtual ethnographic research 
there are key issues that could be illuminated. They include the ability to understand 
primarily the linkages between society and the Internet, or in other terms the ‘social 
meaning’ of the internet. In virtual ethnographic research there is more freedom for the 
researcher to be mobile, especially between the offline and online dimensions. 
 
Virtual ethnography is presented as a method to grasp rapid changes to human life styles 
as they become more entrenched in the cyberspace. A key understanding of Hine (2000) 
is that virtual ethnography is ultimately an adaptive ethnography, adaptive in the sense 
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that it can respond to the fluidity of web interactions without losing track of research 
objectives.   
 
Virtual ethnography has evolved into a strong methodological approach for studying 
online behavior. It has become a critical tool for understanding minute changes within 
human interactions in web space. Virtual ethnography provides an ideal input into the 
social and technological interface that has developed with the interlinking of the physical 
world to the virtual one. But its weakness comes in its grounding, as ‘Virtual 
ethnography’ has a problem in developing robust parameters for its research site and 
researching across interlinked web sites as a clear archiving strategy is not included in 
the method.  
 
Hine (2000) pioneered virtual ethnography as a method when she led a project analyzing 
web content and also reaching out to web producers in an attempt to look at the internet 
events that developed out of the Louise Woodward trial in Boston in 1997. Louise 
Woodward was a teenage British nanny who was tried in Boston for the murder of the 
child Matthew Eppan who was in her care. 
 
Hine’s interest in researching the Woodward case came at the end of the trial. Hine 
claimed that she was drawn in to studying the Woodward case after witnessing the 
increasing numbers of web sites that emerged in cyberspace parallel to the trial. The trial 
began on 7 October 1997, then after deliberation on 30 October 1997 the Jury returned a 
murder verdict on Woodward, but the judge decided to overturn the verdict (under 
Boston law gives the judge the power to overturn jury decisions). The Judge, Hiller 
Zobel announced he would release the ruling on internet, mainly on the website 
lawyersweekly.com. On 10 November 1997 his decision was released in which he found 
Louise Woodward guilty of involuntary manslaughter and passed a sentence of 279 days 
in state prison, which by that time Louise had already served and this set her free. The 
period between 30 October and 10 November saw the internet being deployed as a site 
competing for justice, mainly arguing for the release of Louis Woodward. Many support 
sites were created and the topic was hotly debated in bulletin boards and forums. These 




Virtual ethnographers struggle to establish coherence in their research fields. Unlike in a 
physical setting, the hyper linked nature of web sites always creates and recreates its 
configuration. Thus it becomes difficult for the ethnographer to negotiate these sudden 
changes. In cases of transnational diasporan political engagements, analysis of the 
network spatially is not sufficient for understanding its functions. A temporal analysis of 
the network is critical as well. Virtual ethnographies stop short of the ability to integrate 
both temporal and spatial analysis of networks. 
 
The above approaches to studying online behavior when linked with political action, as I 
have mentioned in this section, have weaknesses that reduce the ability to research 
political engagements across time and space. The network approach is sound in its 
ability to analyze spatially dispersed political movements that are interlinked in 
cyberspace. But it is incapable of providing an adequate temporal framework to support 
its arguments on the political engagements of these networks. These deficiencies have 
made me look for alternative methods that incorporate both spatial and temporal factors. 
Web Sphere Analysis has the capability to capture these interactions or engagements in 
cyberspace. This is why I am introducing Web Sphere Analysis as the best alternative 
research framework. It has the added advantage of being able to integrate traditional 
methods of social science research with high tech interfaces.  
 
3.4 Web Sphere Analysis 
 
As more and more social interaction is shifted to cyberspace, it has become an 
interesting site of human behavior, and of the development of new types of social 
association. The internet, in actuality, is not just a technology. Were it a technology 
alone, little about it would be of great interest. As Jones point out, ‘It is not the technical 
challenges but, rather, the social ones that seem to require most the most demanding of 
social balancing acts, between compromise, competition and standardization’ (1999: 25). 
Thus the internet has become a field of social activity, economic exchange and political 
action. This calls for an innovative research methodology as traditional approaches may 
not help because of the fluidity and dynamism in cyberspace. Here I introduce a system 
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which provides a research method to be applied when engaged in research in cyberspace. 
This system is based on Foot and Schneider’s (2004; 2005) recent contribution to the 
discipline. The key challenge they are trying to manage is the rapid and unpredictable 
evolution of the web, and they attempt to develop methodological approaches permitting 
robust examination of web phenomena over time. 
 
Web Sphere Analysis is an important supplementary framework in my fieldwork 
research design. It leads to primary data and captures them coherently thus providing a 
comprehensive set of data that can be analysed along with the findings from my 
fieldwork in London. The stabilization of the field makes it easier to use multiple 
approaches to analyse web sites, and to analyse them individually while also 
highlighting the way such sites are grouped or aggregated politically.  
 
Web Sphere Analysis is based on the premise that online action and online political 
processes can be analysed or ‘partially explained’ through the identification of web 
objects. These objects are interpreted as representing the motives of the web 
producers and as facilitating potential structures for social action. According to the 
architects of this framework it is a, ‘framework for web studies that enables analysis 
of communicative actions and relations between web producers and users 
developmentally over time’ (Foot and Schneider 2006: 158). The notion of Web 
Sphere Analysis is quite new and thus I am using a majority of direct references from 
Foot and Schneider (2006) who introduced this the approach and conducted research 
using it. There are quite a number of researchers who have now used Web Sphere 
Analysis extensively though the literature is still very limited. 
 
Foot and Schneider go on to explain what exactly a web sphere is and especially 
what its parameters is. As they try to bring out the actual values of the system and 
parameters it covers, they state: 
 
We conceptualize a web sphere as not simply a collection of web sites, but as a 
set of dynamically defined digital resources spanning multiple web sites deemed 
relevant or related to a central event, concept or theme, and often connected by 
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hyperlinks. The boundaries of a web sphere are delimited by a shared topical 
orientation and a temporal framework (2006: 158).  
 
3.4.1 Importance of Web Sphere Analysis 
 
According to Foot and Schneider (2006), the Web Sphere captured through archiving 
becomes the central ‘aggregate unit of analysis’ and this is a stable unit of analysis and 
becomes a significant utility in creative an integrative research framework for structural, 
discursive and socio cultural analysis. Thus the researcher can decide on the selection of 
methods, as the key challenge in online research is devising a framework which can be 
used to capture the online developments 
 
In simple terms a web sphere provides the researcher with a more robust and well 
demarcated site to carry on online research especially on online political action. In this 
light the main understanding should be that Web Sphere Analysis is not just a research 
method but provides the necessary conditions to embark on the research. It is a more 
advanced system for establishing parameters in highly dynamic environments such as 
cyberspace.  In the words of Foot and Schneider it is ‘The processes of 
demarcating/establishing web spheres and of identifying constituent elements in a web 
sphere are foundational to tracking developmental trajectories of online action’ (2006: 
164).  
 
This system helps overcome serious issues regarding online research. Social science 
which depends on conventional methods of researching finds it extremely difficult to 
adapt to the conditions of flux and constant interchange in cyberspace. But when the 
researcher is able to locate a stable research foundation within an identified space, it 
reduces the burden and transforms the research challenge from the seemingly impossible 
to the possible.  
 
As mentioned above the carving out of a web sphere is extremely important in carrying 
out online social science research. But in this section, the methodology of establishing 
and securing these parameters will be discussed. Prior to that, certain realities of the 
 
 99 
dynamics of the web need to be clarified. These dynamics are the primary challenges 
when one tries to demarcate a web sphere.  
 
The web is not produced by one single producer, a web site may have two or more co 
producers. Such joint production by multiple actors makes web sites diverse and bulky 
content making identification of authorship a problem. Also the often rapid and 
unpredictable evolution of the web is the greatest challenge any researcher would meet. 
In this context Foot and Schneider (2006) provide certain guidelines that provide a 
response to these challenges.  
 
Thus, if someone wants to select a set of websites and their connected sites built through 
the hyper-links, they have to test their anticipatability, predictability and stability, and 
explain the implications of various web sphere characteristics for the study of online 
action within and across them. According to Foot and Schneider (2006) the demarcation 
of boundaries is both a process of discovery and a process of creation. Below are the 
three key criteria needed for this dynamic boundary making process: 
 
1. Thematic anticipatibility: degree of emergence of web sphere, extent to which it 
is defined by a specific event. For example the massive internet traffic in 
response to 9/11 attacks and the various discussions and responses that emerged. 
In my research I have focused on the LTTE air raids and the process which 
eventually led to the web sphere activity even prior to the air attacks. 
 
2. Predict types of actors: who are likely to produce material that makes a web 
sphere possible, that can lead to them being at the centre of internet activity with 
the potential for the emergence of a web sphere. 
 
 
3. Stability of constituent web material: level of stability and development of sites, 
impact on how frequently the boundaries of the web sphere need to be 
reconsidered. How often they need to be examined. This also helps to look at 
web sites which have been maintained for a long time, but in Schneider’s and 




In my own research, I look at increased web activities in the post 2001 period, including 
the developments that took place after the peace talks and the signing of the Cease Fire 
Agreement (CFA) between the LTTE and the Government of Sri Lanka in 2002 and the 
internal split of the LTTE in 2004. These developments did show the potential to create a 
web sphere. Within this web sphere I focused mainly on political developments in a set 
of selected websites based on the EU ban imposed on the LTTE in May 2006 and the 
LTTE air raids on Colombo in March 2007. 
 
3.4.2. Approaches to studying the web sphere 
 
The developers of the system of Web Sphere Analysis introduce three different but 
mutually exclusive approaches for analyzing the web sphere. The processes of 
demarcating/establishing web spheres and of identifying constituent elements in a web 
sphere are foundational to tracking development trajectories of online action (Foot and 
Schneider 2006: 165). This in other words is the conjuncture where research methods 
come into play. The three approaches mentioned by Foot and Schneider are, 
 
1. Discursive/rhetorical analysis of web pages sites: content of the websites given 
priority. 
 
2. Structural feature analysis, individual websites as the unit of analysis, number of 
pages, hierarchy, ordering of pages, features, presence of search engine, multiple 
navigation 
 
3. Analysing multi actor cross site action on the web. Based on adaptation of socio 
cultural methods of inquiry. This analysis looks at the inter-linkages of web sites 
parallel to the objectives of the site producers. The cross actor analysis also 
enables the websites to be analysed linking them with offline field research 
methods such as participant observations and interviews.  
 
This categorization also draws an appropriate research design. The first dimension uses 
discursive or rhetorical analyses of web pages or sites. The analytical lens is more 
focused on the content of a web site, including images, texts and graphics, than its actual 
structuring elements. In an online action or political movement aspect, web texts are 
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treated as inscriptions of communicative practices on the part of site sponsors and/or 
users. Employing discursive or rhetorical analysis can help to illuminate social action 
that any movement or organization will take. 
 
The method also sheds light on relations between web producers within a web sphere, 
particularly according to Foot and Schneider (2006) when hypertext intertextuality is 
included through analyses of cross-site linking. This enabled me to look at the 
dominating political discourse in Tamil diaspora politics, and resistance in the form of 
counter hegemonic discourses originating from cyber political initiatives. Thus 
discursive analysis of web content is important to gauge the shape of the political 
struggle and the working of power within them.  
 
The second set of approaches involves structural/feature analyses. In this approach, the 
research methodology focuses on individual web sites as the unit of analysis. Especially 
in this case there is much focus on the structure of the site, such as the number of pages, 
hierarchical ordering of pages, or on the features found on the pages within the site, for 
instance the presence of a search engine, privacy policy, or multiple navigation options 
 
This also helps to understand what sort of a network that the website is part of, and it 
helps research mostly based as a network centric approach. But the meaning or 
‘substance’ of those network structures can be difficult to infer from large-scale mapping 
studies. 
 
The third type of approach for Web Sphere Analysis is focused on analyzing multi-actor, 
cross-site action on the web. This is based on adaptations from socio-cultural methods of 
inquiry in social science research. This is the most important approach in this set as it 
broadens the scope of the research. This provides the ultimate online, offline 
convergence. Lindlof and Shatzer (1998) make a significant contribution to this in their 




Socio-cultural approaches are useful for the analysis of complicated scenarios of online 
activism, which can include features of collaborative mobilization and extensive co-
production of features, pages, and interlinked sites of the social activism projects (Foot 
and Schneider 2006). The importance of Web Sphere Analysis is its capability to 
integrate a wide range of methods of analysis and forms of linking online content with 
offline activism. I use this analytical tool in engaging with political strategies of Tamil 
diaspora activists and to look at the findings based on concept of cyber terror and its 
offline implications. 
 
These three approaches are facilitating modes of analysis, and do connect when the 
research is executed, mainly in combination with research design choices regarding 
levels and units of analysis. As these analytical tools can be used in combination, my 
Web Sphere Analysis contains a mix of all these three approaches. 
 
The key factor that generated my interest in Web Sphere Analysis was the fact that it 
enables the researcher to work with methods not limited to online research. As political 
action, online activism always has a link to the offline. Web Sphere Analysis provides 
the space to carry on research online, mainly through the first two approaches mentioned 
above, while allowing the integration of methods such as interviews, focus group studies 
and surveys. This provides an integration of research methods and also generates very 
robust data and findings in any research project focused on online action. 
 
3.5 Applying Web Sphere Analysis 
 
In short the advantages of Web Sphere Analysis can be summed up as, 
 
1. Ability to define a research site, as it provides necessary parameters to form a 
research field out of multiple websites of various forms working on a common 
theme. 
 
2. It allows research both on a spatial axis as well as on a time period. Thus spatial 




3. It prevents the researcher veering off-course, as search engines and hyperlinks 
can be quite deceiving and may take shoot the research project into a different 
trajectory. 
 
4. Web Sphere Analysis functions as the perfect conduit between online and offline 
research fields. 
 
Kirsten Foot and her team of researchers carried out an elaborate Web Sphere Analysis 
on the types of civic engagement in the post-September 11 web sphere (2006). They 
mainly focused on understanding which type of site producers responded to the attacks 
via their sites, what kind of social and political actions web sites facilitated, what type of 
site producers were most likely to facilitate what kinds of actions, and what forms of 
civic engagement were reported by internet users in the weeks after September 11 2001. 
 
Foot’s research strength was based on effective archiving and analysis of web content. 
The research team managed by integrating findings based on web archives and 
interviews conducted with site producers to point the emergence of ‘online structures for 
action’ Web Sphere Analysisthe enabled Foot’s research team to identify forms of 
content produced in single sites as well analyses web content based on themes of 
political and social action. They analysed data emerging from Pew internet project’s16 
research on its sub project on ‘American Life’, along with sites produced by individuals 
as a response to the 9/11 attacks. These responses varied from providing further 
information about victims, or about, Al Qaeda, to specific web sites coordinating 
assistance to victims.  
 
3.5.1 Challenges encountered in researching the web sphere 
 
The key challenge in this method is processing the enormous amount of data generated 
from a Web Sphere Analysis. All these three approaches need periodic studies. As there 
are both spatial and temporal dimensions of online action, there definitely needs to be a 
                                                   
16 The Pew internet project is a think tank which is focused on looking at issues, atttitudes and trends 
shaping the American society. URL: http://www.pewinternet.org/about.asp  
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system of data archiving. Data archiving has become quite popular with more 
digitization of publications. Thus there are demands for systems of information 
management.  
 
The ephemerality of the web and its content emanates from both its ability to be changed 
instantaneously and its construction process. Thus from the perspective of the social 
researcher there is an acute shortage of specialized tools and techniques that ensure that 
content can be viewed again at a later time (Foot and Schneider 2006). The web has 
demonstrated its ability to sustain and store information at the same time, which brings 
about a sense of persistence that clearly distinguishes it from performance media. Thus a 
key challenge involves making decisions about when and what to archive, what will be 
the long-term use and how can one make material available for revisiting the data.  
 
In making this decision a technical challenge which I had to deal within my archiving 
process was effective and precise capturing of web sites and their materials such as 
images and videos in their original form and appearance. To overcome this challenge, 
while maintaining the originality of the sites, I selected a web capturing software called 
Snagit to aid data capturing. This software tool is developed by a company called 
TechSmith which is mainly involved in creating commercial web capturing solutions for 
the market.17 This software enabled easier capture of web sites in their full format. It 
contained the added advantage of an inbuilt editing tool making it easier to capture 
images and simultaneously customizing images to fit the necessary sections in my thesis. 
All images presented in this chapter, and the web content that is introduced in the next 
chapter, were captured and archived using this software. 
 
An important aspect of Web Sphere Analysis is that it enables the researcher to develop 
a strong archive out of web sites collected at regular intervals during a specific period, 
enabling retrospective and developmental analysis of many aspects of online relations. 
The web sphere in my research includes sites from both the pro-LTTE and anti-LTTE 
factions, following the criteria for a web sphere. These sites are interlinked, not through 
permanent links to each site, but because they are referring to opposing web sites 




constantly. Thus these inter-linkages have made the web sphere more dynamic and 
politically interesting and bring out the true dynamic nature of web space. The websites 
which are brought together in the analysis for the thesis are Nitharsanam.com, 
Eelamnation.com/net, Tamilnet.com, Tamilcanadian.com, Tamileditors.com, and 
Tamilnation.com, which are the most important websites of the pro-LTTE outfits as all 
other pro-LTTE websites are based on developments on the above websites. Websites 
such as www.vizhippu.com, Tamilaffairs.info, subicham.de, Thenee.com/de , www, 
Tamilaffairs.com and www.Neruppu.com represent the dissident web operations and 
these websites spearhead the dissident political discourse. These above websites were 
used mainly because they were the ones mentioned by many respondents in my pilot 
research in early 2006. There were also the interlinked websites which made up the pro-
LTTE and dissident web networks, each site, with the exception of www.Tamilnet.com 




This chapter examined existing research methodologies which look at social and 
political phenomena in cyberspace, while outlining some key methods such as network 
analysis and virtual ethnography. The chapter identified the importance of these two 
methods as well as their weaknesses. I introduced Web Sphere Analysis as the key 
research framework that I have adopted to analyse my online research. Web Sphere 
Analysis has been developed as a method to understand online political and social 
mobilization and it has the capacity to be integrated into larger research frameworks. 
This is the key feature of this method which is important in my research as well. My 
research is an integrated analysis of the impact of the internet on Tamil diasporan 
political activists that was explored through interviews conducted with them. This 
integration of larger research framework between an offline fieldwork and an online 
research can be achieved using Web Sphere Analysis as the online component as it is 
creates a strong unit of analysis in the form of an elaborate and solid web archive. I 
engaged with Ranganathan’s research (2002) that attempted to study the web 
phenomenon in the context of Tamil diaspora politics. She has focused on a limited 
number of websites and does not clearly outline her research methodology. In my 
fieldwork I engaged with political activists and gathered data through a mixture of 
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investigations looking at their own experience of cyberspace with politics and what they 
have witnessed on the rise of the use of internet technologies for politics. This chapter 
identifies the method I used to research online politics and the importance of my 
methodology in analyzing both the web sphere and linking it to the respondents’ 
interviews. I have argued why Web Sphere Analysis is important while outlining its key 
methodological features. I introduced approaches to Web Sphere Analysis, and which 
particular websites were selected for this research, which will be presented in the next 








This chapter is based on the online research component of my thesis and contains the 
analysis of the online political engagements as a form of power struggle. The events 
introduced are used as online evidence of the importance of web sites for politics and 
hegemony. The methodological framework of Web Sphere Analysis, its features and its 
importance, were discussed in the previous chapter. This is one of the two chapters 
devoted to its practical application, focusing on developments in cyberspace parallel to 
Tamil diaspora politics, and the use of the internet for political processes and objectives. 
This chapter contains a number of analyses of web sites and online developments, based 
on their thematic distinctions. I look at two key topics which were of interest to link 
Tamil diaspora activists during the period of my research. These two topics, are the ban 
imposed by the European Union (EU) on the LTTE in May 2006, and the air raid 
launched by the LTTE targeting a key military base of the Sri Lankan government in 
March 2007. I also introduce a case study of the personalised web attacks on the 
dissident activist Jeyadevan. This chapter will look at this phenomenon from the view 
point of extreme web politics in power struggles, while Chapter Five will look at it from 
the perspective of a political strategy of conflict. Analytical tools prescribed in Web 
Sphere Analysis from discursive analysis to cross actor participation are utilised for 
observing and anlaysing forms of conflict shifting to web space. 
 
Web Sphere Analysis will be based around events from 2006 – 2007. The analysis in the 
chapter will be guided initially by analysing the two key political developments 
mentioned above in the form of ‘web storms’. A web storm is an important event in the 
process of Web Sphere Analysis that has the potential to be transformed into a unit of 
analysis because of intensive inter-actor and inter-site activity over a relatively brief 
period of time based on a specific theme or event. Foot and Schneider (2004) note that a 
political scandal can result in a web storm, and they point out that some web storms 




4.2 ‘Web storms’ in Web Sphere Analysis  
 
Pro-Tamil nationalists who were sympathetic to the LTTE contributed to the shift in the 
conflict to cyberspace by developing web sites encouraging pro-LTTE fronts and LTTE 
led diaspora operations to take cyberspace seriously. Tamilnet.com was the first website 
which began its operations and was started by pro-LTTE activists. My online research 
took place ten years after the launch of Tamilnet.com. The Web Sphere Analysis in this 
thesis looks at the dynamics of web based political action while tracing new 
developments which have occurred during this period. The Tamilnet.com originated 
under circumstances in which the Sri Lankan government and dissident Tamil activists 
were gaining propaganda mileage over the LTTE in the eyes of pro-LTTE elements. 
They soon realized that the military engagements were not limited to troops, weapons, 
and battlefield advantages – they were also about a battle of perceptions. The LTTE 
understood the impact real time global feed would have on strategic decisions about the 
war and thus they wanted to gain the advantage of this. Initially the web operation of the 
LTTE was based on acquiring of this strategic edge and out-smarting the Sri Lankan 
state in this information sphere. What the LTTE did not expect was that in about ten 
years time the internet would not be limited to an information sphere and its spatial 
features might facilitate political action and mobility, transforming cyberspace into a site 
and space of politics. I start my research on the conjecture that the internet seems to have 
surpassed the idea of a mere informational exchange process. As Jones points out, the 
internet has not only connected computer networks but ideologies and ways of life that 
have, thus far, seemed disconnected or perhaps were even beyond connection (1999:23).  
 
Prior to engaging with my fieldwork in the next chapter I locate the struggle that has 
engulfed the Tamil diaspora in the last few years between the pro-LTTE activists and 
Tamil dissidents. This is captured in the inter web activity and this struggle drives my 
thesis as it intensifies political engagement among diasporan Tamils. To maintain the 
flow and to analyse important political events which triggered political engagements in 
cyberspace chronologically, I will present two web developments to start off the online 
political analysis of my research. These two are the cyber engagements parallel to the 
impending EU ban on the LTTE which came into effect on 29 May 2006, and in March 
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2007 LTTE air raids on Sri Lankan government installations. These two were selected as 
web storms because both these incidents created more than 200 web articles based 
around them. These articles not just reported the incidents but were activiely responding 
and engaging with the issues surrounding the two incidents and resulted in creating fresh 
issues such as the targeting of individuals such as Jeyadevan and Sethupuram Nadarajah. 
These web engagements dominated the web sphere for more than two weeks at a stretch 
with massive hit counts. The hit counts were revealed by the web masters of Thenee.com 
and Tamilnet.com and by analyzing the web usage through the web service Alexa.com 
which provides data about site access and the number of users and visitors to a web site.  
 
4.2.1 Web storm 1: The EU ban  
 
I researched the online developments between March and May 2006 and this enabled me 
to capture some intensive web usage by Tamil diasporan political activists based on the 
European Union’s move to name the LTTE a terrorist organization and proscribe it in the 
European Union region. In the period between March and May 2006, the LTTE was 
trying to fend off an impending ban of the organization within the European Union. At 
the same time dissident Tamil political activists were running a political campaign to 
push through the ban. This lobbying and mobilization of political interests and agents in 
the Tamil diaspora created significant online activity. This included political strategies 
based on inter web activism, such as web sites campaigning for and against the ban, to 
precision email campaigns targeting important EU delegations. My analysis of these 
websites, and their political symbolism is based on a discursive analysis of the messages 
embedded in the sites and a structural analysis of the web sites, which includes looking 
at the wording of texts of the use of images and media technologies. These are two key 
analytical approaches to web sites archived and captured through Web Sphere Analysis. 
 
The LTTE fronts carried out a campaign to deter the EU members from imposing the 
sanction and to expose what they called ‘state terrorism’. These campaigns which 
included larger sections of the Tamil diaspora mainly took the form of protest rallies.  
The Tamilnet.com article featured in Figure 418, sets the scene, in a rally protesting 
aganst the impending EU ban carrying the graphic image of civilians allegedly murdered  
                                                   




by Sri Lankan armed forces. The banner reads ‘is it our fate to bathe in Blood? 
Deafening silence doesn’t the world has words?’   
 
 
Figure 4 Images of dead civillains and the Sri Lankan President 
 
 




Tamilnet.com used the images and the speeches of demonstrations. These texts included 
comments made by European politicians in support of the Tamil struggle. The web site’s 
main intention was to show, by referring to such EU officials comments, that the EU ban 
does not reflect unanimous agreement among EU members in the region. The websites 
were trying to point that the EU was not totally against the LTTE and that the LTTE also 
had allies within the EU. It attempted to reinforce belief in the existence of substantial 
support for the LTTE all over Europe. The site captured in Figure 519 announces the 
various locations of the protest rallies. By indicating these international locations in one 
page, the strategy is to fold the geographic distance. This also signifies the LTTE attempt 
to stamp its hegemony and domination throughout the diaspora sphere. Tamilnet.com by 
listing the diaspora activities throughout the globe highlights LTTE control over all 
Tamil diaspora mobilization. It is an attempt to point to a structural fact of the LTTE’s 
superiority in controlling the diaspora. This exercise by Tamilnet.com to bring all Tamil 
diaspora centres into one web page demonstrate this control of the LTTE disguised as an 
act of uniting the voice of Tamil diasporans.  
 
On 30 May 2006 Tamilnet.com, Nitharsanam.com, Tamilcanadian.com, and 
Tamilnation.com, the larger and major players in the web-sphere, all came out with a 
combination of images from Europe, Canada and Australia, summing up the climax to 
the protests against the EU ban on the LTTE. These global mobilizations were projected 
in these sites to demonstrate the transnational organizational ability and the power of the 
LTTE. The significance is that all images published depict Tamils waving LTTE flags 
and holding placards of the LTTE leader (Figure 6)20. All images contain more flags and 
placards of the Tigers and the images are more focused on LTTE symbols than on the 
actual people involved. The notion of LTTE hegemony at work in the form of web 
operations discussed earlier is reinforced with these images. They depict LTTE’s 
aspirations to be the symbol of power and symbol of authority within the Tamil diaspora. 
Analysing the content of these web pages shows that they are more concerned with the 
LTTE show of strength and defiance, engineered in cyberspace, in order to symbolise the 
seamless control of the diaspora by the LTTE across the globe rather than the actual 
lobbying for the lifting of the ban. 
                                                   
19 http://www.Tamilnet.com/art.html?catid=13&artid=18293 (accessed 26 May 2006)  





   
Figure 6 Diaspora rally held on 29 May 2006 in Bern against the EU Ban on the LTTE.  
 
Structurally analysing these websites, one can see that they had undergone certain 
facelifts, from changes to their home pages and site structures as a response to 
modifications to their web campaigns against the LTTE ban. Structural changes were 
made to websites in line with this strategy in which the home pages were redone, with 
even their normal templates inverted for new images, and images with side bars 
depicting harrowing pictures of dead women and children claimed to be killed by Sri 
Lankan armed forces. In analysing the purposes and importance of such face lifts to the 
web sites one can see that such graphic material goes beyond the discursive positioning 
of the Tamil Tigers’ struggle. It structurally endorses them by trying to bring the conflict 
emphatically closer to the visitors of the web sites.  
 
In the wake of the ban the websites unleashed a hate campaign, even targeting the EU. 
The web sites carried graphic visuals as embedded pictures, for example, the ‘you too 
EU’ attached to a picture of a mother holding a dead child allegedly killed by the Sri 
Lankan forces. These were graphic and they sustained a campaign of demonstrations and 
events denouncing the ban imposed by the EU and claiming that the Tamil people will 
face genocide in Sri Lanka. 
 
Observing the responses generated from anti-LTTE or dissident websites, parallel with 
the web activism of pro-LTTE websites, plays an important role in my analysis. 
Dissidents resorted to targeting the internal problems that were brewing within the 
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LTTE’s organization structure, especially the military hierarchy, during this time period. 
The anti-LTTE movement was actively campaigning to push through the ban in the EU. 
They worked relentlessly to get the HRW (Human Rights Watch) March 2006, 
publication on LTTE extortion of the Tamil diaspora funding. The dissidents used 
attacks on LTTE operations in Europe, and its main target was the ailing LTTE 
theoretician Anton Balasingham.21 The dissident websites concentrated on attacking the 
LTTE during the build up to the EU ban. On 18 May Vizhippu.net carried the main title 
‘LTTE panicking about its EU wide ban proscription.’22 The same period also saw the 
dissident websites such as Vizhippu.com targeting the Nitharsanam.com23 web site of the 
LTTE. Interestingly once the ban was finally imposed on the LTTE, rather than 
celebrating the ban, the dissident websites concentrated on a full scale attack on 
Nitharsanam.com. This may be due to the impact it had on the lives of dissident political 
activists.  
 
The LTTE was targeted in this web storm by a website which gained rapid popularity 
named www.Thenee.com. Figure 7, is an image from the banner of the website, which is 
one of the most successful websites of the Tamil dissidents. Thenee literally means the 
‘bee’. The website is run by an ex-militant belonging to the group EROS, by the name of 
Gemini, based in Stuttgart Germany. 
 
 
Figure 7 Banner of the dissident website Thenee.com 
 
The site, launched in 1998, had significant threats from the pro-LTTE operations. It 
started to properly operate from 2003 onwards, and in 2005 the site had to change its 
service supplier due to the massive hit-count and the servers crumbling under increasing 
                                                   
21 Anton Balasingham was the Theoretician of the LTTE and its nationalistic project, a key advisor to the 
LTTE leader Prabhakaran. He settled in London in the late 1990s and was a pivotal figure among the 





23 http://vizhippu.net/node/2757 (20 June 2006)  
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demand. By early 2006, the site was getting 80,000 hits a day, according to an activist 
who did not want to be named in my research. The site did have a huge impact in 
becoming an information provider to the dissenting community. Moreover, it was able to 
expose many LTTE activities, which in turn successfully hampered many LTTE 
propaganda and funding operations, as well as altering its image among international 
organizations varying from human rights to aid agencies. Keeran revealed that the LTTE 
attempted to shutdown Thenee.com’s operations and even tried to duplicate the website 
to prevent or reduce the visitors to the site.  
 
Thenee.com on its home page on the day of the EU ban on the LTTE, carried an image 
of Prabhakaran claiming the LTTE fascism was revealed, and it reminded visitors of the 
impact of the Canadian ban on the LTTE on April 2006: ‘the Tigers will die out soon 
along with the Canadian ban’. A significant aspect of the discourse around the ban was 
highlighted in the second story which ran under the heading, ‘Democratic space to 
breathe for the Tamil people’, hinting at the weakening LTTE control of diasporic space. 
The reference to democratic space was important; this was similar to the arguments 
made by Tamil dissident respondents whom I interviewed. There seems to be a 
reassertion of the political priorities of the dissidents as well as the confidence that 
cyberspace contributes in opening up possibilities that were limited to these activists in 
their earlier efforts to become engaged in politics.  
 
Equally important was the third story featured in Figure 8, an instance where the attack 
is taken to the LTTE, where an image of children is captured alongside an LTTE cadre 
and another man in civilian clothes. The site claims the man is the head of recruitment of 
the ‘Tiger baby brigade’ (child soldiers), by the name of Thiagaraja. Thenee.com also 
revisits Thiagaraja’s recent statement to UNICEF, claiming the LTTE does not recruit 
children; they come voluntarily to join the LTTE. Though subtly introduced, this story 
was another clear attack on the LTTE, displaying Thenee’s capacity to maintain pressure 





Figure 8 Image from dissident website Thenee.com on the day of the EU ban on the LTTE  
 
     
What Thenee.com displayed in this one web page were the possibilities cyberspace has 
provided for political action. In one article it endorses the dissidents and urges them to 
break the LTTE authority, to come out against the LTTE. Simultaneously, as Figure 824 
indicates, the dissident web site precisely targets weaknesses of the LTTE, challenging 
LTTE where and when it’s most vulnerable, picking up allegations of child soldiers in 
their ranks and evidence of its recruitment agencies. Thenee.com exposed an 
embarrassing problem LTTE is facing with charges of child conscription on the same 
day it was banned in the EU.  
 
On the other side a structural feature of the pro-LTTE websites were their attempt to 
shield the LTTE leader, during the period leading up to the ban and immediately after 
the ban came into force. The pro-LTTE web sites consciously refrained from publishing 
any images of the leader of the LTTE or any response from him to the ban. All 
comments on the impending ban in the aftermath of enforcement of it were made by then 
political head of the LTTE late S.P. Thamilchelvan and the LTTE theoretician late Anton 
Balasingham. The argument made by the LTTE was that it was a political matter, but the 
interesting aspect of this is, though some of these websites are directly under the LTTE 
control, most of them are run by individuals and organization which support the LTTE. 
These web sites functioned as a blanket damage controlling mechanism, shielding its 
                                                   
24 http://www.Thenee.com/html/euban_tamil.html (accessed 30 May 2006)  
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leadership and diverting attention to other issues such as increasing attacks on Tamil 
dissidents.  
 
Web Sphere Analysis into Tamil diaspora political activism demonstrates that the 
politics on the web takes on its own dynamic as it is inhabited by a diverse set of 
political actors. The political engagements in these web sites have become more 
interactive as web sites tend to respond to each other; the confrontation between 
Nitharsanam.com and Thenee.com is an example for this new kind of web activity. Prior 
to the inception of dissident websites pro-LTTE web activity was more of a 
communication tool concerning developments within Sri Lanka and the LTTE role in the 
conflict. Prior to the dissident web activity, Tamilnet.com or Tamilcanadian.com 
positioned themselves as information gateways for the conflict, mainly targeting the 
Tamil diaspora. Whitaker (2007) points out that the Tamilnet.com was brought out to 
challenge the information revealed by the dissident web site belonging to University 
Teachers of Human Rights (Jaffna) group. But the difference in this kind of web acticity 
was that there was intensified interactivity and Uthr.org was not updated in a daily basis 
as it served mainly as an information service which created in-depth reports about certain 
situations arising through the conflict, mainly on human rights issues. The LTTE and 
pro-LTTE operations had to introduce new web sites or change the manner in which 
some traditional web operations were run from being mere information gateways as the 
web space started facilitating multiple web sites which are actively engaging with day to 
day diaspora political activities.  
 
Increased web interactivity has resulted in the emergence of political issues which range 
from the wider politics of the conflict to more personalised political confrontations. A 
classic example would be the pro-LTTE web sites responding to dissident web 
operations. These efforts, timing, and the resources spent on attacking dissidents and 
managing dissident counter attacks, have to a certain extent derailed the purpose for 
which these sites were initially established. In the mid to late 1990s the web sites were 
almost all pro-LTTE within the diaspora and their sole purpose was to reflect the Tamil 
Eelam or to reinforce the notion of homeland and virtually keep it alive. This trend 
started to dissolve from 2001 onwards, as the dissidents started using the web space for 
political purposes. This change can be further explored in the web engagement which 
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emerged in the back drop of the LTTE air raids, on a Sri Lankan air base, in March 2007 
which led to the second web storm analysed below. 
 
4.2.2 Web Storm 2: LTTE Air attack 
 
The web storm of the year 2007 came in the back drop of the use of air attacks by the 
LTTE on the largest Sri Lankan military airbase in March. The LTTE air attack on 29 
March 2007 on the Katunayake airbase became a large web storm similar to the web 
traffic generated by the 2004 Boxing Day Tsunami. The significance of this was the fact 
that it was the most important military operation captured in the web, surpassing all 
Tiger military campaigns against the Sri Lankan state.  
 
The web sites of both pro-LTTE and anti-LTTE elements on the Tamil diaspora web 
sphere had their different takes on the air attacks. The event became a web storm 
immediately and web sites related to the Tami web sphere came out with news, articles 
and photographs. Even a pro-LTTE web site doctored images to show a vast air field in 
the North of Sri Lanka claiming to be housing many more LTTE aircraft. The discursive 
construction of the air attack was to demonstrate the LTTE’s ability to violate the 
sovereign space of the Sri Lankan state and remain uncontested in such efforts.  
 
Tamilnet.com broke the story about the attack at 20.00 hours GMT on 29 March 2007, 
and had four updates on the story, and frequent comments from the LTTE military 
spokesperson. The first report was confined to revealing that the high security air base 
was under attack; this has been another feature of managing the flow of information in 
websites which supported the LTTE cause, a fact which respondents in my own 
interviews pointed to. The constant updating keeps the diasporans connected to a real 
time battle. My respondents brought out the importance of this linkage between the 
battle theatres and the diasporans. The second online update had a comment from the 
LTTE military spokesman ‘two attack aircraft belonging to Liberation Tigers carried out 
bombing raids at the Sri Lankan Air force base at Katunayake.’ The third update, which 
came 6 minutes after the first, claimed that Sri Lanka’s only international airport, which 




The politically important revelation came in the fourth news update, about two hours 
after the first, In this the LTTE military spokesman claimed, ‘Two aircrafts of 
TamilEelam Air Force (TAF) with air to surface capability participated in the sortie’, 
this is first instance the term ‘TAF’ was used as shown in Figure 925, In the context of 
the Web Sphere Analysis the careful selection of the words by the military spokesman 
which appeared first on cyberspace was not just limited to commenting on its attack; the 




Figure 9 LTTE air attacks on Sri Lankan Air base.  
     
 
The internet has always being used to project and present technological development of 
the LTTE. Such military achievements and the technological know how of the LTTE 
was projected to the diaspora in real-time to reinforce the military development of the 
organization while encouraging them to believe the LTTE was in a process of evolving 
into a powerful military machinery which could take on the Sri Lankan government in 
any military dimension. While the LTTE was using cyberspace in these web storms to 
keep the diaspora connected with its achievements in Sri Lanka, the dissident response to 
the attacks was based on the objective of containing LTTE propaganda. This is similar to 
their strategy in the previous web storm, to stop the LTTE from taking the trajectory of 
image building and political mobilization efforts based on developments in Sri Lanka. 
 
                                                   
25 http://www.Tamilnet.com/art.html?catid=13&artid=21667 (accessed 26 March 2007)  
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In the backdrop of the LTTE air attacks, the dissidents resorted to pointing out the 
discrepancies in the information disseminated by the LTTE. In the same web 
engagement the dissident Tamil web campaign targeted the key LTTE site 
Nitharsanam.com. It is interesting to see that, with the evolution of the dissidents’ 
approach to web politics, the unitary hold of the web campaigns of the LTTE changed as 
well. The LTTE’s main concern was waging the war with the Sri Lankan state and 
making that real war felt to the diasporans. The dissident factor which emerges about 
with the new millennium has a significant effect on the dynamic of online politics.  
 
Exploring the dissident response to Tiger air raids in the light of the above argument is 
important to grasp the level of web activity and intense rivalry around it. A leading 
dissident Tamil web site, Tamilaffairs.com carried the article in Figure 10. This is an 
interesting twist in the web politics of the Tamil web-sphere, the main focus of the 
article is a direct attack on the key LTTE website operated through a webmaster directly 




Figure 10 Sethupuram on Tamilaffairs.com 
 
The air attack is made secondary in this report appearing on Tamilaffairs.com where the 
website attacks the webmaster of Nitharsanam.com. Figure1026 also demonstrates the 
dissidents’ web site attacking the web master and questioning the credibility of his site. 
In the same page Tamilaffairs.com claims ‘Nitharsanam.com publishes threats and 
intimidations and even confirms certainty of deaths of some individuals before they are 
assassinated by the LTTE’. This reinforces the reputation Nitharsanam.com has 
developed among the diaspora political activists as new fear generator, which is the key 
reason it is being targeted by dissidents at all available opportunities such as the air 
attack scenario.  
 
The dissidents, in spite of the media and information interest in the air attacks, diverted 
attention to attacking Nitharsanam.com and discrediting it, pointing out its exaggerated 
                                                   
26 http://Tamilaffairs.com/node/100 (accessed 26 March 2007)  
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claims in the aftermath of the attacks in Sri Lanka. Importantly, sites such as 
Tamilaffairs.com, vizhhipu.com and Thenee.com are creating alternative political issues 
even at the height of LTTE propaganda campaigns with substantial evidence to back the 
LTTE attacks in Sri Lanka. The efforts to attack the pro-LTTE sites within prominent 
web storms have created a situation where the pro-LTTE sites have to maintain 
maximum propaganda while devoting significant resources to counter the dissident sites.  
 
Thus analysing such web storms captures political activities that are now becoming 
bitterly contested and creating more personalised and immediate political conflicts 
among diasporan political activists. These can spiral into conflicts not necessarily 
mirroring the developments or incidents in theatres of conflict in Sri Lanka. Such 
incidents of personalised diaspora conflicts, and new political priorities among diasporan 
political activists, are further analysed in the section under cyber terrorism later in this 
chapter. These shifts herald the shaping of Tamil web politics, transforming them from 
being web enhanced politics to web based politics. The term ‘web based’ political 
activism is discussed by Vegh as ‘used for activities that are only possible online’ (2003: 
72). I argue that such web-based activism has a profound impact on the lives of activists 
as well, as activists turn to such web based activism to generate effects in real world 
politics. This exceeds the general perception of internet’s political potential being limited 
to political action based on ‘electronic civil disturbance’27 strategies.  
 
In my final analysis of the two web storms, the archives capture the tensions that were 
discussed earlier between the pro-LTTE Tamil activists and the Tamil dissidents. The 
dissidents have challenged the political arena previously dominated by the LTTE and its 
allies. The key objective for the LTTE in this contest is to maintain total hegemony, and 
for the dissidents, their aim is to carve out spaces of political action and positions to 
attack and challenge the LTTE and its authority. These tensions in some web sites are 
brought out through structural alterations to site content, while more discursive 
constructions of domination and resistance are the key features in this power struggle in 
other web sites. 
                                                   
27 A strategy using information technologies to target a website as a mark of protest, mainly used by 
activists to disrupt web services of a site using tactics such as ‘virtual sit ins’ where activists try to access 
an identified web site simultaneously and repeating it till the web site crashes unable to manage the traffic 




For the LTTE, the state-based discourse or championing the notion of Eelam (homeland) 
remains the justified route to state building and nation building. This theory guided the 
shaping of strategies dealing with the Tamil diaspora for the LTTE. These strategies 
were based on the objective of gaining the total support of the diaspora Tamils and 
achieving virtual allegiance from them. The dissidents emerging in the web have 
identified the importance of dethroning the LTTE from this moral high ground and are 
the strategic focus in organizing their political campaigns to challenge the LTTE. The 
web is significant for political action and activism and it also creates spatial conditions 
where geographic fixities are being challenged by spaces of political and social 
possibility beyond the confinement of statist ideologies. In the next section I introduce 
one of the key new developments online.  
 
4.3 Analysing online violence through web sphere 
 
The web archiving during the periods of web storms, as well as during the time of my 
fieldwork, shed insights into the changing patterns of cyber engagement in the sphere of 
Tamil diaspora politics. I look at the websites archived in the web sphere to look at the 
use of intimidation, violence and terror strategies embedded in them. These are discussed 
under the general theme of cyber terrorism. This is not to frame all similar tactics under 
one label, I am introducing it because it was the most recurrent term used by my 
respondents. 
 
4.3.1 Cyber conflict in power struggles  
 
The use of cyberspace for political engagement in Tamil diaspora politics seems to have 
undergone certain changes in its features and objectives with the dawn of the new 
millennium. For many years diaspora politics and online political action were focused on 
the ethnic conflict: developments in Jaffna, LTTE activity, the Sri Lankan government’s 
responses to the LTTE, potential hotspots susceptible for violence, ongoing violence and 
the military campaigns. Web politics and information flow were based on these issues 
till around 2001. Things gradually started to change following the split within the LTTE 
in 2004, and the increased dissident activity within diaspora communities, which in turn 
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generated a change of political priorities in the diaspora sphere and web politics. This in 
turn has effectively problematised the existing notion of cyber conflict and cyber 
terrorism, notions integral in security studies (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 1997; Denning 
1998, 2007; Weimman 2006). In the interviews with political activists in London, the 
notion of cyber terrorism was given new meaning and a new type of interpretation.  
 
The term ‘cyber terrorism’ and ‘terrorist’ became an allegation increasingly leveled by 
dissident activists at certain websites belonging to or run by LTTE factions. Figure1128 
depicts an article on the dissident web site vizhippu.net and it is a direct attack on 
Nitharsanam.com and its webmaster. This cycle of attacks, and counter -attacks by 
Nitharsanam.com, has taken the spatial focus of the conflict to a new dimension. This 
personalised web war will be discussed, using as a case study the attacks on dissident 
activist Jeyadevan and his responses. The impact on actual political activists’ lives will 
be further discussed in my fieldwork analysis presented in Chapter Eight.  
 
 
Figure 11 A text from vizhippu.net.  
 
This section of the chapter will be using Web Sphere Analysis to understand the notion 
of cyber terrorism based on archived web sites. I use the archives to analyse the content 
of these websites, their structures as well as the discursive construction of violence using 
both images and texts. 
 
                                                   
28 http://vizhippu.net/node/2421  (accessed 30 April 2006)  
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The term ‘cyber terrorism’ or ‘cyber terrorist’ appears on all of the dissident websites. 
The LTTE is reported by all researchers on cyber security as the first group that used 
cyber terror or tactics of web attack (Vatis 2001; Denning 2000). But there is hardly any 
focus on cyber terrorism and the use of such forms of terror mechanisms by the LTTE, 
its front organizations and its cyber operations in the last 6-7 years in cyber security 
literature.  Figure 11 provides an example to the use of the term ‘cyber terror’ and the 
kind of justification for the use of the term provided by many activists I interviewed. 
Vizhippu.net discusses the intimidation tactics unleashed against Jeyadevan and Bazeer, 
one a Tamil activist and another a Muslim who oppose the LTTE. The website quotes a 
threatening LTTE email send to Jeyadevan, this is featured in Figure 1229. 
 
                                                   






Figure 12 Email sent to Jeyadevan reproduced on Vizhippu.net  
 
The email while attacking Jeyadevan targets Sayed Bazeer the head of Islamic 
Information centre in London. His name came up in the interviews in my fieldwork in 
London, where respondents claimed Bazeer had to restrict his daily movements for fear 
of being attacked as he was targeted by LTTE websites. Images of Bazeer morphed30 
with Jihadist literature are hosted on pro-LTTE websites. This email attempts to justify 
                                                   
30 In computer animation process, morphing refers to an animation technique in which one image is 
gradually turned into another. (http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/M/morphing.html)  
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the claims and brand him as a terrorist having links with Islamic extremism. This is 
alarming for Bazeer, according to his colleagues I interviewed, as they named him to be 
one of very few activists from the Muslim community of Sri Lanka, working for the 
rights of Muslims caught in the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict and a famous critic of the 
LTTE operations in London. 
 
Political allegations, personal scandals linked with women and sex, were limited to web 
forums prior to these intense web engagements that developed from 2001 onwards. 
These have become political weapons and tools in the political confrontations between 
pro and anti-LTTE fronts. The emergence of ‘scandal’ and ‘cyber scandal’ as a weapon 
of intimidation is an important factor as these scandals or personal attacks take 
prominence in both the political and web spheres. None of the websites such as 
theene.com, vizhhipu.net or Tamilaffairs.com are operated or contributed to by experts 
on cyber security. Yet the websites openly use the term ‘cyber terror’ for certain images 
and articles appearing on pro-LTTE sites such as Nitharsanam.com.  
 
A key web site referred to by many of my respondents and noted in many dissident web 
sites and identified as the instigator of cyber terrorism is the LTTE operated 
Nitharsanam.com. I argue in Chapter Eight, cyber terrorism has focused mainly on 
macro frameworks of analysis such as threats to state infrastructures and state 
institutions. In my research, effects on individual political agents and their behaviour 
patterns as result of intimidatory web tactics are revealed. I define these effects and the 
study of such issues as research into ‘micro-facets’ of cyber terrorism and I argue that 
they are important aspects in the study of cyber security and cyber conflict. The targeting 
of dissident activist Jeyadevan through Nitharsanam.com and other pro-LTTE web sites, 
and his response to such attacks, and the cycle of web intimidation, is captured in my 
Web Sphere Analysis. In analysing the mini case study I argue that such cyber 
engagements do emerge theoretically from a power struggle to control the diaspora 
communities but such online struggles diverts attention to key macro issues such as 




4.3.2 Jeyadevan’s story 
 
R. Jeyadevan came to London in 1979 in the back drop of the political violence that was 
unleashed in mid 1977 after the general election which brought the United National 
Party (UNP) and its leader J. R. Jayawardene to power. J.R. Jayawardene was the first 
executive president of Sri Lanka, the election that brought him to power came with a 
mandate to introduce a new constitution and a new economic system to Sri Lanka. The 
aftermath of this victory saw several incidents of violence mainly unleashed against the 
Sri Lankan Tamil community. Jeyadevan, who completed his advanced levels 
examination in 1975, was 3 marks short of the grades required to attend university and 
was a victim of the education standardization policy of the state; he suffered severely in 
the 1977 violence and left for the UK. 
 
In his political life, Jeyadevan was an ardent supporter of the LTTE and established a 
Hindu temple known as Eelap Patheeswarar Temple in Wembley and was its 
management trustee. It is widely believed that the money collected in approximately 35 
Hindu temples in London was diverted to the LTTE. He was also a founding member of 
International Federation of Tamils (IFT), The Confederation of Tamils, Tamil Refugee 
Action Council (TRAC) through which he established the Tamil Community Housing 
Association. He also ran the LTTE English publication, The Tamil Guardian. Between 
1990 and 2000 Jeyadevan was most influential LTTE political activist in London. But by 
2003 there were certain discontents growing between the LTTE command and 
Jeyadevan. The height of this tension was during the aftermath of the 2004 Tsunami 
when Jeyadevan and his colleague Vivekanadan travelled to the Vanni (the LTTE 
stronghold in Sri Lanka) and were placed under house arrest. The key behind this action 
was to force a transition of the temple authority established by Jeyadevan to a Tiger front 
organization named Sivayogam Trust in Tooting, run by Nagendran Seevaratnam an 
arch rival of Jeyadevan. Jeyadevan was forcefully made to comply to sign papers 
transferring the ownership of the temple during the period when he was held as a 
prisoner.  
 
The friction between Seevaratnam and Jeyadevan goes back to the mid 1980s, when 
Seevaratnam who is also an accountant by profession based in Nigeria, and who had run 
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Tiger fund raising campaigns, moved to London in 1987. Seevaratnam, who is from 
LTTE leader Prabhakaran’s birthplace of Velvettiturai, quickly established pro-LTTE 
operations and started fund raising campaigns. He also started the English fortnightly 
Tamil Voice International (TVI) to counter the Tamil Times an independent Tamil 
journal printed and published in London. In this operation, despite already being 
married, he managed to befriend and marry Jeyadevan’s sister who was half his age. 
Jeyadevan managed to oust Seevaratnam from his operations in the late 1980s using the 
conflict between Seevaratnam and Anton Balasinghamm, the late LTTE theoretician, 
both of whom were struggling to be the top LTTE person in UK. But in the late 1990s 
Jeyadevan fell out with Balasingham over their different views to approach to the Anti-
Terrorism Bill introduced in 2000. Jeyadevan opted to challenge it while Balasingham 
saw the option of taking the LTTE operations underground whilst avoiding a legal 
challenge to the Terrorism Act.  
 
When Jeyadevan returned to UK after his incarceration he was a bitter man. Jeyadevan 
joined forces with the anti-LTTE organizations and political activists in London and 
established a significant web operation challenging the LTTE organization in London. 
He began to expose LTTE operations using the internet as a political tool and site, 
setting up websites with the help of other dissidents. These sites included 
www.Subidcham.de, www.Tamilaffairs.com and www.Srilankaguardian.org. The LTTE 
and pro-LTTE operators started to respond to Jeyadevan’s web operations and they also 
became increasingly personal in their attacks. Nitharsanam.com targeted almost any 
individual it perceived as a threat to the LTTE or to the LTTE machinery and Jeyadevan 
claimed that Nitharsanam.com and sites like Tamileditors.com, Neruppu.org targeted 
him and his family.  
 
The intensity of the attacks on him can be seen even at the height of the web storm 
around the impending EU ban on the LTTE. Nitharsanam.com was relentlessly attacking 
Jeyadevan. On its main page it carried three stories on 20 May 2006. The first story was 
responding to the web storm over the issue of EU ban of the LTTE based on a quote 
from an EU official named as Robert Evans claiming ‘it is highly unlikely the LTTE will 
be banned in EU’. The second story is very interesting, it says ‘ENDLF Ramarajan’s 
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wife fell in love with Jeyadevan’s Jeep and she is now riding it’. This is a strategy of 
developing scandals and using them as an insidious attack to dissident politicians. 
 
 
Figure 13 Image of Jeyadevans vehicle31 
 
Figure 13 demonstrate the new ways the LTTE is trying to subjugate the dissidents who 
are using the internet to challenge them. The image is captured from Nitharsanam.com, 
where Jeyadevan’s vehicle is photographed along with a poster attached to it 
claiming it been used by his mistress. Jeyadevan claims such web publications as a new 
type of intimidation unleashed against dissidents who use the internet to expose LTTE 
activities. This is a new trend in cyberspace where personalized attacks have been used 
by the LTTE to counter the political organization of the dissidents. The images 
demonstrate to a certain extent the measures used by the LTTE fronts to silence such 
dissidents such as Jeyadevan 
 
The third main story in the same page on Nitharsanam.com is titled as ‘The father dances 
at the temple and the son dances with girls in the brothel.’ This carried pictures of 
Jeyadevan’s son with his friends and also the image of his daughter with a man (Figures 
1432 and 1533). These developments are captured in the web sphere and seem to be 
                                                   
31 http://www.Nitharsanam.com/?art=17428 (accessed 1 May 2006)  




different from traditional political engagements online. The attacks are becoming 
personal in each and every way that the victim find the notion of public and personal has 
broken down in cyberspace and political conflict has penetrated the personal space of  
the family.  
 
 
Figure 14 Images of Jeyadevan’s son.  
                                                                                                                                                
33 
http://www.neruppu.org/index.php?subaction=showfull&id=1206917136&archive=&start_from=&ucat=1





Figure 15 Images on Nerrupu.org  of Jeyadevans son and his daughter.  
 
The diasporans I interviewed fled Sri Lankan with their families in the first instance for 
the fear of persecution. They used spatial distance as a safe buffer between them and the 
actual battle theatres. Though they have become diasporan political activists, they did 
not expect such intimidation and terror.  
 
These attacks can be further seen, on Nerruppu.org, which is a pro-LTTE site. On 1 May 
2006 Neruppu.org carried the message, ‘interested to know more information about 
‘money box’ Jeyadevan’, embedding the home address and home phone number of 
Jeyadevan, while stating in Tamil ‘give us more information.’ This is cited on 
Figure1634. This is an intimidation strategy, which the pro-LTTE websites have carried 
out, the target is identified and hit multiple times. Psychological operations are an 
integral part of military tactics: both the LTTE and the Sri Lankan armed forces use it 
heavily, from propaganda leaflets to scare tactics. It is still difficult to achieve numerous 
psychological operations at one time on a selected target, so the LTTE has made used 
cyberspace for this kind of multiple and ceaseless targeting of dissidents. The attacks on 
Jeyadevan are a classic example of this. 
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Figure 16 Jeyadevan’s address on Neruppu.org.  
 
The discursive construction of Jeyadevan’s image and the language employed is one 
aspect that needs to be analysed, as its the way the LTTE attempts to isolate its enemies 
and use the web. Such strategies are novel and the impact the web has had on it is 
tremendous. The significance of this is that, the analysis of conflict in cyberspace is 
taken beyond the traditional focuses of cyber conflict to focus on micro political 
spectrums such as effects on individuals and discursive production of power and counter 
discourse of power through texts in websites.  
 
Foot and Schneider point out, ‘The process of discovering/establishing the web sphere 
under study also includes defining the steps or procedures to be taken to identify the 
specific elements to be examined’ (2004: 6). Thus depending on the characteristics of the 
web sphere, this process can involve a number of strategies and the above web trends 
can be elucidated with the use of both discursive and structural analysis of the web 
sphere. This is why I first introduced the web storms and analysed the contents of the 
web sites, on different levels. I took the strategy of identifying the key structural changes 
web sites underwent during this time. These include the text that was used, the images 
that were embedded, and in some case the changing templates of web sites as responding 
to the political developments. The discursive analysis of web pages, reading through the 
texts and images, pointed to a process of creating hegemony and counter hegemony 
between the pro-LTTE and dissident web operations. The next section looks specifically 
at the political tactic of intimidation and the very personal types of political attacks 
directed at individuals. These surfaced when I subjected the web sites to both a structural 
and discursive analysis and linked diverse political attacks on Jeyadevan to reveal the 
use of the web for the political victimization of rival activists. The next section looks at 
the further analysis of the web sphere which captured the response of people like 




4.3.3 Jeyadevan responds 
 
As Nitharsanam.com targeted Jeyadevan, the dissident websites mostly influenced by 
Jeyadevan countered these attacks by unleashing a similar campaign against Sethupuran 
Nadarajah, well known as ‘Sethu’ among diaspora activists, and identified as the web 
master of many LTTE led websites including Nitharsanam.com. These personalised web 
exchanges were visible even during important political developments such as the two 
web storms mentioned above, of the EU proscription of the LTTE and the LTTE air 
attack. The dissidents concentrated on targeting Sethu amidst these web storms. The 
counter attack was not merely a response to counter Nitharsanam.com, it unfolded more 
into a full blown offensive on the pro Tiger web sites and its operations. 
Jeyadevan who, is also a part of this counter operation, in an interview told me,  
 
Well I challenged Nitharsanam and I have taken on the site and its operators. I 
have exposed that they had the LTTE insignia and now they taken it off. They 
have to put in their mission statement that they are not the official LTTE site.  
 
This counter attack can be analysed in two phases. The first wave is unleashed on the 
website and its operators, and the second concern LTTE activists on the ground. The 
LTTE activists, like the organization itself, function secretively which is a strength of the 
LTTE movement as a whole. 
 
In the discursive analysis of this counter attack it is interesting to identify the manner in 
which the pro-LTTE sites and their handlers were exposed as ‘cyber terrorists’. These 
discursive constructions and positioning have an impact on the LTTE web operations in 
total. LTTE web operations were mostly highlighted as a propaganda network. In attacks 
against Jeyadevan, Nitharsanam.com used photographs of him and his family and in the 
same manner the dissidents found images of Sethu, both to expose him and also to 
expose his link with the LTTE. The dissidents allege that Sethu, who was responsible for 
LTTE web operations, even created a domain named www.Jeyadevan.net, and an email 
address Jeyadevan.gmail.com, and started sending hate mails to Jeyadevan using the 




Figure 1735, represents the turn that the online political engagements have taken and the 
expansion of targets once more beyond the activists to their families. The image is from 
dissident website Tamilaffairs.com, which is accusing the LTTE of using the images of 
the children of dissidents, but resorting to similar tactics by using images of children of 
LTTE members in London for political intimidation. 
 
This is a clear example of what I argue is cyberspace’s role in creating new political 
issues that do not parallel developments in Sri Lanka. Instead these new conflicts 
concern issues that have become important because of the use of the internet for political 
purposes among the Tamil diaspora activists. Jeyadevan’s case brings out the 
complicated nature of these engagements, and their impact on political priorities among 
diaspora activists and the focus of politics within the diaspora. 
 
     
                                                   





Figure 17 Images from dissident web site Tamilaffairs.com  
 
4.3.4 Dissidents resort to web intimidation 
 
The attack on dissidents like Jeyadevan has sparked a significant response from 
dissidents as well, though the dissidents who earlier were even quite afraid to be 
politically engaged among the diaspora, have started to respond to the LTTE threat, 
virtually or in cyberspace, with cyber-attacks on LTTE operations. This full blown cyber 
engagement, using web sites, has had a significant impact on the traditional forms of 
web based politics such as informational campaigns, propaganda campaigns and 
strategies of electronic disobedience. 
 
The first phase of the counter attack included dissident operated websites such as 
Subcicham.de, Elanasam.com, Vizhippu.com, Nerrupu.com and Tamilaffairs.com taking 
 
 136 
on LTTE web sites which the dissidents identified as carrying out terror tactics. Thus 
these dissident web sites commenced a concentrated attack on the LTTE web site 
Nitharsanam.com and its web producers. Such attacks were also directed to pro-LTTE 
web sites such as tamileditors.com, yarl.com and Eelamnation.com. In the second phase 
of the counter-attack the dissident web sites launched a campaign to identify and isolate 
political activists supporting the LTTE. According to my Tamil dissident respondents, 
LTTE activists in London were soon exposed for using web operations, and considerable 
background details about these individuals and their connections with the LTTE were 
published online. In my interviews, the dissidents argued that such tactics were adopted 
to counter the LTTE and expose those activists that thrived on the secrecy of their 
operations and their networks. With dissident websites exposing these, and using 
targeted attacks on these activists, some respondents claimed that some pro-LTTE 
activists, such as some pro-LTTE councillors, have been forced to abandon or scale 
down most of their political operations.  
 
The caption featured in Figure 1836 is from Tamilaffairs.com which clearly identifies 
four London councillors in a pro-LTTE rally. They are identified as the ‘Gang of Four’ 
and the web site links these councillor’s with the LTTE, using the image of protest and 
their presence at it and also brings them together as one team working for the LTTE. The 
websites identified four Labour councillors of Sri Lankan ethnic origin and began 
carrying photographs of them participating in events organized to support the LTTE, and 
in a few months these councillors were identified as the Gang of Four. This campaign to 
isolate the so called ‘Gang of Four’ and their capability to organize rallies supporting the 
LTTE, had a significant impact with numbers dwindling in the events organized by 
them.  
 
                                                   





Figure 18 Tamilaffairs.com identify Pro-LTTE councillors in London Boroughs. 
     
The dissident web sites also exposed the LTTE’s criminal acts and continuously exposed 
Nitharsanam.com as a site which carried actual threats to lives of the Tamil dissidents. 
On 16 August 2006, www.uthr.org carried this statement:  
 
The LTTE-intelligence related web site Nitharsanam devoted 7 lines to the 
killing of Kethes. It began, ‘Infamous traitor of the Tamil race Ketheswaran 
Loganathan was shot dead a short while ago. Known as Tamil Betrayer 
Kadirgamar Junior, he was deputy head of the government Peace Secretariat… 
This derisive snigger is the stamp of the killers, their very nature and their values 
that are the antithesis of decency and true heroism. The implicit boast in the 
killing and its timing is that this organisation can and would pick off its unarmed 
opponents at will. 
 
The above analysis of web sites, inter site activity captured in web storms where rival 
web sites were trading attacks on each other, and observations made by the respondents, 
were possible because of two things. Firstly the Web Sphere Analysis framework 
captured these web sites and their inter-site activity, thus enabling us to view them as a 
unit of analysis. The web storms were two such examples as numerous websites could be 
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traced revolving around political issues. Trends such as the attack on Jeyadevan could be 
systematically analysed and presented as they happened along with their implications for 
political activism in the Tamil diaspora. Secondly the analytical framework proposed in 
Web Sphere Analysis of engaging online data with site producers and the offline stake 
holders of the issues related to the web activity. These advantages in framing and 
analysing contributed to identify an important theoretical facet to online political 
mobilization. The research analysis pointed out the use of real identities of political 
activists especially in web confrontations. These finding contradict one of the key 
arguments for the use of internet for political mobilization based on the ability for 
activists to be hidden or anonymous in cyberspace (Turkle 1996).  
 
Cyber theories focusing mainly on activism have claimed that cyberspace became a 
favourite tool for activists because of the ability to be hidden or, as Turkle points out, it 
has the potential for any one to create and make a projection of a constructed persona 
(1999). In my research the dissidents introduced notions such as ‘safe space’ and 
‘democratic space’ in the context of cyberspace. These terms were used to stress 
physical safety rather than the traditional concepts of cyberspace as a site encouraging 
anonymity and safety based on features of anonymity.  
 
The issue of anonymity and its advantages was first witnessed in the rise of hacker 
culture and the expansion of hackers online, and the expansion of the targets selected by 
hackers such as national defence establishments like the Pentagon. An Israeli hacker by 
the name of ‘analyser’, whose real name was Ehud Tenebaum (Jordan 2004:26), was 
famous for targeting and attacking the Pentagon’s computer network. The increasing 
importance of anonymity and its link with activism emerged in literature on social 
movements (Olsen 2004, McDonald 2006), with the absorption of hackers into 
mainstream cyber activism and identifying them as being part of activist organizations 
rather than lone hackers.  
 
Anthropologists such as Taggart (2006), who have examined hacker activism among 
Palestine youth organizations, call this ‘encrypted identity’ and claim it is needed for 
activists to challenge hegemonic discourse, while at the same time making it hard for 
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ethnographic research online. Activists began addressing each other, and also reached 
out to their audiences by their ‘screen names’ (2003:148). Jordan and Taylor (2004) 
bring out the transformation of the hacker group Cult of the Dead Cow (CDC) into a 
large scale ‘hacktivistick’, or activist group online, which they describe as a digitally 
correct activist37 group. They point out the challenges in such research as the difficulty in 
looking at their operations through the fluidity of identities of individuals involved. 
 
In contrast to the existing theories of anonymity and its importance in web based 
political activism, the tactical ploys in the Tamil diasporan web sphere are exactly the 
opposite of cyber enthusiasts who used the freedom of the net and its annoymity as an 
advantage in political activism. The argument for this has been the ability for political 
actors to be anonymous and thus evade the control of state or by the use cryptography to 
be ultra secretive in their operations. Anonymity has been a key feature in cyber theories 
which discuss political mobilization, for example current theories about Zapatista 
movement and its internet-savvy subcomandante Marcos, as secretive organizations of 
the anti globalization movement. Turkle claims , ‘The fact that self presentation is 
written means that there is time to reflect upon and edit ones “composition”, which 
makes the shy to be outgoing, the nerdy sophisticated’(1999:644).  
 
Research into cyber activism brings out the problematic side to the notion of anonymity, 
due to the linkage between credibility and anonymity, thus as cyber activism involves a 
lot of anonymous identities it makes their objectives and practices superficially less 




In this chapter I presented the online activities of both pro-LTTE web sites and 
dissidents, explaining the clash of two rival political ideologies. The Web Sphere 
Analysis captured the ‘web storms’, or the intensified web activities between the rival 
groups, during key political battles. The web sites were de-coded to highlight their 
political significance and political attributes, such as the LTTE hegemony reflected in 
                                                   
37 According to Jordan and Taylor (2004)‘digitally correct hacktivism’ is focused on the notion of ‘rights of 
all to information’. 
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web operations symbolised in texts, images and structural features embedded in the 
architecture of web sites. It also explored the dissidents use of web space in intense 
political developments as reflected in the web storms. The chapter also introduced the 
level of politics to which the LTTE has had to resort to because of online politics. The 
attacks on Jeyadevan as revealed in this chapter demonstrate that the internet has been 
able to drag the LTTE away from its political position of fighting for a Tamil homeland 
and being representative of the Tamil people. The LTTE always managed to stay away 
from dirty politics and blamed the other political groups and parties for becoming 
involved in political scandals. The LTTE positioned its politics as having much deeper 
and higher importance and preserved it self as an example of an organization which did 
not get involed in petty political conflicts. But in countering Jeyadevan’s campaigns and 
attempting to target Jeyadevan, the LTTE has been dislodged from their moral high 
ground in political engagements. This was an important aspect of Tamil diaspora politics 
which came out of my analysis on the internet and its use in Tamil diaspora politics. This 
is further explored from the view point of respondents in Chapters Six to Eight where I 
present the findings based on my fieldwork research. Chapter Eight discusses the use of 
the internet to unleash violence and intimidate political activists and the sorts of attacks 
discussed in this chapter will be looked at more broadly under the themes of cyber 
conflict and cyber-terrorism and based on interview data from the respondents. The Web 
Sphere Analysis showed that the political use of the web dominated by the LTTE for 
propaganda purposes has been surpassed by more interactive political engagements and 
the use of the internet for wider political objectives from 2001 – 2008, with more 
political stakeholders prolifering the LTTE dominated web presence and challenging 
LTTE’s domination. By exposing the interactivity between rival web sites and activists 
the chapter also, makes the claim that the online has effects on the offline political 
conduct of political activists. It argues that the online is not a mere reflection of the 
offline but is a more dynamic phenomenon which can generate offline reaction to online 
content and interactions. Thus the analysis confirms the findings of my fieldwork 
research where the respondents were claiming there were real world impacts arising 
from online activities. There is a significant subsection concerning the political processes 
of the Tamil diaspora manifesting in these virtual spaces. These web sites are not purely 
interacting with each other; they are engaging with actual political activists and this 




The Tamil dissidents also embraced the use of web technologies and for them it 
materialised as a source of power, a site of political practice and endowed them with 
multiple political options in shaping their political practices. These tensions which are 
emerging between the Pro-LTTE/LTTE factions and the dissidents for the use, 
occupation and political gains in cyberspace has made the study of political engagements 
among Tamil diasporans interesting and casts light on  different dimensions within 
diaspora politics itself. The tensions in political engagement between the pro-LTTE 
elements and the dissidents again are a key feature in the chapter as these tensions seem 
to be taking a circular pattern with web engagements driving them. Unique features 
originating in cyberspace as a result of these engagements develop an inherent dynamic 
to spawn new political issues within the diaspora community. 
 
In the case of the Tamil diaspora web politics I argue that the web initiative has affected 
political priorities among diaspora political activists that mostly focus on the 
developments within the conflict in Sri Lanka. This indicates a change in the nature of 
web politics. Whereas in 1995–2000 online activism followed the offline shifts in the 
battlefield now web politics spawns new issues beyond the battlefield which can affect 
offline activism. The impact of these engagements on their lives brought out on the 
notions of cyber conflict and cyber terror. These forms of cyber conflict tactics are 
discussed as expression of intensity in the struggles between the Pro-LTTE and dissident 
groups. This factor will be revisited, examining its importance as a political strategy and 








This chapter forms the second analysis based online research; it looks at the web content 
captured through Web Sphere Analysis. Chapter Four captured the high amount of 
interaction web sites have generated through inter-site activity and cross actor 
participation in the analysis of web storms. This chapter analyses web content that has 
been used as images to gain political advantage in the context of Tamil diaspora politics. 
These images I argue are made to be strong visual representations and the circumstances 
of their production are meant to have political effects.   
 
In the first section of this chapter I focus on graphs generated using a visualization tool 
to display the amount of interactions some of the websites I have selected for my 
research have with other related websites. These websites included organizations ranging 
from LTTE operations, pro-LTTE fronts, anti LTTE groups, the Sri Lankan government, 
International institutions to local and international media organizations. The graphs are 
used to demonstrate the importance of the websites I have selected based on their roles. 
In this light I look at the use of images and texts in such websites as politically 
significant symbols and utilities in the Tamil diasporan political sphere.  These images I 
argue are symbols of power, resistance and political identity, thus representing the 
discursive construction of political ideologies of the LTTE and the dissidents. The online 
political processes I introduce in this research are not categorically analysed in the 
existing cyber politics literature; this is why it makes these types of political formations 
and tactics important in expanding the parameters of knowledge concerning cyber 
political initiatives. 
 
Thus I look at developments in online politics on a par with Tamil diaspora politics. I 
look at their importance at certain levels in the sphere of Tamil diaspora politics. One 
of the uses of these websites is deploying these sites for misinformation campaigns 
contrary to web politics such as in the Zapatista case or Chinese dissidents’ web 
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operations which were used to provide accurate information. Another key theme 
discussed in the chapter is that the web images are extensively used for positioning 
the LTTE leadership in the context of the post LTTE split scenario from 2004 
onwards. Finally, I look at the increased use of military jargon on pro-LTTE web 
sites attempting to establish an informed knowledge base among the diasporans 
relaying to its military capabilities. I claim in this chapter that the use of web sites for 
political gains using texts and images is an integral part of the power project of the 
LTTE to dominate the Tamil diaspora. Finally the chapter engages with hack attacks 
that deface or hijack web domains; this is analysed as a form of political 
visualization. The term visualization has two distinct meanings, firstly in visual 
research it means the analysis of images and graphs to identify the social context in 
which they are produced and what meaning they can be assigned culturally. 
Technology plays a key role in modern times in how images are produced, 
positioned and displayed to the society. Rose points out that: 
Technologies used in the making of an image determine its form, meaning 
and effect. Clearly, visual technologies do matter to how an image looks and 
therefore to what it might do and what might be done to it. (Rose 2001: 14) 
 
Thus visual researchers such as Rose give images a deeper reading to unravel the 
meanings and the context in which they are produced. Secondly, the term 
visualization has a direct link with the technical vocabulary of Information 
communication technologies (ICT). One of the definitions of visualization in this 
discipline is: ‘Visualization can refer to: Graphic Visualization as in any technique 
for creating images, diagrams, or animations to communicate any message. Also 
used for Information visualization, Knowledge visualization, Scientific visualization 
and Product visualization’38 . Thus in this chapter I use the term visualization to 
denote the computer generated images and visuals to denote images or pictures used 
in websites captured for my research. I argue these web images are discursive in 
nature and represent ‘knowledge’ and ‘truth’ and one situated as a symbol of political 
power. In political engagements between rival ideologies and hegemonic projects I 
                                                   




argue such political visualization efforts on web sites end up becoming subjected to 
hacks, resulting in losing the original image or in my analysis the interface of truth. 
5.2 Visualisation of web sphere 
 
Prior to engaging with the use of images and text in online political processes among the 
diasporan websites I will introduce the importance of visualization by demonstrating the 
linkages certain websites have developed in the context of Tamil diaspora politics. Web 
Sphere Analysis was all about capturing web sites which were important for my 
research, and analyzing them in a single unit. This enabled the research to be carried out 
around inter-site activity and to derive political meaning. I am presenting below two 
graphs which depict the scale of interconnectivity of two different web sites, 
www.Nitharsanam.com (Figure 19) the pro-LTTE website, and the dissident web 














Figure 20 Visualization of the linkages dissident web site thenne.com has with other websites  
     
To generate the above images I used a visualization aid which is embedded on the 
website www.touchgraph.com. Touchgraph is a business venture which specialises in 
providing computer generated visualisation services. Their website contains an 
integrated demonstration tool designed for generating visualisations of web networking 
using the search engine Google to visualise the levels of interactivity among web sites. 
This is done through using Google’s database of related web sites and the way Google 




In the above graph which visualise the interconnection between the web sites, the larger 
circles represent larger domains or sites which are dominating the flow of information 
and symbolise the importance of websites such as Nitharsanam.com, Thenee.com and 
Tamilnet.com. In Figure 33 where the Touchgraph visualisation of the dissident web site 
Thenee.com reveals that Tamilnet.com maintains maximum inter-linkage with the 
dissident sites. These inter-linkages are also maintained through other web sites which 
link with the larger web domains. This visualisation helps to justify the comparative 
analysis, based on the rivalries and contestation between the pro-LTTE and dissident 
groups. The above two images were to visualize the interaction between web sites and 
their inter-linkages with important organizations 
 
5.3 Misinformation campaigns  
 
My online research and interviews with pro-LTTE activists highlighted the importance 
of cyber space in achieving tactical gains. Tactical gains included the ability to wage 
psychological warfare against the Sri Lankan government, against anti-LTTE elements 
and also to keep the diaspora Tamils closer to the conflict. LTTE operatives had to deal 
with Sri Lankan armed forces and their psychological operations which were an 
important weapon in the war against the LTTE for the Sri Lankan forces. The LTTE 
used cyber space to the maximum to unleash their own type of psychological warfare on 
the Sri Lankan state and dissidents alike. In this section I refer to the development of 
‘deception/lies’ by LTTE as a weapon that can wage psychological warfare and to 
counter Sri Lankan government propaganda.  
 
I show in this section the tactics are deployed in web sites reputed for being credible and 
consistent in reporting on the conflict in Sri Lanka. In particular Tamilnet.com acquired 
the reputation linking the alternative voice of Sri Lankan Tamil affairs since its inception 
in 1997. My analysis points out that even Tamilnet.com has from 2004 onwards become 
part of the misinformation strategy of the LTTE. Tamil dissidents whom I interviewed 
referred to the intentions of web sites such as Tamilnet.com and the websites are 




In one of my interviews with Sutha, the pro-LTTE activist who was earlier introduced in 
chapter Two, it was revealed that the LTTE was using the web for what he termed 
‘misinformation campaigns’. To expand on his analysis of the use of web politics by the 
LTTE he cited the example of the LTTE developing the story of a Tiger air attack on the 
largest Sri Lankan military base in the North. Such tactical advantages were exploited by 
the LTTE using cyber space to spearhead misinformation campaigns Sutha said,  
 
It was a guessing game and the diasporans were waiting for the attacks and at the 
same time kept the Sri Lankan government believing that there will be no attack 
as all claims of attacks before the real attacks were misinformation.  
 
The actual LTTE air attacks, which took place in March 2007, demonstrated the 
calculated strategies of the LTTE but the important factor raised in this argument is the 
strategic dependence on tactics such as the deception campaign. Such campaigns were 
used by the LTTE and pro-LTTE operations to build-up an expectation of the air attack 
among Tamil diasporans much before it actually took place. The hype of the air attack 
was important politically as it was a type of attack never carried out before by the LTTE 
in the history of the conflict.  
 
On 11 August, 2006 seven months before the actual air attack, Tamilnet.com carried an 
article claiming, ‘Tiger air craft rockets Palaly base, curfew in Jaffna’, and tiger 
spokesman confirming the attack said, ‘we will use our soldiers, sailors, airmen and 
marines in an all out defensive measure to protect our  homeland’. The construction of 
the text which is totally deceptive also goes on to introduce terms such as ‘marine’ and it 
was the first time this term appeared on a pro-LTTE website. The web page is captured 
and presented in Figure 2139. The LTTE were staging a campaign and rallying the 
diasporans even prior to the actual attack. Thus it was more than a misinformation 
campaign as Sutha claimed. It was the virtual positioning of the war and the web was 
being used in this instance to bring in the cinematic effect of using a trailer.  
 
                                                   





Figure 21 Misinformation campaign of the LTTE  
    
In the aftermath of the actual air attack in March 2007, the LTTE web operations 
continued with their ‘misinformation campaign’. I argue that these misinformation 
campaigns come in a set of coordinated stages and they have interludes between each 
other where the real event is incorporated into the chain of events. In the second stage of 
the misinformation campaign based on the air attacks, the LTTE attempted to magnify 
the damage caused on the Sri Lankan air bases by its air raids. Pro-LTTE web sites 
depended again on the importance of image as a political object; they used images 
incorporating satellite imagery and the technologies of digital imaging depicting massive 
damages caused to the Sri Lankan air base by the air attacks. These images were of huge 
symbolic value for the Tigers and they used these images heavily on most of the LTTE 
and pro-LTTE websites to create a real time linkage to the diasporans with the actual air 
attack. Nitharsanam.com used satellite imagery of the Katunayake airbase and attempted 
to pin point the impact of the bombs.  
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The misinformation campaigns were important for the LTTE, enableing them to 
maintain a tactical edge over the enemy. On 28 April 2007 the Air Tigers struck again, 
bombing a Sri Lankan military base, and this triggered a response from the Sri Lankan 
air force where by the air force bombed many LTTE targets in several sorties in the 
North over the next few days. On 30 April 2007 Tamilnet.com broke another story. It 
said ‘LTTE claim Sri Lankan Mig 27 Jet fighter shot down’ as shown in Figure 2340. The 
LTTE spokesman’s quote is very important: ‘our auto activate air defence system 
attacked the Sri Lanka Air force Mig 27 bomber when it approached our Ira’anaimadu 
airfield’. Reports from the Sri Lankan government and other independent news sources 
verified there were no air force sorties carried out at that time.  
 
 
Figure 22 Tamilnet.com claiming the LTTE has shot down a Sri lankan bomber.  
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Figure 23 Tamilnet.com contradicts own news item 
 
The LTTE's ploy of carrying out misinformation campaigns prior to the actual air attack, 
and then resorting to similar tactics to say they have the capacity to shoot down 
government jets, is an attempt to discursively construct, the LTTE’s ability to dominate 
the skies over Sri Lanka and its ability to protect the skies or spaces of Eelam. A 
discursive analysis of the text reveals it to be far from a mere news article: the 
terminology such as, ‘automatic air defence’ and ‘anti aircraft defence system’ is a 
reiteration of LTTE’s military strengths and this comes in the wake of the successful 
bombings made by its air wings. There were two articles on the shooting down incident 
and they were inaccurate as the articles were contradictory. While one article claims 
‘Mig 27 ground attack craft’ was shot down, the other claims ‘Kafir bomber’ (Figures 22 
– 2341) was the target. Thus the site producers may have missed the informative value 
but the intentions of the articles were clear, the need through this misinformation 
campaign was to establish LTTE’s strengths and its claims to the skies.  
 
The key issue here is the extensive use of Tamilnet.com to carry out the political and 
military tactics of ‘deception’. This website was to be the counter media space in the 
context of the ethnic conflict of Sri Lanka, it focused on the alternative information 
source of the developments in North and East of Sri Lanka and the plight of the Tamil 
people. Whitaker (2007) notes that the chief editor of Tamilnet.com wanted to develop 
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credibility among the readership of Tamilnet.com. This message according to Whitaker 
(2007) was communicated directly to the founders of the Tamilnet.com project by the 
late Sivaram Dharmeratnam as soon as he was appointed chief editor of Tamilnet.com. 
Whitaker summarises this as, ‘henceforth, its news stories were to be double-source and 
carefully fast checked, so as to be accurate beyond challenge’ (2007:121). Tamilnet.com 
is one of the largest information repositories which is constantly referred by other key 
web operations including international media, international governments and the Sri 
Lankan government and its other security and information agencies. This is very clear in 
Figure 24 of the inter-linkages Tamilnet.com has captured through touchgraph.  
 




These changing tactics in online politics and the use of internet and websites such as 
Tamilnet.com for deception politics are having the effect of maintaining perception of 
the LTTE’s military prowess which it perceives can work as a deterrent to dissidents 
while consolidating LTTE’s support base and confidence among diaspora communities. 
Thus politics of deception using web technologies is an attribute of the LTTE hegemonic 
project to control the Tamil diaspora as well as a warning mechanism for any one who 
opposes their authority. 
 
The virtual sphere enabled the LTTE to achieve the political objectives of maintaining a 
coherent grip on diaspora fronts whilst boosting its international image-building 
campaigns. While the Jihad movement did not care less about the international image 
they acquired from circulating images and videos of attacks and beheadings of their 
enemies or rivals, the LTTE filtered them and always tended to justify their use of 
violence. In the above example the Tiger spokesman always alludes to the ‘protection of 
our people and homeland’. From the analysis of the politics of deception as a virtual 
strategy of hegemony I will analyse the use of text and images on their websites as a 
tactic for the political and military positioning of the LTTE. 
 
5.4 From military symbolism to reasserting Tamil/LTTE 
leadership 
 
The image of the LTTE and the mechanisms of its hierarchy are all based on decisions 
made by its leader Prabhakaran. The image of the leader is an important symbol for the 
organization, along with the image of the Eelam map used to symbolize the homeland 
which was always kept alive among the diaspora community by the LTTE. The recent 
confrontations with dissidents and the rise of internet use by the dissidents witnessed the 
LTTE leadership being challenged and its authority questioned. The split within the 
LTTE in 2004 was the catalyst for increased dissident activity, and demonstrated for 
many that the impossible is possible whereby the LTTE leader could be challenged. In 
the wake of such open challenges to his authority by one of his top lieutenants and this 
split spilling into the diaspora, the LTTE used an aggressive web campaign to reassert 




After 2004 there was a resurgence in net activity to re-position the LTTE leader as the 
sole authority of the Tamil community. This effort I identify as the ‘resurgence of the 
cult of Prabhakaran’ and try to analyse the role of cyber space in this political 
positioning. I also look in a sub section of this chapter at the LTTE’s attempt to display 
its military strengths especially at a time when it is challenged from within and from 
outside. These challenges include: international efforts to curb transnational terrorism; 
the Sri Lankan government selecting the path of warfare to eject the LTTE from its 
strongholds in the East and North; and dissident diaspora challenges.  
 
The LTTE as an organization has faced challenges from many quarters in the last few 
years and some of these developments depleted the organization militarily while others 
challenged it politically. The political challenges it faced were mainly from the dissident 
activists who were actively engaged in political campaigns against the LTTE, 
questioning its legitimacy in representing the Tamil people in Sri Lanka. As Prabhakaran 
has made clear, he and the LTTE are synonymous and not two different entities.  
 
Pro-LTTE websites actively started to respond to these challenges to the leadership in 
subtle ways. In my research I analyse the web content especially the images and texts 
used from 2004 onwards by the LTTE as a means of responding to these challenges. 
This discursive construction is supported by the structural embodiment of the web sites 
with the message focusing more on the LTTE as a military outfit. The cult of 
Prabhakaran is not a novel phenomenon. It is the attempt to reposition Prabhakaran and 
his authority mostly through pro-LTTE web sites which traditionally featured and gave 
priority to objectives of the Tamil liberation struggle including the notion of the 
homeland and Tamil nation. The pre 2004 web sites were structured around two 
principles. The first was to pay significant attention to their leader but symbolically 
image-wise focus on the map of Eelam as the major symbol of the struggle while 
secondly, the LTTE was represented using the image of the LTTE flag. These traditional 
web images were substituted by the increased use of images of the LTTE leader. In a 
classic example of this transformation, photographs of the LTTE leader taken with the 
pilots who flew the light aircraft which attacked Colombo in March 2007 were circulated 
and posted on all pro-Tiger websites and international news agencies piggybacked on 
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them (Figure 2542). Politically this was a significant challenge to the Sri Lankan state 
while sending a clear message to the diaspora to believe in the LTTE’s strengths and its 
expanding military capabilities. The LTTE in all of the phases of war especially from the 
mid nineties projected military gains through cyber space extensively, even though it has 
lost significant hold over the boundaries of the so called homeland. These images also 
asserted the importance of the LTTE leader and his contribution to making the LTTE air 
attacks a reality. 
 
Figure 25 The LTTE leader with the pilots of the Tamil Tiger air wing.  
 
These images all included the LTTE leader and it seems the leader is projected in such a 
way that he is turned into a more of a symbolic avatar than an actual leader. This section 
of the analysis uses the structural analysis approach as one of the three key approaches to 
Web Sphere Analysis. I look at the use of images and the importance of each individual 
image that is embedded in the web sites and the political significance of these images of 
the LTTE leadership. Some of these images form the banners of certain websites and 
some are used in news articles. I argue that all these images have deeper meaning which 
is linked strategically with the text in these web sites for political gains. I discuss this 
argument based on the use of images of the LTTE leader with the text of his Heroes day 
speech in November 2007 on Tamilnet.com. 
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Figure 27 Image which accompanied text of the LTTE leader Prabhakaran’s Heroes day speech 2005 
on Tamilnet.com.  
     
The Images in Figure 2643 depict LTTE leader Prabhakaran in different modes. This 
annual speech of the LTTE leader is used by the Sri Lankan government and all parties 
interested in the Sri Lankan conflict to get a sense of the LTTE’s strategies and the 
policies that it will adopt for that particular year. Tamilnet.com produced three pictures 
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of the LTTE leader along with the text of his speech in 2007. This was the first time 
three photographs were used with the text of the heroes’ day message. The web images 
were first used in November 2004 simultaneously with the text of the LTTE’s leader’s 
speech. This image is featured on Figure 2744. These images of 2007 presented in Figure 
26 are part of an attempt by the LTTE, using a number of photographs of the LTTE 
leader in various poses to reinforce his presence and authority. I analyse the importance 
of these images as visual symbols of political and military authority. The image has 
many meanings and its representation is extremely important. I try to locate the 
properties of each image and its contents. The contents include the background and the 
physical objects that surround the LTTE leader and the personal accessories that are 
visible in the images. These objects include the podium with the LTTE insignia, the gun 
belt worn around Prabhakaran’s waist, three flags of Tamil Eelam, and the map of 
Eelam. Latour (2005) refers to the importance of objects and their visibility in the realm 
of politics and claims such an assemblage of objects forms political meanings in the 
modern world and highlights the need for such objects to be identified in the realm of 




Figure 28 banner of the web site Eelamhomeland.com (accessed 11 July 2007) 
 
                                                   





Figure 29 Figure of LTTE leader Prabhakaran with advanced rifle. 
 
 
Figure 30 Figure of Prabhakaran with hand gun 
       
 
 





Figure 32 Prabhakaran after the press conference in April 2002. 
 
In analysing the repositioning of the image of Prabhakaran in the last few years due to 
external and internal challenges to his leadership I also look at the importance of dress 
and the digital imaging of the LTTE. Web sites such as Pathivu.com, Puthinam.com, 
Tamilnet.com, and Eelamhmeland.com depict the manner in which the LTTE leader is 
projected. Figure 28 features the banner of the homepage of the web site 
Eelamhomeland.com. Prabhakaran’s face is portrayed in this with a communication 
head-set; the head set is a technological symbol and functions as an icon of the military 
and technological advantages achieved by the LTTE and the adherence to technology by 
the leadership. The next images (Figures 29 – 30) are from the same site. Figure 30 
shows Prabhakaran holding a modern hand gun and Figure 29 shows that he is using an 
ultra modern AK 103 assault rifle. These images are used on the home pages of these 
web sites. These images are not the same type used in earlier propaganda campaigns 
which were mainly of Prabhakaran in the battle field. I contrast these images with 
images taken in 2002 of the LTTE leader during the time of the cease fire agreement 
between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE; there is a stark contrast from his 
current appearance with a clean shaven face and suit to match a politician’s look rather 
than a military leader. Figures 3145 and 32 feature Prabhakaran at a key press conference 
with his late advisors Anton Balasingham and S.P Thamilchelvan. The new images 
appearing from 2005 – 2008 have re-positioned Prabhakaran as the military leader and 
the main pivot in the LTTE which is hard to depict in civilian outfit.  
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These new images depict the need for a larger than life cult of Prabhakaran with the aura 
of a larger than life leader. This seems to be an effort to reinforce the notion of 
Prabhakaran’s leadership and enhance his actual image which fits the digital age. The 
array of wallpapers46 presented in Eelamhomeland.com demonstrates how important is 
Prabhakaran; there is no other image of any LTTE fighters among hundreds of wallpaper 
images hosted on this website, which is contrary to their normal public discourse 
elevating heroism and sacrifice of LTTE fighters in battle.  
 
The increased use of images of the LTTE leader have dominated the web content of the 
pro-LTTE web sites since 2004 and it has displaced more traditional web images that the 
LTTE web sites tend to give priority to. It has also prompted the web producers to 
enhance their web formats from being lengthy text based to increasing the use of images 
and videos. The LTTE have also used the web especially since 2004 to demonstrate their 
military might. They started to use images and terminology in the web text to give a 
sense of intense modernization in their strike capabilities and the expansion of their 
military arsenal. These web sites presented analysis on the military strategies the group 
was adopting and introducing combat regiments within the organization. These web sites 
discuss the importance of ‘Black Tigers’, the suicide arm of the LTTE as their greatest 
military asset. 
 
Such explicit self exposure by the LTTE of its military structure online makes it different 
from web operations similar to other organizations. For example this tactic is totally 
opposite to Zapatista type activism (wearing their ski masks, concealing themselves and 
idolising concealment as a political message of equality to justify the suffering masses.) 
The LTTE seems to be developing web savvy military machinery while going to great 
effort to construct a virtual military machine. The LTTE developed this inherent virtual 
link with the constant updating of their campaigns against the Sri Lankan armed forces; 
the classic example is the virtual reporting of the military operation ‘Unceasing Waves 
3’ which was launched in March 2007 to attack the strategic military camp at the 
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Elephant Pass in Jaffna. This LTTE attack killed more than 1000 military personnel 
which is one of the largest peace time losses of soldiers in a single battle.  
 
The LTTE has become heavily reliant on a campaign of huge image-building around its 
military symbolism and the reinforcing of its leadership. Below is an image (Figure 3347) 
of the 21 members of the Black Tigers (the suicide wing of the LTTE). This image is 
more like an image from an action movie. These 21 men and women all perished in a 
daring raid on a Sri Lankan air force base in Anuradhapura area. These images were 
released after the attack. All members of the suicide team are posing with Prabhakaran. 
The LTTE has depended a lot on the web based projection of its structures and the 
virtual signature of an organization with massive military might. The commando raid on 
Anuradhapura cannot be compared to the scale of the LTTE operations such as 
‘Unceasing Waves 3’ in 2000. Still the LTTE managed to project limited operations into 
spectacles of military victories with the extensive use of web images and videos 
embedded in web sites.   
 
 
Figure 33 LTTE leader Prabhakaran with a team of BlackTigers. 
 
  
The discursive construction of the LTTE as a superior military outfit is also part of the 
web campaign. The LTTE thus maintains a military machinery which is virtual in web 
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sites spearheaded by Tamilnet.com. These websites managed to popularise terms such as 
TAF (TamilEelam Air force), Tiger Marines, Tiger Commandos, Tiger Underwater 
Demolition Team and Tiger Air Defence Units, all denoting technological advances 
made by the LTTE in developing an innovative war machine. These terms appeared after 
2004 and seemed to be part of the attempt to bolster the LTTE’s image as the supreme 
Tamil militant organization in the eyes of the Tamil diasporans.  
 
Until the mid 1990s the LTTE was a guerrilla organization, and although they 
confronted the Sri Lankan military in conventional engagements and skirmishes there 
was no formal organization within the fighter ranks. LTTE fighting formations were 
formally organized into military units in the mid 1990s. The first three formations were 
an infantry battalion named after the former second in command of the LTTE Charles 
Anthony. ‘The Charles Anthony Brigade’ was the first fully-fledged infantry unit of the 
LTTE, the second infantry unit ‘Malathee’ was a women-only unit and finally the 
leopards of the special forces unit were named the ‘Jeyanathan’ brigade. These three 
infantry units and structures are recorded as the first real military formations within the 
LTTE. This was revealed in 1998 through the writings of the late Sivaram 
Dharmeratnam (1998) who was actually the pioneer in presenting the ethnic conflict on 
the web through Tamilnet.com. Sivaram was a brilliant political and military analyst and 
through his online contributions he was doing a favour to the LTTE by boosting its 
discursive shaping of the military machinery. Sivaram in one his articles provided an in 
depth analysis of the regimentation and development of the LTTE as a military 
organization.  
 
From 2005 to 2007 there has been a significant increase in the use of military jargon on 
the websites most of which is related to modern forms and attributes of warfare and 
military hardware. As mentioned above terms such as marines, frogmen, advanced 
snipers, tank killer squadrons, air defence and specialized reconnaissance detection 
teams are a new form of jargon. These types of virtual military categorizations were used 
to depict the LTTE transformation into a technologically advanced fighting formation. 
To project this, the LTTE has identified the importance of the web and also it has 
understood that amidst this intense engagement, the advanced military orientations it has 
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Figure 36 Tamilnet.com reporting on a LTTE attack 
 
The Figures 3448 and 3549 are based on the last major LTTE military push and military 
success in capturing one of the most strategic military garrisons in the North and a 
general preview of the last major military campaign by the LTTE, the ‘Unceasing Waves 
3’ operation. Both these texts from March and April 2000 have references to limited 
military units of the LTTE but Figure 3650 is from a 2006 LTTE statement where the 
term ‘marine corps’ appears. 
 
The importance of the contrast between the 2000 and 2006 web reports on Tamilnet.com 
are not limited to the jargon which is trying to point out the technological advances of 
the LTTE military machine. The text is based on the press releases of the LTTE while 
the 2006 web pages carry the image of a LTTE military spokesperson. The LTTE 
resorted to providing real time information through the spokesperson and Tamilnet.com 
updated its website multiple times sometimes on one incident based on the 
spokesperson’s update. The introduction of a military spokesperson symbolizes the 
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evolution of the LTTE into a conventional and well organized military organization 
going beyond the identity of a guerrilla outfit.  
 
Even in the context of the major military operations such as ‘Unceasing Waves 3’ in 
2000 or any prior military operation the LTTE did not use such military jargon such as 
‘Tiger marines’, ‘frogmen’, or ‘automated air defense systems’. This military symbolism 
has become a key trend in the pro-LTTE websites where the virtual codification of the 
LTTE military machinery has become a central attribute in its hegemonic discourse. The 
web has become the site of production of important symbols of military achievement by 
the LTTE. The images and texts are attempts to galvanize the belief of the Tamil 
diasporans in the capability of the LTTE to develop as a potent military force.  
 
The LTTE believes that maintaining the image of the superior military power is critical 
for its political claim of being the sole representative of the Tamil people. In particular, 
the period of my research 2005 – 2007 was a time of military setbacks for the 
organization and it also saw a dramatic increase in the use of the web to visualize the 
military domination of the LTTE to the diasporans, highlighting the organisation's 
military strength despite its actual defeats. The two sections discussed in this chapter 
pertaining to the virtual veneration of the LTTE leader and the increased use of military 
jargon in pro-LTTE web sites is a sign of the virtual importance of the militarization of 
web space.  
 
The web operations of the LTTE discussed above in the case of the discursive 
construction of its military strength and the use of visuals for political domination is 
quite a distinct departure from web sites and web spheres that have been studied up until 
now such as the Zapatistas and cyber-Jihadists. In the case of the Jihad movement which 
is more concentrated on carrying out anti western propaganda or recruitment drives, 
websites merely demonstrate the violence and attacks the fighters make on western 
interests and forces. The next section argues that with the increased importance of image 
as a political entity the face of a web site becomes a site of contestation and conflict 
where rivals attempt to destroy these images of political expression. This is my 
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interpretation of the hacks captured on the Web Sphere Analysis of rival web sites in the 
struggle between hegemonic and counter hegemonic forces in the Tamil diaspora. 
 
5.5 Hacker wars 
 
The types of cyber conflicts and cyber violence and misinformation campaigns may be 
new, in replacing more traditional cyber attacks such as hack attacks, hijacking of 
domain names and email bombings. Nevertheless there are recent hack attacks which 
were captured in the period of archiving websites. The web site is an agglomeration of 
texts and images, and alternatively it is an image/snap shot of the political position or 
ideology it is representing. This image generating potential is tied to the generation of 
knowledge. Thus it has the ability to evoke a collective imagination and the websites use 
this strength to reinforce the discourse of Eelam, the LTTE as the sole representatives of 
Tamil people and the importance of the national liberation struggle waged by the LTTE. 
 
Here I introduce a hack attack on the Eelamnation.com website, which is a pro-LTTE 
website with a significant number of hits and with a long term cyber presence operating 
since the late 1990s. The domain of the website was hijacked on 1st February 2007 and a 
notice appeared on its home page claiming the site had been put up for sale (Figure 37). 
The site administrators had to immediately react and used another pro-LTTE website 
Sangam.org to carry a message publicly claiming Eelamnation.com had been attacked 
and has been re-hosted under a different domain. The Web Sphere Analysis also enabled 
the capturing of the message reappearing on Sangam.org (Figure 3851) on behalf of 
Eelamnation.com, as the archiving process in Web Sphere Analysis constantly focuses 
on the web sites which are interlinked which is a vital strength in Web Sphere Analysis. 
                                                   











Figure 38 Sangam.org reporting on the hack attack on Eelamnation.com 
 
     
5.6 Conclusion 
 
This chapter included observations made on the web sphere focusing mainly on the uses 
of cyber space for political engagement and political purposes. Including the rise of 
LTTE military symbolism on the net, the resurgence of a type of leadership image 
building in the LTTE which I analyse as the ‘repositioning the cult of Prabhakaran’, and 
I discuss the use of hack attacks as an effort to disrupt spreading the message of power 
and domination through the virtual visualisations of political objects. The LTTE as this 
chapter argues use cyber space as a location for their military strength to be displayed to 
diasporans as well as a space in which to assert its authority. These visualizations 
discussed in the chapter are snapshots of the LTTE effort towards defining the collective 




The research also reveals the virtual build up of the LTTE as a powerful military 
organization and the reinforcing of the image of its leader. The novel factor was the 
duration of the LTTE’s dependence on this virtual development of its organization. In 
the pre 2001 era the actual military build up of the LTTE was reflected in cyber space 
along with its successful offensives; with these success drying up the LTTE is observed 
building up on its virtual offensives with the objective of gaining a political impact in the 
diasporan political space. Commenting on the importance of digital images, Furstner 
claims, ‘they can be used where ever images and the knowledge on images form the core 
of scholarly enquiry’ (2005:898). This chapter highlights the possibilities of digital 
imaging and the competition it has with real images in a time when image is becoming 
extremely important in politics, with images carrying huge political significance in the 
politics of the web.  
 
The analysis in this chapter presents new dimensions of cyber politics that were 
traditionally limited to analyzing political practices influenced by information flows. I 
argue that cyber space can generate visualizations that are deceptive, and purposely used 
as political tactics supporting LTTE strategies geared for maintaining hegemony among 
Tamil diasporans. This chapter also reveals an alternative dimension in the politics of 
power and its manifestation in such conditions; until recently power in the diaspora 
space for the LTTE was about maintaining hegemony and control to guide the Tamil 
diaspora community. This chapter contributes to the thesis by revealing the multiple 
dimensions in the use of web objects and web space for political engagements. It 
demonstrated the methods required to discursively and structurally analyse the meanings 





Chapter 6 Power and Space in Web Politics 
 
The way we tell stories or any tales of discovery is in terms of crossing and 





This chapter is based on my fieldwork findings in London. The research opens up 
various dimensions to understanding Tamil diaspora politics online and the impact of 
online technologies on Tamil diaspora political processes. This chapter focuses on two 
concepts emerging through the analysis of the data from my respondents on cyberspace. 
I focus on two key concepts that were constantly alluded to by respondents using the 
different terms of: ‘space’ and ‘power’. The respondents extensively used terms such as 
‘dominating’, ‘taking over’, ‘controlling’ and ‘resisting’ in the context of cyberspace. 
These terms are mostly affiliated with theories of power in political theory so in this 
chapter I shall look at the dimension of power theoretically in the context of Tamil 
diasporic politics online. Throughout my interviews these activists insisted that 
cyberspace has brought about a democratic space for politics where some claimed it was 
a safe place but for many it was identified as a space for mobilization. The chapter looks 
at this concept critically and explores the reasons behind the constant reference to the 
term space in most of the interviews.  
 
The analysis brings out the different approaches to politics in cyberspace of pro- LTTE 
and dissident activists. I explore the shaping of the virtual political practices of the Tamil 
diaspora’s political activists due to their different approaches to cyberspace. The tensions 
in these approaches are identified in the struggle between the pro-LTTE elements 
working to control cyberspace in maintaining the LTTE supremacy among the Sri Lanka 
Tamil diaspora under one coherent political ideology and the Tamil dissidents who 
oppose this. Interestingly, the dissidents spoke of cyberspace as facilitating a unrestricted 




Thus I will look at the importance of cyber-politics while trying to make sense 
theoretically of the relationship between space and power in the context of diaspora 
political engagements online. The first half of the chapter looks at cyberspace and power, 
specifically at power-relationships that are identified by political activists. These 
activists pointed to the use of cyberspace for constructing and maintaining hegemonic 
discourses for the domination of the Tamil diaspora community. They also presented 
diverse observations about the importance of politicizing cyberspace to resist 
domination. Their feedback and arguments about the power dimensions involved in 
political practices in the use of the internet are presented in the first section of this 
chapter   
 
The second section of the chapter looks at the importance of ‘space’ in these political 
struggles in cyberspace and its repercussions in the lives of diaspora activists, as social 
relationships and political engagements carry significant value in political analysis. The 
chapter introduces these different views of the respondents and engages with them 
critically. The chapter looks at the impact of such perceptions and experiences of the 
political activists and how they have contributed to the opening up in new dimensions in 
the study of online political engagements in the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora. It also 
reveals the personal experiences and perceptions of these Tamil activists. Based on both 
accounts of dissidents and pro-LTTE activists, cyberspace has become a site of locating 
politics rather than a basic medium of communication.  
 
6.2 Power: in spaces of politics 
 
In all my interviews with the respondents, I identified a common use of certain terms 
especially covering the political importance of cyberspace and its advantages in political 
practice. This word pool consisted mainly of terms such as ‘domination’, ‘control’, 
‘resistance, and ‘challenge’ in the context of political practices. Tonkis states that power 
can be a difficult phenomenon to observe but it gives itself away in space. One of the 
most visible ways of exercising power, after all, is to occupy or to control space (2006: 
60). The respondents did highlight such forms of practices in cyberspace and this is why 
I am simultaneously analyzing space and power in the context of cyberspace and online 
diasporic political engagements. The interesting development in my research was the 
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manner in which cyberspace was presented by respondents. The Tamil dissidents 
perceived it as giving themselves more political opportunities and simultaneously 
offering them a kind of alternative, free and safe space for politics. Pro-LTTE activists 
vehemently defended the notion that it was an important space that should be controlled 
and dominated. The interviews shed light into the struggle between the hegemonic 
project of the LTTE and the counter hegemonic discourse of the dissidents. Looking at 
Mouffe’s view of hegemonic processes in society, she argues that it is politically 
instituted and according to her analysis the terrain on which hegemonic interventions 
take place are outcomes of previous hegemonic practices (2005:805). This is an 
interesting observation which captures the pro-LTTE and dissident clash. The LTTE 
established its diaspora presence from the early 1980’s as mentioned in Chapter One. 
This entrenchement aided the LTTE in politicizing cyberspace. This is a continuation of 
the hegemonic process, building on the LTTE’s earlier apparatus of hegemonic 
structures within the diaspora.  
 
6.2.1 Power: a short review 
 
It is important to include a short analysis of the relevant literature on power in order to 
identify the forms and constitution of power within the context of political engagements 
in cyberspace. I will suggest that the online political struggle of the Tamil diaspora can 
be framed as a power struggle and that analysing online engagement adds to 
understanding of the notion of power. This short review will outline the classical 
dimensional views of power before looking at the post structural approach to power 
found in Foucault’s work. 
 
This review will start by looking at the debate that occurred in 1960s and 1970s among 
American political scientists such as Robert Dahl, Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz. 
Steven Lukes outlined the two dimensions of power that guide this debate and introduces 
his own ‘third’ dimension of power. Lukes identifies the pluralist critique made by the 
Robert Dahl on C. Wright Mills analysis of American democracy in his work The Power 
Elite published in 1956. Mills claimed that only when influential segments in American 
society were capable of influencing and being part of the government in the USA. Dahl 
challenged this notion by highlighting the importance of methodologically assessing and 
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researching the way power works within American politics. In his major work, Who 
Governs (1961), he looked at political decision-making in the city of New Haven in the 
1950s and stressed the importance of observing and studying the actual behaviour of 
political agents and deriving conclusions based on analyzing such behaviour.  
 
Dahl suggested that power was located in the decision-making process. In Who governs 
(1961) he looked at the political nomination process, public education and urban 
renewal. His research included data collected through newspaper reports, official 
documents and accounts of participants (Clegg 1992: 53). Hauggard (2002) points out 
that Dahl could not find any specific group dominating any of the spheres of political 
nominations, public education or the urban renewal sectors in his research and thus came 
to the conclusion that there was no single power elite that controlled all spheres of 
government in New Haven. Thus Dahl advocated the ‘behaviorist’ methodology and his 
theorization conceded that power was divided unequally but nevertheless it was the 
people’s intentions that led to the establishment of governing authorities.   
 
According to Dahl, power was all about people and their relationships, which are 
manifested in power relations.  He argued, ‘let us agree that power is a relation, it is a 
relation among people’ (Dahl 1957:203). In the larger context of the power debate, 
Stuart Clegg declares that Dahl’s work is a landmark in the analysis of power (Clegg 
1989:11).  The importance of Dahl’s analysis, as Lukes identifies, is that he points to the 
difference between ‘actual’ and ‘potential’ power. Lukes, in his categorization of the 
power debate, identified the arguments raised by Dahl and his fellow pluralists as ‘the 
one dimensional view on power’ by which he meant: 
 
Power involves a focus on behaviour in the making of decisions on issues over 
which there is an observable conflict of (subjective) interests, seen as express 
policy preferences, revealed by political participation (2005: 19). 
 
His influence on theories of power was not limited to Dahl representing a certain distinct 
school of thought but it triggered a debate which led to the theoretical advancement of 
power by Dahl himself. It also set into motion, a more energetic interest in engaging 
with the concept of power by social scientists. 
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A significant critique of Dahl’s theorization came from the political scientists Bachrach 
and Baratz (1962; 1970). They brought in a new dimension to the pluralist view on 
power, which they termed the ‘second face of power’. Dahl’s critics pointed out that his 
pluralist view of power only brought out the public domain of power and did not have 
the capability to unravel the private domain (1962). They were referring to the agenda-
setting factor in policy making which could neutralize the ability of public participation. 
 
Based on Bachrach and Baratz’s work, Power and Poverty: Theory and Practice (1970) 
Lukes claimed that their central point was: ‘to the extent that a person or group – 
consciously or unconsciously – creates or reinforces barriers to the public airing of 
policy conflicts, that person or groups has power’ (200: 20). This analysis of power by 
Bachrach and Baratz is framed as ‘two dimensional view’ of power by Lukes. He claims 
that they criticize the behaviorist analysis of power made by Dahl and other pluralists. 
(2005: 22). Bachrach and Baratz attack Dahl at the point where he developed his 
conclusion on power as being located at instances of decision-making. They claimed 
Dahl’s focus on decision-making, ‘unduly emphasised the importance of initiating, 
deciding, and vetoing’ (1970: 6). The duo pointed out that there is in practice a covert 
exclusion of interests of individuals or groups which will prevent legislative bodies, 
committee from taking action about them. This was a conclusion which they arrived at 
looking at issues facing the Black community in the USA.  
 
In Power: A Radical View (PRV) (1974) Lukes introduces his own analysis of power. 
He situates his analysis as a response to the key debates on power in 1960s starting with 
Dahl and his pluralist views on power, which Lukes identifies as the ‘one dimensional 
view of power’ and the critique on Dahl’s views put forward by Bachrach and Baratz 
which Lukes called the ‘two dimensional view of power’. He identifies his own 
conceptual framework of power as the, ‘three dimensional view of power’ (1974). The 
central premise of Lukes’s analysis is based on a comprehensive critique on Bachrach 
and Baratz. Lukes claims that though Bachrach and Baratz criticized the behaviorist 
approach of Dahl they too are very much committed to behaviorism as a methodology in 
observing the exercise of power. He claimed ‘In the first place, its critique of 
behaviourism is too qualified, or, to put in another way, it is still too commited to 
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behaviourism – that is, to the study of overt, actual behaviour, of which ‘concrete 
decisions’ in situation conflicts are seen as paradigmatic’(2005: 25). 
 
The advancement Lukes proposed in analyzing the concept of power is based on 
understanding the working of domination. He claimed: 
 
A may exercise power over B by getting him to do what he does not want to do, 
but he also exercises power over him by influencing, shaping or determining his 
very wants. Indeed, is it not the supreme exercise of power to get another or 
others to have the desires you want to have – that is, to secure their compliance  
by controlling their thoughts? (2005:27) 
 
 He argues that social structures and cultural patterns have a significant effect on the 
decision making of individuals and this structural dimension has been missed out in the 
‘two dimensional analysis’ of power. He states:  
 
Is it not the supreme and most insidious exercise of power to prevent people, to 
whatever degree, from having grievances by shaping their perceptions, 
cognitions and preferences in such a way that they accept their role in the 
existing order of things, either because they can see or imagine no alternative to 
it, or because they see it as natural and unchangeable, or because they value it as 
divinely ordained and beneficial? (1974: 28). 
 
Lukes’ contribution to developing an analytical framework for power was important 
because of his analysis of the working of domination and its diverse forms of 
deployment by individuals or organizations. His analysis also highlights the lapses in 
behaviorist analysis which Dahl and Bachrach and Baratz (1970) championed, where the 
source and effect of power can be located at times of actual conflict. Lukes (1974; 2005) 
claims that insidious power sometimes works at nullifying conflict by maintaining total 
compliance among the subjects influenced by the source of power. 
 
Foucault’s contribution to the understanding of power presents a clear break from the 
one, two, and three dimensional analysis of power. He, according to Clegg, broke the 
monolithic view of power because ‘central to Foucault’s conception of power is its 
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shifting, inherently unstable expression in networks and alliances’ (1992: 154). Foucault 
points out those modern forms of power and its linkage with knowledge have spawned 
new forms of domination. He concentrated his analysis on exposing the domination of 
the individual through discourse, social institutions and social practices. 
 
Foucault’s discursive analysis of power located the individual as an effect of power 
created within the flows and relationships of power that function as a network cutting 
across bodies of human beings. The important aspect of Foucault’s contribution to power 
is his attempt, as Lukes rightly observes (2005:88), to introduce a ‘micro-physics of 
power’. In other words Foucault did not perceive social life to be enacted in a single 
space of society, but rather within a society which has multiple layers or dimensions and 
for Foucault these dimensions formed and shaped the domination and subordination of 
people. The micro-physics of power was the lens in which he exposed such detailed and 
multi dimensional workings of modern power. In his famous prison talk interview, 
whilst responding to a question about the history of repression, Foucault points out his 
intentions in the analysis and unearthing of the attributes of power: ‘But in thinking of 
the mechanisms of power, I am thinking rather of its capillary form of existence, the 
point where power reaches into the very grain of individuals, touches their bodies’ 
(1980:39). This post-structural orientation that Foucault develops through a discursive 
engagement on power has drawn significant criticism. The main criticism from realists is 
his attempt to dissolve human agency and present a power field where agency is 
discursively trapped in every power relationship. Lukes terms this undermining of the 
autonomous moral agent in Foucault’s analysis of power as an ‘Ultra radical view on 
power’ (2005: 88). Foucault in fact did a U-turn in his analysis of the human being as an 
effect of power by trying to reinforce the fact that power is productive and not just 
repressive. For example, in his later writing he explores concepts such as 
governmentality ‘by which one can constitute, define, organize, instrumentalize the 
strategies which individuals in their liberty can have in regard to each other’ (1987: 19). 
Lukes argued that by trying to deviate from his position on the idea of power 
constituting the human subject, Foucault’s ultra radical view of power dissolves (2005: 
97). Best and Kellner though urge that Foucault brings out ‘an intense vision of 
oppression’ (1991 54), while emphasizing he should not be reduced to a fatalist 
philosopher. They further claim the argument that is made against Foucault which 
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illuminates his analysis of individuals as ‘hapless and helpless victims’ (1991: 55) 
misses out the vulnerabilities of power and its manifestations in places that are 
mentioned in his work where he claims resistance to power takes place.  
 
The notions of ‘domination’ and the achievement of ‘compliance’ are both important in 
my thesis as I locate my research around the struggle between two rival political groups 
within the Tamil diaspora. This section of the thesis will deal with the dimensions of the 
power struggle between the two groups and their use of cyberspace. I will also look at 
the importance of Foucault’s analysis of power by suggesting that the diaspora activists’ 
use of web sites is a discursive production of domination and that sites used by the Tamil 
dissidents actively challenge hegemonic interests of the LTTE. I will look at Foucault’s 
and Lukes’ key claims to locate the exercise of power, the use of domination techniques 
and the working of resistance in cyberspace. The role of power in cyberspace and the 
theoretical premises that the online and the offline can intersect are aspects on which I 
focus on in this section. I look at the instances where domination is imposed in the case 
of the LTTE and simultaneously identify the moments when it is resisted by Tamil 
dissidents. This analysis on the notion of power will be used to understand the role of the 
Tamil diaspora politics and its interface with cyber technologies and the cumulative 
effect on the working of politics of domination. It also will look at the individuals and 
the role of such individuals as agents of power or as subjects of a ‘false consciousness’ 
where domination is a hidden force. I will also look at the internet as a site for asserting 
political agency among activists to defy the dominant discourse and as an alternative 
network where repressive technologies such as LTTE international operations can be 
challenged and resisted. The working of power will be assessed through the separate 
analysis of viewpoints and real life experiences of political activists belonging to both 
pro-LTTE elements and dissidents.  
 
6.2.2 Pro-LTTE view on power 
 
I will start this section with Sutha’s views on cyberspace and power. His yearning is 
quite clear when he told me casually while sipping a caffe latte in a Starbucks near the 
Holborn tube station, London. ‘I want to see two flags flying in Sri Lanka, and the Tiger 
flag should symbolize the existence of two nations.’ Sutha revealed that he became 
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involved in politics in 1995, ‘I followed the conflict from Sri Lanka to Nigeria to 
London as a diaspora child.’ Sutha was born in Sri Lanka but his parents emigrated to 
Nigeria where he said he was in 1983 during the time of the violent riots in Sri Lanka. 
He became a prominent political activist when he took over a leading English 
publication for the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora, and developed a budding relationship 
with the late Anton Balasingham, the LTTE theoretician who was based in London. 
Sutha explained that he was mainly lobbying against the Sri Lankan government 
campaigning on Tamil rights at international organizations such as Amnesty 
International, the EU and the Home Office in London. He also mentioned the added 
advantage of being a Tamil diaspora activist with the ability to use English and the dual 
identity of being Tamil and being British.  
 
Sutha shared his views with me on the advantages of cyber politics. In this discussion he 
outlined a two pronged approach. The first was a threat perception which the LTTE and 
all its affiliated organizations are most conscious of, the threat from the Sri Lankan state. 
In this context Sutha was focused on challenging state hegemony. He told me: ‘the web 
is genuinely de-territorialized, the web is free of state centric focus, especially as the 
operational apparatus is dispersed’. He further said: ‘The web has made us be on our 
toes. Its like an unceasing time field where, for political activists, the game never ends.’ 
Sutha stressed that being and occupying the web is the same time.  He told me, ‘if you 
are not in web space you are not a relevant player.’ He added,  
 
The importance of cyberspace was enormous with the speeds of access and 
massive reach it had. We had to be on top of the political scenario and to be 
aware what is happening in Sri Lanka. Then only we could be guiding the 
political themes in the diaspora community and it was an important tool to be 
used for us to be ahead.    
 
This is a strong indication of the notion of presence as speed and immediacy are 
properties of the architecture of power in web space. As Sutha said, ‘The presence 
decides the quality of the game’. The sum of all these observations is linked to the 
strategic thinking that has been invested on cyberspace by the LTTE since its inception 
of terror tactics in 1997. The LTTE’s strategic approach to the Tamil diaspora is linked 
to its fundamental political objective of being the single voice of the Tamil nation. The 
approach Sutha takes to politics in cyberspace involves strategic manoeuvres, as he says 
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‘guiding the diaspora’, by which he means the forms of domination that the LTTE has 
developed that will be deployed in cyberspace.  
 
The second strand to Sutha’s approach to cyberspace and online political engagement is 
his emphasis on the need to be in control of cyberspace in the context of Tamil diaspora 
politics. He told me about the dispersion of messages from the LTTE leadership and the 
use of cyberspace for this rapid dispersion to keep the presence of the LTTE and its 
leadership felt throughout the diaspora centers. What Prabhakaran does in his annual 
speech on Heroes Day (27 November) is to reiterate the commitment for a Tamil 
homeland and, in a coded way to, provide the setting for the war each year. This 
becomes like the episteme for the Tamil diaspora or the supreme knowledge which they 
need to have to be part of the political effort. Thus what Sutha was saying is that they 
shape cyber political engagements or the political space accordingly. From Sutha’s 
views is is clear that the LTTE is keen on being free from the hegemony of the Sri 
Lankan state interventions within the Tamil diaspora but at the same time to establish a 
frontier controlled through the LTTE. Fuglerud (2001) commenting on the LTTE’s 
political project, claims that the LTTE is in a process of ‘embedding’ their own activities 
as cultural constructions and in the context of the diaspora to identify each and every 
diasporan as being part of a national liberation struggle for the formulation of a 
homeland where they will ultimately return as citizens. 
 
What I uncovered in my interviews with Sutha was that he was acknowledging the 
antagonisms that are present in the Tamil diaspora space. The antagonisms operate as the 
LTTE vs ‘the state’ and the LTTE vs ‘any dissenting voice’. Sutha further claimed that,  
 
The Tamil nationalist bloc sets the field, for everybody. The shape of diaspora 
community rests on the pattern set by the LTTE and its leadership as it represents 
the aspirations of all the Tamil people and everyone has to be in this to achieve 
the ultimate goals.  
 
It is interesting to analyse the spatial metaphors Sutha used in his interview regarding 
cyberspace. They included terms such as ‘battle field’, ‘political field’, ‘domain’ and 
‘territory’. Foucault in an interview revealed that the infusion of power and control of 
power has given provenance to such spatial metaphors. He agrees that territory is a 
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geographical notion but he claims that it is a more of a ‘judico–political’ one which is 
controlled by a certain kind of power (1980:68). The notion of ‘setting the field’ in 
cyberspace or ‘the Tamil spaces’ in cyberspace are territorial strategies, employed by 
individuals or groups to attain or maintain control. 
 
Following the interview with Sutha, there is an interesting dialectic which emerges in 
cyber political engagement: the feeling of being free and the need to dominate.  Sutha 
said ‘we battle for the “idea” as it’s the most important in cyberspace’. This illuminates 
the role of the idea as knowledge and the desire to build a control mechanism in this new 
space. Foucault in an interview titled ‘Questions of Geography’, responding to a 
question on the relevance of spatial metaphors to geography and the strategic importance 
of it, claims that ‘once knowledge can be analysed in terms of region, domain, 
implantation, displacement, transposition, one is able to capture the process by which 
knowledge functions as a form of power and disseminates the effect of power’ 
(1980:69). Thus, following on employing this Foucauldian analysis, Sutha is laying out 
the need to dominate this space and accepts that it is made out of a matrix of power 
relationships. According to Foucault’s view on power relations:  
What would be proper to a relationship of power, then, is that it be a mode of 
action on actions. That is, power relationships are rooted deep in social nexus, 
not a supplementary structure over and above “society” whose radical 
effacement one could perhaps dream about… a society without power relations 
can only be an abstraction (2000: 343).  
 
Sutha is preaching a mode of action geared towards domination and it is presented very 
subtly while demonstrating the deep rooted urge of the eternal need to control any 
political space. His response and dismissive attitude towards the dissidents reflected the 
overall pro-LTTE view of the dissident Tamil diaspora political role. What Sutha 
attempts to reiterate point blank was that the political space was controlled by the LTTE 
and there is no alternative political space even in cyberspace. Still his responses did 
prove his awareness of being involved in a larger political engagement and conflict 
which was not limited or parallel to the traditional conflict the Tamil nationalist bloc 
waged against the Sri Lankan state. Sutha, in his responses, symbolised the strategic 
thinking of how political spaces can be controlled which is very reflective to the LTTE 




Kumar heads an organization which is mainly a Tamil nationalist lobby centre, focused 
on human rights, but it is also a strong pro-LTTE operation and one of the earliest 
established Tamil lobby organizations in UK. He was formerly a production assistant at 
the Wellawatte spin and weaving mills in Colombo, Sri Lanka, which is known as the 
citadel of trade unionism in Sri Lanka that had witnessed the emergence of many trade 
union leaders and the development of the politics of protest. Kumar got involved in the 
Tamil nationalist movement when his brother was among the 22 people arrested 
(including Sathyaseelan, Mave Senadiraja, Kasi Anandan) in 1979, all of whom 
belonged to the Tamil radical youth organization ‘Manavar Perawai’. This organization 
was the inspiration for many militant groups which emerged later on including the 
LTTE. ‘I was doing a Masters degree in UK and returned to Sri Lanka to secure the 
release of my brother.’ In this visit he was asked by the founders of the Tamil Refugee 
Rehabilitation Organization (TRRO) to establish TRRO as a charity in London, and he 
later founded his current organization which was mainly for political lobbying as the 
TRRO had no mandate for lobbying in the UK as it was established as a charity.  
 
‘The power of this space and the potentials are enormous. Earlier we were able to do 
specific campaigns and agitations and write a mail to a minister or a parliamentarian. 
Now we are able to hit multiple targets and carry out multiple political functions and this 
is a great force for us’, Kumar revealed in his interview. He comments on the ability pro-
LTTE networks have developed to supersede earlier forms of hegemonic power sources, 
from mass rallies and the handing over of petitions. The space has thus altered for him 
and a new space for struggle has opened up which offers a wide array of political 
powers.  
 
6.2.3 Dissidents’ view on power 
 
Nallu has a history of being part of the Sri Lankan Tamil nationalist movement and the 
militancy. She is a former member of the LTTE who left it disenchanted.  She resorted to 
campaigning against the LTTE and led a life virtually under threat from the LTTE. She 
had to flee Sri Lanka and live in safe houses in India and is now settled in London. 
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Currently she is part of the vanguard of Tamil dissident activists who are countering and 
resisting the LTTE ideologies and political practices based in London. 
 
I posed her the question ‘Does the web give you the power to challenge or resist the 
hegemony of both the Sri Lankan state and the LTTE?’ She told me,  
 
The web gives you an ability to resist certain things, such as LTTE dominations. 
I feel this ability comes through the security the internet provides. The web is 
also in a way a secure mechanism especially for political activity. Especially, as 
a dissident activist, I can find LTTE people at my door step as they will trace any 
dissenting Tamil community member and the consequences can be quite scary.  
 
This struggle demonstrates similarities with Mouffe’s (2005) analysis of power and 
hegemony, where the configuration of power relations around which a given society is 
structured is a struggle between opposing hegemonic projects. Thus for the dissidents 
cyberspace has provided them with opportunities to develop their own sets of power 
relationships and to resist hegemonic advances from constant challenges.  
 
In Nallu's view, the LTTE domination was an impediment to dissident political actions 
and she resented the fact of being powerless to act along with her conscience as a 
dissenting political activist. Being pursued by LTTE hit squads in Sri Lanka and India, 
and living life constantly shifting between safe houses shows how Nallu has been living 
in fear. For Nallu the notion of power or being empowered meant challenging and 
resisting the LTTE and also the Sri Lankan state which she felt was not working towards 
safeguarding the basic rights of the Tamil people. The safety of the political spaces 
offered through cyberspace allowed Nallu to operate and challenge the LTTE 
ideologically.   
 
The LTTE front offices throughout Europe and its well-established networks have full-
time money collectors, propaganda people, researchers and data entry offices employed 
to keep track of money being collected from the diaspora community. They oversee new 
arrivals, where they are settled and also maintain records of their families living in 
Europe or in Sri Lanka. This includes frequent visits by these individuals to houses for 
collecting money or distributing propaganda leaflets. These individuals include LTTE 
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hit-men who are involved in intimidation, abuse and harassment of any Tamil diaspora 
member who refuses to pay, or who tries to organize community events that are not 
sanctioned by the LTTE fronts. This is a network which is working for the LTTE and 
which believes in the total domination of the public space of the Tamil diaspora. These 
LTTE outfits have limited dissident networking and coordination by denying them any 
space for political mobility. This is the key reason why the dissidents have found 
alternative spaces of politics which they tend to call ‘democratic spaces’ and ‘safe 
spaces’. For the dissident, challenging these dominant networks is a political task, and 
cyberspace is seen as a key space that the dissenting political activists realize function as 
a point of resistance against dominating networks and institutions. 
 
Nallu, in her explanation of how she can resist LTTE and state domination of political 
spaces through the internet, spoke about the ability of cyberspace to have enlarged or 
created political spaces which cross state boundaries easily. She was pointing out the 
ease of political coordination through cyberspace. The key fact is Nallu’s identification 
of this as a major source of power. According to Nallu, 
 
Because of this transcendence it gives us a sense of power and also it has 
allowed us to organize events in multiple locations such as, Toronto/ London, 
New York/ London. The dissidents unlike the LTTE did not have resources for 
globally mobilizating activists. We did not have the strength to challenge the 
LTTE and also if we were doing it physically the LTTE would stop us using 
their henchmen and unleashing violence on us. This is why I think cyberspace 
and internet has given us the power to mobilize and a safe space to mobilize in. 
 
In the middle of the Sri Lankan conflict such spaces opened up through cyberspace that 
enabled dissident activism has played a major role in affecting the LTTE and the state’s 
balance of power. In military conceptions, according to Hirst ‘we are concerned here not 
merely with specific built environments but also with wider spatial patterns. War 
organizes space in subtle ways, not just in fortifications or battles. It often links together 
structures and places that seem to us to belong to very different orders’ (2005:54). The 
diasporic communities spread out in Europe and the North America are subject to 
hegemonic pressures from their host countries as well LTTE networks operating with 
efficiency of a transnational movement. Thus as the dissidents reorganize themselves in 
such spaces as part of the conflict itself, cyberspace has become the organizing space 
linking the dissident movement. As ‘power relations are rooted in the whole network of 
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the social’ (Foucault 2000:345), the political spaces opened up in cyberspace seem to 
have a vast array of power networks circulating through it and reaching the social and 
political around us.  
 
Rengan is a solicitor based in Ilford (London) and a key member of the Tamil dissidents.  
He is known to his friends as the solicitor who will read all web pages on Tamil politics 
before studying his cases. In an interview with him regarding power and cyberspace in 
the context of his politics Rengan remarked, ‘if we hadn't had this facility we would be 
nowhere and this is quite clear with the increase of interactivity in cyberspace and the 
responses websites generated in the last decade’ 
 
Jeyabalan who is a dissident revealed that as a political activist, cyberspace made the 
dissidents possess some indirect and, unseen power. He said,  
 
As dissident activists we could use cyberspace and the communication 
technologies to challenge the LTTE which was not possible at such speed or 
effectiveness using the traditional print media and the most important thing is 
you can get the LTTE panicking and responding. That’s why I feel it’s a kind of 
unseen and indirect power that can be generated using the internet as a political 
tool.  
 
According to Jeyabalan these capabilities enabled the dissidents to develop their own 
political project and challenge the LTTE circles. This is important as the notion of 
indirect, unseen power can be analysed in allusion to Steven Lukes’ (1974) third 
dimension of power, which has the potential to dominate and have an insidious presence 
throughout the political sphere. The important point here is that the levels of domination 
in cyberspace are, in one aspect, very open and straightforward but in some spaces of 
politics they are submerged or function at an insidious level. Lukes argues: 
 
Power can be deployed to block or impair its subjects’ capacity to reason, 
well, not least by instilling and sustaining misleading or illusionary ideas of 
what is ‘natural’ and what sort of life their ‘nature’ dictates, and,in general, 




According to Jeyabalan the dissidents have managed to challenge the discourse of Tamil 
Eelam and national struggle of the LTTE which, in Luke’s (2005) sense of domination, 
has kept the Tamil diaspora believing in the struggle of the LTTE and believing in the 
importance of Tamil homeland. Thus cyberspace has been used as both a site of 
resistance against this domination and as a medium to contest the domination which, in 
Lukes terminology, can be identified as false consciousness, generated by pro-LTTE 
elements in the political sphere of Tamil diaspora. Cyberspace has become a meaningful 
expression of dissident agency where dissidents championed a counter discourse to the 
LTTE operations and where the diasporan subjects of the LTTE discourse were urged to 
set themselves free.   
 
Keeran, who was introduced earlier, in the beginning told me ‘cyberspace has become a 
decentralized power zone’. He brought forward this idea based on his experience as an 
activist and his interest in online politics. Keeran is one of the few activists actively 
observing the internet and its use in the political processes in the Tamil diaspora. Keeran 
was hinting at the control the LTTE was exercising on the diasporans and this capacity 
to infiltrate their political boundaries that cyberspace has created. As territoriality and the 
classification of boundaries are political strategies designed to attain particular ends, they 
are subsets of power relationships and containers of power relationships. Keeran 
emphasized the importance of his point on ‘decentralized power’. He told me, 
 
Five or six years ago cyberspace was dominated by the LTTE and the Tamilnet 
and for every one the truth was the Tamilnet, but what has happened now is that 
especially with the rise of sites like Thenee, the balance has shifted. There is no 
one truth. The LTTE just can’t lie to the Tamil diaspora. I personally know even 
now LTTE sympathizers have started to look at dissident web sites. There are 
over 50 dissidents sites now and the LTTE is trying new sites such as pathivu 
and puthinam to back tamilnet, but the truth is that there is no one power in 
cyberspace it is now distributed and finally the Tamils have a choice to see and 
hear alternative voices and see alternative politics to the LTTE. 
 
The notion of ‘truth’ which Keeran brought out is important as the LTTE maintained 
through its web operation the discourse of the Tamil nation. Discourse, in the Foucaldian 
sense, is a working of power and but, Foucault claims, though discourse is produced by 
power there can be ‘a point of resistance and starting point of an opposing strategy’ 
(1980:101). This is the type of de-centering of power and the ability to resist and 
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challenge the LTTE’s ‘discourse of truth’ that could be understood from Keeran’s claims 
based on his experiences as a dissident political activist. 
 
6.2.4 Summing up power 
 
The forced migration of the Tamils created diaspora centres from London, and Toronto 
to Sydney and thus made these centres important hubs for the conflicting parties in Sri 
Lanka. These hubs function as international centres that are important to the sustaining 
of the Sri Lankan conflict. The significance of web space and web based technology has 
been the opening up of spaces which were dominated even within these transnational 
hubs. These hubs emerged as strategic centres for the conflict in Sri Lanka that were 
continuously fortified and controlled by the LTTE. Fortification of space has been 
perceived as a method of acquiring and maintaining power, from remote strongholds, to 
cities which were designed as fortresses and walls protecting borders to political 
sovereignty. Fortification has been a symbol of power and dominance (Hirst 2005). The 
opening up of web space has made such dominations and fortifications obsolete and, to 
political players who use these new spaces, this is seen as a new form of democratic 
space. 
 
There are two key significant approaches to power in the context of cyberspace and 
political engagement online which emerges in this analysis. Power aspirations such as 
those expressed by the LTTE, using terms such as hegemony and domination, are 
denominators of a state-centric discourse of power. From the LTTE view point the 
Eelam or Tamil nation controls the spaces of the Tamil diasporan. The second is the 
systematic resistance that emerges; the dissident engagement in cyberspace seems to be 
displacing the traditional one track aspiration of the LTTE to dominate. The internet 
constitutes points of resistance for the dissidents enabling them to encroach the LTTE 
fortifications forcing the LTTE to rethink their strategies in cyberspace.  
 
There is an interesting power attribute of changes in processes of domination and 
resistance in cyberspace from the power dynamics that existed prior to cyber 
engagement. This is the strategic fact that, ‘hegemonic cultural practices will always 
attempt to fix the meaning of space, arranging any number of particularities, disjuncture 
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and juxtapositions into a seamless unity: the one place, the one identity, as in for 
example the nation’ (Natter and Johns 1997: 150). The reality in these scenarios is that 
hegemony being the process that naturalizes both space and social relations, is like any 
form of power: never fixed or inevitable but always open to exposure, confrontation, 
reversal, and refusal through counter-hegemonic practices. The power struggles that I 
discuss, and the use of cyberspace as a site of struggle as well a source of power 
especially in the counter hegemonic interests of the dissidents, represents the plurality of 
autonomous struggles waged throughout the micro levels of society. These struggles are 
inherently political and are power driven. In Foucaldian terms, they act as ‘Micro logical 
strategies’ since power is decentered and plural, thus space becomes a key aspect within 
this plurality. This is the reason why the notion of space is explored in the next section of 
the chapter. The other fundamental reason being ‘power’ and ‘space’ were constant 





Modern diaspora theories are informed and influenced through research on globalization 
and global flows.  Such spatial flows indicate transnational movements of people, culture 
and capital. The implications of transnationalism52 are profound for any argument for a 
progressive politics that tries to transcend both the spatial limitations of political 
imagination and reformulate notions of community, identity, and solidarity beyond 
surpassing limitations such as nation state boundaries and ideologies. Diaspora theorists 
who analyse the phenomena in such contexts clearly argue that diaspora formation itself 
is going beyond marked spaces such as nation states. Karim notes that the ‘milieux that 
diasporas seek to create are not bounded by the borders of nation states – their rhythms 
resonate transnationally to mark out non–terrestrial spaces that stretch out inter-
continentally’ (Karim 2003:10). If the diaspora itself is a manifestation of 
deterritorialization, or a symbol of global flows, it is interesting to seek the perception of 
                                                   
52What I understand as transnational politics, is based on the notion of transnationlism broadly alluding to 
the development of multiple ties and networking of people and institutions across the nation states. These 
linkages have spawned new global forces and academic research have focused on issues based on 
transnational forces from capital flows, inter-governmental agencies, non-governmental organizations, 
politics, services, social movements, social networks, families, trade, citizenship, corporations, migration 
circuits, identities, public spaces, public cultures. The notion of cyberspace, virtual communities and cyber 
politics have widen the horizon of such research 
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Tamil diasporans using and being in cyberspace, which is also a technologically 
deterritorialised entity. In this text the political importance of cyberspace and its spatial 
attributes that make it important according to the respondents are discussed below. This 
discussion is mainly divided into two subsections according to the identities of two 
groups of respondents; the two categories are the Tamil dissidents and pro-LTTE 
activists. Later on, the views are juxtaposed to investigate whether the emphasis on 
space by these political activists brings out new revelations about the role of cyberspace 
in online political engagements.  
 
6.3.1 Dissidents on space 
 
The dissident political leader Nallu’s comment on cyberspace has become an opening 
statement for the analysis of importance of political space as it is an epitome of the 
impact of cyberspace on political mobilization and from the dissident point of view the 
opening up of alternative spaces for politics. Nallu remarked, ‘We the anti LTTE 
movement in the Tamil diaspora have risen through the web.’  It is well known that the 
Tamil dissidents were challenging the LTTE from the mid 1990s and there were reports 
of LTTE intimidation, attacks and even killings of such dissidents to intimidate them.  
The reality of the Tamil dissident movement was that, though there were isolated 
clusters of dissidents, there was no one movement or mobilization against the LTTE 
until 2001. Thus Nallu’s statement seemed a contrast to the history of Tamil dissidents in 
the Tamil diaspora. It is also clear that the dissidents have become more active, 
especially among the diaspora since early 2000 and they have demonstrated more active 
and organized political mobilization challenging the LTTE openly, which was a new 
phenomenon in the Tamil diaspora. I asked what she actually sensed and what role 
cyberspace played in her political activities as a dissident activist. She told me,  
 
It is so obvious for us as the problems and challenges we faced in political 
activities, we could not easily organize, our comrades in Europe could not 
mobilize, and our activities were restricted. We did not have the ability to 
mobilize as a network of activists. Dissidents and people who supported 
dissidents were attacked by LTTE and our publications halted. There were many 
intimidations against us such as of dissenting activist Jeyabalan and Rengan. 
Now internet has given us this ability to be in places and do political 
mobilization, organization and the LTTE cannot stop these activities. Look at the 
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way SLDF runs, we run it totally online, all our engagements and political 
activities are organized through internet. 
 
The Sri Lanka Democracy Forum (SLDF) is an important Tamil dissident 
organization that was founded in London by a group of activists in 2004. Nallu is a 
founding member of the the SLDF. It has become an important organization for 
mobilising dissident political activists and people who are interested in Sri Lankan 
politics. Another founding member who did not wanted to be named told me that in 
their first meeting the activists who formed the SLDF unanimously decided not to 
put the term ‘Tamil’ as part of the organiation’s name. The SLDF was formed 
broadly to look at the issues affecting minority communities in the back drop of the 
Sri Lancan conflict. SLDF holds discussion meetings with different international and 
Sri Lankan stake holders and attempts to intervene in both policy making and grass 
roots organizations in Sri Lanka.  
 
Though SLDF was founded in London, its members are located within many 
European states as well as in the USA and Canada. Thus Nallu was pointing out most 
of the coordination among these members is carried out through the internet. The 
SLDF constantly sends e-mails of texts, journal articles, country reports and 
interviews on the Sri Lankan conflict to its members using a mailing service.  
 
 




The above insert is from the website www.lankademocracy.org53, the website of the 
SLDF (Sri Lanka Democracy Forum). The countries of the network that the SLDF 
website indicates are all major Tamil diaspora hubs and such networking in these 
nodes was only possible for pro-LTTE organizations a few years ago. The dissidents 
did not dare to organize in this manner. The logo of SLDF is a globe with the title 
covering the total image of the globe; this is symbolically indicating the reach that 
the SLDF has achieved. Significant amounts of coordination and mobilization of the 
SLDF membership is done online for efficiency and safety, according to members 
whom I spoke to in my interviews. The SLDF web operations point to some of the 
arguments the dissidents were making especially on issues such as democratic space, 
safe space and strategies of mobilization. These websites have significant political 
value both at operational levels and at the symbolic level.  
 
The internet tends to assume the role of an information provider, especially of news 
stories in the context of Tamil diaspora.  I asked Nallu as political activist the level of 
impact the internet has on diaspora politics as a news provider and its potential beyond 
that role. She told me, 
 
No definitely not, news alone, that is more on the superficial level. We do 
understand and strategize our political plans using the internet. And we use it to 
sense the vibes of all political currents as they are felt on cyberspace. It for me 
gives a sense of connection. For, example I feel the affinity to somebody in 
Germany through cyberspace, it’s like some kind of a transcending. I equally feel 
someone is thinking like me, the email has become a interactive thing taking the 
shape of a discussion. I use to hold discussions through out the world with our 
members and it is our site for interaction  
 
The term ‘rising through the web’ may reflect that Nallu was bringing out an over 
enthusiastic response to a mere technological utility.  However, in the lengthy discussion 
I had with her it became increasingly clear that she was aware of the limitations for 
dissident politics given the rigid controls and intimidations that the LTTE resorted to 
among the diaspora community (by virtually controlling or violently shutting down any 
space for dissent). She highlighted the importance of cyberspace for challenging these 
structures of control. 
                                                   





Laguerre (2005: 129), in his research on Haitian diasporan politics, tries to grapple with 
the role of web forums and their impact on diasporan politics.  He then constructs the 
concept of ‘virtual diasporic space’ which, he claims, is a particular region of cyberspace 
that provides a virtual spatial infrastructure for diasporans to engage in online 
communications for real world benefit to themselves, the homeland, and the host land. 
This is also interpreted as a kind of a virtual gateway linking diasporic individuals and 
groups. The response from Nallu stretches the notion of diaspora space beyond the 
communicative element Laguerre is theorizing. Nallu was trying to point out that 
dissidents have regained the ability of voice (speaking out against the LTTE), action and 
developing political relationships among the diaspora for mobilizing against LTTE 
domination.  She was stressing the importance of the internet as a conduit as well as a 
site for political action which had a significant effect in overall Tamil diaspora politics.   
 
Nallu also revealed another dimension to why political activists similar to her have 
begun to make increasing use of the internet. The Sri Lankan Tamil diasporan political 
activists, especially the dissidents, were mostly self-funded, unlike the LTTE activists 
who had enough financial power in doing politics. In this aspect the cost effectiveness of 
the use of internet according to Nallu is an important ‘leveler’ in the fields of political 
conflicts. Also she pointed out it would not have been possible if this was in Sri Lanka 
where access to the internet is relatively expensive. In this political engagement Nallu 
pointed out that technological access is one of the most important things for current day 
political activism.  
 
Jeyabalan’s main concern when he arrived in the UK in 1991 was the lack or almost 
non-existence of political space in London for ‘Tamil voices’ (a term used by Jeyabalan 
throughout the interview emphasizing the need for alternative voices other than of the 
LTTE), as LTTE had a strong control over the Tamil political space in London. He 
stressed the importance for Tamil people to be free of LTTE dominance and be free to 
express views and have political affiliations other than with the LTTE. In my interview 
with Jeyabalan about the impact of cyberspace on his politics and the general political 
strategies of Tamil dissidents, he brought out an interesting observation based on his 




The Web space enabled us to position a democratic Tamil movement leading to 
the democratization of the Tamil political space in London. This is my 
experience as a journalist and dissenting activist, LTTE could control or 
intimidate us or just shut down our operations, like when we try to put 
publications in Tamil shops they will be taken off immediately. Through such 
control the LTTE limited dissident activity and limited the areas we could 
operate.  
 
Jeyabalan stressed that the diaspora political space desperately needed an alternative 
voice because of the level of control. He told me, 
 
In the Tamil diaspora everything was controlled from Jaffna, thus cyberspace 
gave the people who opposed the LTTE a chance to bring out their voices. The 
diasporans had to go with the voice of the LTTE and accept what the LTTE said 
to them. The ability to find our own voice and speak out and mobilize against the 
LTTE using the internet strengthened the anti-LTTE movement which is the 
alternative voice of the Tamil people.  
 
The argument Jeyabalan attempts to make parallels Nallu’s reasoning that cyberspace for 
Tamil political activists is a site from which to deploy resources for political 
engagements. He identifies the inherent features of cyberspace such as the constant 
reshaped boundaries which prevent it from being subjected to LTTE control. The 
internet has become in some aspects a primary political field which was not controlled 
through various hegemonic projects. 
 
Jeyabalan highlighted the economics behind being politically active in cyberspace, 
mainly the relatively cheap economics of political engagement in the sphere; ‘another 
key reason I shifted to cyberspace was financial reasons and secondly the media was an 
expensive enterprise. Printing costs, publishing costs and the total control of the LTTE 
meant there was no medium to operate freely.’ The LTTE maintained a significant 
international operational network and it had the financial strength and assets to maintain 
its control over all possible political activities and outlets amongst the diaspora 
communities. This was a major advantage the LTTE diaspora network possessed, 
forming a formidable buffer to maintain their territorial hold in the diaspora.  
 
Raj, the dissident activist, who was introduced in Chapter Two, told me, ‘The cyber 
democratization and opening up of political spaces is significant in countering the 
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LTTE.’ It was interesting to see that all my interviews with Tamil dissidents on the 
impact of cyberspace on their lives tend to reveal that they approached it as a site for 
politics rather than a communication medium. I asked from Raj what he meant by 
‘democratization’. In response Raj brought out an example which referred to efforts in 
the early nineties by a dissident Sri Lankan Tamil journalist who emigrated to Canada in 
1986. He told me, 
 
A Sri Lankan Tamil by the name of George Khrushchev started a political 
magazine called Thayagam. This magazine took an anti LTTE line, the LTTE 
immediately imposed a wide ranging ban on the Tamil community on 
supporting, selling or reading this magazine. The pro-LTTE groups led a smear 
campaign against the family of the editor, giving him death threats and branding 
his wife a whore and intimidating his children on their way to school This 
compelled him to terminate operations in fear. Soon after the web revolution in 
mid 1990s, Khrushchev re-launched his magazine online, and since then he has 
taken-on the LTTE and the LTTE was unable to stop him and he continues his 
writing. 
 
The above example can be put down as a classic example of the development of 
communication technologies and the ability to disseminate information, but in this case 
what Raj was pointing out through his historical analysis of the fate of dissident Tamil 
political activists was the yearning to be located in a political space which was free from 
LTTE control and its intimidatory tactics. The dissidents were looking for a spatial 
boundary within which they would feel safe. Raj introduces the importance of 
cyberspace in this sense as a site for politics as well a socially constructed space for 
politics, where social and political relationships can develop and grow without being 
subjected to any subjugation.  
 
Raj revealed cyberspace was an important political space for him personally. He told me,  
 
Internet gave us a kind of safety, as the dissenting views came out operating 
using the internet made you feel safe. As dissidents we carried elements of fear 
in our lives. We still remember the cold blooded murder of Sabaratnam in 1994 
carried out by LTTE hit squads in Paris and also the gangs that target dissenting 
activist. When you are in a political process it is important to be safe and it is a 
fundamental reason why the use of the internet for dissenting Tamils was 
important. This is why I think it creates a democratic space. The LTTE had the 
ability to strike fear into the lives of dissenting Tamil activists and using the 




Raj’s reference to Sabaratnam’s murder is very important in locating the importance of 
web politcs and the safe space it provides for dissidents. Dissident activists had a hard 
time even voicing opinion against the LTTE in fear of attacks by pro-LTTE activists 
within the diaspora community. Sabaratnam’s murder in Paris on May 1, 1994 in front of 
his family members by two LTTE members was a stark reminder of the threat the 
dissidents faced within the diaspora communities. Sabalingam Sabaratnam was 
murdered because he was finishing a book which was to be released in France written 
criticising the LTTE. Many dissident activists have been threatened and assaulted for 
publishing against the LTTE. These included the attacks against the journalist D.B.S. 
Jeyaraj in 1993, Tamil dissident activist Vaithiyanathan Loganathan and journalist 
and academic Selliah Nagarajah. 
 
Nagarajah is a political analyst and a lecturer in law attached to the University of 
Western Australia and a dissident activist. He was threatened by pro-LTTE activists in 
October 2005 and Human Rights Watch (HRW)54 indicated clearly that the pro-LTTE 
group issued death threats on Nagarajah. In London the staff of the anti-LTTE radio 
station the Tamil Broadcasting Corporation has been subjected to threats and 
intimidation and its director, V Ramraj, received many death threats. 
 
Raj was trying to bring out the importance of web politics in the light of attempts by the 
LTTE and pro-LTTE groups that were targetting dissident activists. The dissidents were 
struggling for modes of organization and mediums of expression within diaspora 
communities, thus cyberspace has been used to facilitate both these needs. Raj then 
applied his thinking to very recent political processes he was involved in and a program 
he was organizing along with his fellow dissident activists. This was the commemoration 
event of Kethesh Loganathan, the Deputy Secretary General of Sri Lanka Government's 
Secretariat for Coordinating the Peace Process (SCOPP), and a former member of the 
Tamil political group EPRLF. He was assassinated in Colombo, Sri Lanka. The Late 
Kethesh was one of the few dissenting Tamil political activists based in Sri Lanka and 
his assassination triggered public defiance in the diaspora community against the LTTE. 
                                                   




The Kethesh Loganathan memorial meeting in London was held on Saturday, 31 March 
2007, at the Conway Hall. 
 
Raj, who was a key organizer of the events held in London and in Paris, revealed that 
many of the things which were needed for the organizing of the event were acomplished 
online. The online collaboration among dissidents ranged from deciding on printing and 
the page settings of the commemorative publications to coordinating dissident 
participants from all over the globe. Raj pointed out that the dissenting political activists 
used web space as a political space to congregate and make decisions in this event. He 
pointed out that although the dissenting community was spread out across Europe it was 
important to keep the coordination and preparations going on despite the disruptions 
made by the pro-LTTE fronts. Elaborating more on the significance of web space and the 
technological factors providing the gateways, Raj spoke of his experience on witnessing 
how the more senior political activists and members of the Tamil diaspora are depending 
on the web. ‘People who are active are now extremely depending so much on this 
technology,’ he said, ‘for example even the older generation activists who are not literate 
in such new technologies have resorted to making their children to use their expertise 
and knowledge on.’ 
 
In my interview with Keeran on the use of cyberspace for political purposes, he said he 
would like to discuss his personal experience and its impact on him as an activist. 
Similar to all dissident activists, his response was based around the argument that the 
LTTE did not allow any political activist to occupy a political space or let a political 
space be created in the diaspora unless they accepted the LTTE’s political positions and 
spatial parameters of its operation. ‘We have recovered what we have lost through 
cyberspace’ said Keeran, ‘it has given us a democratic space and this creation of 
democratic spaces has sent a powerful challenge to the LTTE.’ I probed him on the use 
of the internet as an information tool and asked if it was the premier use of internet in the 
context of Tamil diaspora politics. Keeran told me, ‘more than an information utility 
cyberspace is becoming part of life and in socio-political usage it is affecting the way 
elections are held, how money is circulated and how it challenges all types of power 
structures’. He told me, ‘dissidents like us use it to do publications, popularizing the anti 
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LTTE messages to organizing and mobilizing against the LTTE, and we have used the 
internet significantly.’  
 
The main point Keeran was raising was that the internet and the use of internet politics 
have opened up opportunities with which the dissidents were incapable of engaging prior 
to its inception. His articulation of cyberspace was more as a democratizing field and a 
political launch pad and he also spoke of cyberspace as a place rather than being a pure 
medium of communication. His argument was that the qualitative significance of 
cyberspace was that it offered attributes of a place and as a means to infiltrate places of 
politics within the diaspora securely held by the LTTE. 
 
This is parallel to what Nallu described earlier about the dissident movement emerging 
through the web, and what Jeyabalan and Rengan corroborated. In the current context the 
dissident movement is very active physically in political operations in London and the 
interviews revealed that the dissidents are very conscious of the spaces which they were 
able to occupy for political action. Some significant engagements are in cyberspace and 
this space has enabled them to find alternative sites to counter hegemonised physical 
spaces in London by the LTTE fronts.  
 
The dissidents appreciate cyberspace as a medium of communication and in some 
moments of political engagement they identify its potential to be a place and its 
networking potential and the power of such procedures. Laguerre (2005) talks about the 
formation of informal alliances in the case of diaspora political activism online where 
strategic alliances can be made between political groups.  This, according to him, allows 
the process of flexible membership. This is predominantly in his research on the political 
engagements of the Haitian diaspora. In the case of the Tamil dissidents who are not as 
organized as the well established networks of the LTTE such real time and transnational 
alliances between different dissident groups are critical for mobilization politically 
against dominant LTTE operations. In the case of the Sri Lankan diaspora politics I 
argue that cyberspace functions as a space not just for networking but for the 
convergence of different political groups with similar political objectives. The 
crisscrossing between political spaces of different individuals who are against the LTTE 
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and the speed that the dissidents could operate in, bypassing spaces and flows controlled 
by the LTTE, demonstrates the power of mobility.  In fact, mobility itself is transformed 
into an attribute of power within a diaspora space which was well guarded by a 
hegemonic player. 
 
In a discussion of the role of cyberspace and the scope of political opportunities in online 
politics, Jeyadevan said, 
 
When the alternative groups started aligning together and develop an anti LTTE 
movement, our campaign took a massive focus on the internet, and this enabled 
this movement to bypass the LTTE spaces which depended on pure domination. 
The internet was important for the LTTE and the diaspora was using it for 
information and to understand the political situation in the Sri Lanka. The LTTE 
maintained its position of as the top dog until the dissident web sites started and 
the whole domination was challenged. The LTTE feel this challenge that is why 
they attack me and all other dissidents because we have become a threat to them. 
 
The importance in the context of cyberspace is to what extent it was significant in this 
surge in dissident activity. Jeyadevan points out, 
 
Regarding the LTTE monopoly over media, there was totally a hardcore LTTE 
support base, and no space for alternative force (democratic force) and the other 
groups did not challenge the LTTE. The dissidents saw the effectiveness of 
internet and also we could position the alternative voice even if we still could not 
control the areas which were under the thugs sponsored by the LTTE. We do not 
need to be out in the street to challenge the LTTE I use emails and also write to 
sites to expose people such as Shanthan, Sethu and other LTTE sympathisers.  
 
These groups who were opposing the LTTE virtually did not have any ground in which 
to operate in or in other terms a political space, ‘As we needed a space to campaign the 
cyber network had the ability to influence  the Tamil community’, said Jeyadevan. This 
was what they were yearning for as dissidents because ‘the LTTE strength was secrecy, 
and ruthless control, but when we shifted to online politics the political space was 
opened up’. The dissidents were mostly discussing the political potentials that 
cyberspace opened up for involvement in political activity, Jeyadevan is demonstrating 
how these opportunities have even enabled them not just to challenge the political 
positions of the LTTE but the LTTE organizational apparatus which is a significant 
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network of individuals and different organizations ranging from Hindu Temples and 
charities to cultural forums.  
 
Rajanayagam was another key respondent in my fieldwork, a veteran of Tamil diaspora 
politics and a human rights activist. He ran the most published Tamil magazine in the 
whole Tamil diaspora the Tamil Times. Rajanayagam started publishing Tamil Times in 
Ocotber 1981 and the magazine was published till December 2006. A veteran of the old 
left movement in Sri Lanka he is a lawyer by profession and is a key member of the 
Tamil dissident activists in London.  
 
Rajanayagam said the events which led to the burning of the Jaffna Public Library at the 
end of May 1981 by government backed Sinhalese thugs triggered the need to publish 
the Tamil Times. He said the decision was taken after a meeting of a dozen Tamil 
professionals living in the UK who pledged support for him to start the publications. He 
said in the first edition of the magazine, he used the editorial to outline the purpose for 
which the Tamil Times was established. These included, discussions on democracy, 
human rights violations in Sri Lanka and Tamil rights. Rajanayagam emphasized ‘we did 
not want to side with any political party or group. I outlined this in our first publication. 
Even the TULF leader Amirthalingam who was the leader of the opposition in the Sri 
Lankan parliament asked me in 1982, to make Tamil Times the official journal of the 
TULF, but I flatly refused.’ Rajanayagam also claimed, the LTTE tried to disrupt the 
publishing of the magazine by trying to threatned the sponsors and also prevent shops 
from selling it. The importance of the Tamil Times is the pioneering effort of few 
political activists from London and its wide reach as a Tamil publication. Tamil Times 
was started even prior to the LTTE presence in London and later on, the the magazine 
had to constantly struggle with the LTTE for political space as the LTTE started 
dominating the diaspora sphere.  
 
In relation to the use of cyberspace for politics Rajanayagam stressed the key point all 
dissident political activists were talking about, which he highlighted having critical 
importance. He said, ‘cyberspace has opened up space and opportunity for non LTTE 
groups, activists to communicate and operate without fear of being targeted.’ The key 
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point which he brought out about cyberspace as a ‘safe space’ was also brought out by 
other dissidents such as Raj, Rengan and Jeyadevan.  
 
6.3.2 Pro-LTTE view on space 
 
The pro-LTTE respondents spoke less about the concept of space, but they did speak 
about the concept of ‘power’ through terms such as ‘dominate’, and some even used the 
term ‘hegemony’. In their short references to the notion of space and democracy they 
were focused on being in control and the democratic elements cyberspace offered were 
identified as sites of resistance to the domination of the Sri Lankan state. 
 
In my interview with Sutha, he claimed that the dissidents did not represent Tamil 
people’s aspirations and effectively did not have a say in the political struggle. While 
claiming that there was no threat from dissidents Sutha stressed that the Tamil diasporan 
politics in cyberspace will be under their control and will be politicized with the object 
of separate homeland. Sutha said, 
 
What do the dissidents represent? Do they represent the Tamil people’s 
aspirations? If they are against the LTTE are they supporting the Sri Lankan 
government? I do think the dissidents have a political position to take either they 
are for the Tamil people or they are traitors. 
 
Sutha’s response reflects the hardline position the pro-LTTE and LTTE operatives take 
regarding dissident activists. It also reveals the crux of the conflict between the two 
groups in question where spaces for politics remain under the authority of the LTTE. 
The dissidents are denied any alternative space for politics in the diaspora. The LTTE 
interpret the diasporan space of politics as one homogenous unit in which they are in 
total control, based on the notion of Eelam or the place called Eelam. By adopting this 
approach to cyberspace the LTTE is displaying a retreat to place or depending on using 
the controls they apply in geographic places they control in Sri Lanka. Political 
ideologies and mobilizations based on geographic interests to Massey, is a kind of denial 
or an attempted withdrawal from difference.  She claims it as a politically conservative 
haven and a position that fails to address the real forces at work (2005: 5). Approaching 
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the LTTE’s control of the diaspora space and its application of similar tactics to restrict 
cyber mobilization suggests similarities with Massey’s observation of situations where 
multiplicities generated in spatial relationships are being ignored. The pro-LTTE 
elements did not understand the challenges brought out through dissident web counter 
attacks and the efficacy of multi-pronged attacks using multiple websites.  
 
The main challenge to dissidents is based on the fixity of the notion of Eelam or 
homeland. The political space which has developed based on this fixed entity has a 
tremendous political impact commanding the politics and social life in the Tamil 
diaspora. The LTTE has recently been pushed out of major strongholds in Sri Lanka and 
the map of Eelam does not actually match to what they control now on the ground. The 
reinforcement of the homeland and the spatial existence of it have consequently been 
supplemented by web spaces built and dedicated to it.  
 
Kumar, a Tamil political activist and a leader in the pro-LTTE lobby in response to the 
discussion concerning the opportunities cyberspace has created for politics told me,  
Cyberspace has provided an enormous space for political activity and it has 
created recent debates varying on various perspectives. This space has become a 
powerful tool, to respond to Sinhala nationalism providing academics, scholarly 
response to issues such as Tamil settlements, village name changes 
archaeological discoveries. Such a space couldn't be formed or occupied in Sri 
Lanka.  
 
In Sri Lanka, it is impossible for any scholarly or academic justification of the LTTE’s 
position to be released. It is interesting when Kumar brings out this point that it has 
similarity with Rajanayagam’s point on maintaining the notion of Eelam despite its 
physical non existence. Kumar stressed the role of academics and the space academics 
found in using cyberspace for justifying the real parameters of Tamil Eelam even though 
it was a virtual homeland. He said there are many academic contributions online 
especially in websites such as Tamilnation.org which discuss archaeological discoveries 
which Kumar claimed hold the key in the discursive construction and maintaining of the 
hegemonic discourse of Tamil Eelam. One clear example is the Tamilnet.com re-
structuring of its home page to provide a dedicated space in which to discuss Tamil 
names accredited as place names in Sri Lanka and discuss their etymology. The effort is 
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to claim these area names, place names and geographic names and even rituals as all 
having etymological roots in the Tamil language and Tamil culture which is as 
established historically as the Sinhala civilization. In Kumar’s response he highlighted 
the LTTE’s need for spaces where the politics of nationalism can manifest in multiple 
forms which creates counter spaces against the sovereign state space of Sri Lankan. 
  
6.3.3 Space and democracy 
 
It is clear from the respondents’ comments on cyberspace and its political impact on 
them both at personal and political levels that a difference of opinion on the concept of 
space can be observed between the pro-LTTE respondents and the Tamil dissidents. The 
above data indirectly points to the tensions arising between the articulation of spaces and 
opportunities for the political activity of Tamil dissidents and the contrasting LTTE view 
on cyberspace. The contrast hangs on LTTE fronts maintaining a view on cyberspace as 
a space to be contained, enclosed and controlled. In contrast the Tamil dissident politics 
demonstrate the view of cyberspace as a double entity, both a site and a set of 
relationships.  
 
Their usage of terms such as ‘democratic space’, ‘safe space’ and ‘political 
opportunities’ are based on this dual articulation of space. Tamil political activists look 
at cyberspace as an entity that cannot be totally controlled as there is no one single grand 
integration of all spaces of politics. Cyberspace is a classic example of the multiple 
locations of spaces of politics and its manifestation of seamless connections in the new 
forms of transnational politics. It is also important to introduce the notion of democracy, 
as it was used by all of the respondents across the spectrum of dissidents to pro-LTTE 
activists.  
 
There was a constant allusion to the term democracy in a large number of interviews 
where respondents were attempting to locate themselves and their politics in relation to 
cyberspace. The notion of democratic space or democracy in the context of the Sri 
Lankan conflict has different connotations. The difference emerges from the context in 
which it is used. The dissidents throughout the interviews used the term democratic 
extensively and they used the term ‘democratic space’. They stressed the ability to 
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politicize spaces democratically with their political engagements, claiming that this 
politicization is highly effective in cyberspace. This use of the term democracy needs to 
be clarified from the point of view of the dissidents. They use the term democracy or 
democratic space to refer to the possibilities and space for politics that are not dominated 
or controlled by the LTTE or the discourse of LTTE led Tamil nationalism. Democracy 
in the eyes of Tamil political activists and in the context of Sri Lankan politics also 
represents the aspiration of belonging to the mainstream political process, the yearning 
for the state to accept the multi-ethnic identities which make the Sri Lankan polity.  
 
By contrast the pro-LTTE or LTTE activists use this term to denote freedom from the 
control or domination of the Sri Lankan state. The notion of democracy that both these 
sections represent is theoretically linked to the spaces of politics. The views on 
democracy and expectations based on democracy vary from the right to be a participant 
in the political processes of Sri Lanka to expectations of the state recognizing the 
antagonisms that have divided communities across ethnicities. 
 
In my research these antagonisms are further complicated within the Tamil diaspora, 
with political identities in diaspora Tamil nationalism conflicting with one another. For 
example, the pro-LTTE ideology of securing the political rights and citizenship rights of 
Tamil people through the formation of a separate state conflict with the finding of a 
political solution within one Sri Lanka, based on the devolution of political rights of the 
Tamil dissidents. When political activists bring out the notion of ‘democracy’ based on 
their political objectives, it can be useful to use radical democratic ideals to analyse the 
workings of contested political identities.   
 
Radical democracy comes in the wake of the failure of classical democracy to adequately 
address problems of cultural difference (Blaug and Schwarzmantel 2000: 10) and it 
urges democratic theory to understand and analyse contemporary issues which include 
new political identities and the complexity in political communities. Radical democracy 
also looks at the spaces that emerge in the context of political struggles and resistance to 
forces of hegemony and the ability to politicize spaces of political opportunity and the 
struggles for representation in such spaces. Spaces created through diasporic politics in 
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cyberspace represent sites of contested practices and aspirations. This is very much 
reflected in the way the dissidents and the pro-LTTE elements take on political issues 
such as Tamil rights, Tamil grievances and Tamil representation.   
 
The notion of democratic space signifies the alternative to a dominant discourse that was 
controlling the diasporan sphere and also the need for the democratic expansion of Sri 
Lankan state policies. Such tensions brought out in my interviews will, in a radical 
democratic interpretation, emphasize the numerous social relations where relations of 
domination exist and must be challenged if the principles of liberty and equality are to 
apply (Mouffe 1993: 236). This brief section does not intend to engage in analysing 
theories of modern democracy. Instead, it attempts to locate the multiple references to 
democracy by the respondents in this fieldwork in a theoretical framework.  
 
The dissidents, by emphasizing the need for space and by positioning themselves 
strategically in cyberspace, were responding to an acute shortage of political mobility 
within the Tamil diaspora. In general the notion of lack of space for these political actors 
had several interpretations including the geographical fixities of power such as the 
control the LTTE had on the means of political expression in London through 
publications, properties and full-time employees. They also included the inability to find 
locations, operational limitations such as intimidation and threat to life, and to develop 
relationships needed for political processes across communities nationally and 
transnationally. The respondents spoke about space across a spectrum of variables which 
included political location, safety, relationship building, organizing in relation to politics, 
and cyberspace as part of their own experience as political activists and leaders. Nallu, 
Raj, Keeran; Rengan and Rajanayagam all referred to the notion of ‘safe space’ and 
Kumar, Jeyadevan and Nallu spoke about ‘relationships and organization’.  These 
arguments were illustrated at length in engaging with the respondents’ observations and 
experiences. 
 
The two different approaches adopted by the LTTE and the dissidents to politics in 
cyberspace can be analysed in the context of the academic debates on space where the 
limits of space and what the ‘spatial’ meant became important points of discussion. 
Lefebvre at the beginning of his critical work The Production of Space claims the ‘word 
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“space” had a strictly geometrical meaning’ (2000: 01). His analysis of space attempted 
to bridge the gap between philosophy of the notion of space and spaces created in day-
to-day life of individuals.  His analysis included issues such as what meanings can be 
given to spaces created by practical social activity and whether spaces can be occupied 
by social groups. Thus Lefevbre examines not just metaphors of space but the actual 
events of both in and through the physical and social spaces and relationalities that 
people live in their lives.  
 
Based on the experiences of the political activists, cyberspace performs the role of a 
qualitatively new space at the point of their political engagements and this is also 
emphasized in the scale of impact the online has on generating changes in their lives and 
political activities. The dissidents do have a clear problem of political mobility in certain 
physical spaces, and this emanates mainly from the fear factor. Cyberspace for them had 
provided opportunities of understanding certain aspects of politics by allowing them 
access to political fronts that they would have not been able to access previously. It is 
imperative that what can be grasped from these findings is the complicated architecture 
of cyberspace. Technologically mediated spaces provide facilities for political 
participation which significantly stretch beyond the communicative dimension. 
Cyberspace for some activists has become an important site of politics and a site 
politically important and at the same time facilitating social and political relationships 
that were imposible before.  
 
Even respondents of the pro-LTTE network confirm the notion of cyber space as a space 
for politics by reiterating the birth of a new political space which they term as a ‘net 
battlefield’. Yet they maintained that it was a territory that could be dominated despite 
the fluid nature of cyberspace. They identified the main focus of politics in cyberspace 
as a battle both within the Tamil space for control and hegemony and to counter the Sri 
Lankan state. In this context I argue that the LTTE’s political strategy in cyberspace is 
informed through approaching it as a territory or frontier. The LTTE view on cyberspace 
and the political importance of cyberspace had changed over time. The LTTE realized its 
potential as an information disseminating tool and it realized the communication 
potentials of the internet even in the infancy of the web. However, the LTTE’s approach 
to cyberspace from 2004 onwards seems to have changed from viewing cyberspace as a 
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utility to a space of political importance which should be controlled. This realization has 
transformed into an intense struggle for dominance with the implosion of the Tamil 
diaspora politics parallel to the rise of Tamil dissidents in the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora 
community, revealing the changing nature of cyber political engagement in the diasporic 
sphere. Whether explicit or implicit, control over territory is a key political motivating 
force and appropriation of space or specified territory results from the interplay of social 
and political forces. In this sense territoriality can be seen as a spatial expression of 
power. The notion of controlling cyberspace is in a way to preserve the hegemonic 
discourse that what the LTTE represents to the Tamil diaspora. As such cyberspace has 
been subjected to control because of the need to keep the discursive construction of 
Eelam and the LTTE sole authority in the Tamil nation building intact. 
 
Contrary to the above, the Tamil dissident view of cyberspace is not limited to the view 
of cyberspace as a territorial entity subjected to be dominated. The dissidents also do not 
specifically see the need for it be controlled, paralleling ideologies of territorial politics 
or as a reflection of a national space. They had multiple views on cyberspace in regard to 
online political engagement, spanning from enhancing mobilization, political 
organization to viewing it as a unique location/space. This made it inherently impossible 
to be dominated by hegemonic interests such as the LTTE dominating diaspora centers 
globally. This was a process of resisting the hegemonic discourse of the LTTE. 
 
These tensions are manifested and become key political struggles as the Tigers attempt 
to hegemonize every diasporan space under their control, evoking Eelam/ the state and 
treating cyberspace as a meta space of the larger Eelam space. The dissidents have a 
more decentralized approach to cyberspace where they perceive it to be an opened up 
entity, not subjected to dominations or based on fixed spatial rules. These contradicting 
views and contests contribute to certain changes in political action and political issues 
that have dominated the diaspora politics in the last two decades and a half. The unique 
feature in this approach to web politics is that political struggle between these two 
groups produces remarkable insight into interesting developments to online politics, 
especially the relationship of space and the manifestation of power relationships in this 
dimension. The research is focused on understanding what shapes the political activities 
in cyberspace and its impacts on Tamil diaspora politics. Thus I am also interested in 
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looking at dynamics of politics at the moment of practice rather than the processes, so as 
to explore the changes in the political sphere once people take to online politics. The 
importance of the above analysis of my respondents’ views on cyberspace and 
conceptualizing them to frame ‘space’ and ‘power’ sets up the scene to explore the 




This chapter is the first step in engaging with my fieldwork research and the data coming 
out from my interviews. It integrates with Chapter Four to introduce the notion of power 
and space and the contestations for power as manifested in cyberspace from the 
dimension of web operations and from the point of view of political activists. I focused 
on respondents, linking their role in cyberspace with their political activities. Two issues 
of power and space are clearly identified in this chapter based on what the respondents 
said about cyberspace and how it had played a key role in political activism. These two 
areas were analysed as conceptual frameworks in this chapter. The first section looked at 
the workings and manifestation of power as there was a struggle between the pro-LTTE 
fronts and the dissidents, exploring the workings of the hegemonic discourse and the 
counter hegemonic challenges. These struggles are nevertheless based on the drive to 
maintain or dominate political spheres. Thus the chapter looked at its workings in 
cyberspace and the political activists’ views and experiences of being part of the 
struggle. The cyberspace based and cyberspace focused struggles were analysed in 
theoretical frameworks of power mainly using Foucauldian interpretations of power, 
discourse and hegemony. 
 
The second section of the analysis was on the notion of ‘space’ and this was explored in 
the context of the political activists claiming that cyberspace offered them new spaces 
for political action. This view had the connotation of a place or political site and they 
also explained the expansion of political opportunities in cyberspace. These views were 
engaged in the chapter to look critically at the importance of such perceptions. This 
investigation was complicated because there were contesting views on the same notion 
of space by the dissident Tamil activists and the pro-LTTE respondents. Though 
cyberspace cannot be structured as a qualitatively different space, it does point to the 
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generative power of cyberspace and its political potential in locating, facilitating and 
mediating political practices of Tamil diasporan political activists. 
 
There is a clear pattern emerging in this final analysis of these interviews concerning the 
notion of space and power within the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora politics with the 
emergence of the dissidents and the expansion of spaces of politics, especially in the 
context of online political engagement. Cyberspace is presented by many diasporan 
political activists in almost all the interviews in a double sense, as ‘a space for politics’ 
and ‘a space that has to be politicized’ in their struggles. The interviews demonstrate that 
some of these cyberspace based spaces of politics have redefined the way diasporans 
have done politics and reprioritized political goals. The pro-LTTE fronts are being made 
to rethink new strategies of holding spaces and controlling them than sticking to the 
traditional strategy of maintaining a single political hold on the diaspora.  
 
Thus all these new struggles as demonstrated in the interviews have contributed to 
creating new immediacies in the sphere of Tamil diaspora political activities. Such new 
political issues spawned in and through cyberspace sidelined the tradition of political 
actions for establishing a Tamil homeland as more immediate political issues within the 
diaspora. The dissidents using cyberspace for politics has forced the LTTE to shift its 
political actions from being limited to the national liberation struggle and the 
establishment of a Tamil homeland in Sri Lanka. Dissidents like Jeyadevan, Nallu, 
Keeran and Jeyabalan have, through the use of cyberspace, made the LTTE enter the 
realms of grubby politics which they tended to argue that they never would get into. By 
dragging LTTE into such political engagements and making such political issues 
priorities for the LTTE operations, cyberspace has managed to open up different levels 
of political engagement in the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora. This diversion is not limited to 
the struggle for political identity and the struggle for political domination. It affects the 
change of political strategies of mobilization discussed in the next chapter and the new 
modes of more immediate conflicts that have emerged in cyberspace that will be 
discussed at length in chapter seven. The next two chapters reveal how such new 
political issues which have been created in these spaces of politics spawn new struggles 
within the diaspora and shift the focus of the conflict from Sri Lanka to a different 
sphere of diaspora politics. This is why in my research on the impact of online politics 
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on the political process of Tamil diaspora becomes quite critical when looking at online 
cyber engagements. There seem to be multiple social and political changes across these 
new spaces, especially at the moments when politics shifts to spheres such as 
cyberspace, and its connection to real-world politics is felt by political activists and in 










This chapter explores and investigates the effect of online politics on political processes 
and the political decisions of Tamil diaspora political activists shaping their day to day 
political engagements. The structure of the chapter explores two themes which are 
identified as important in the politics of the Tamil diaspora and the use of the internet for 
political purposes. The first theme is presented as ‘political opportunities’ focusing on 
the use of cyberspace to extract opportunities for political advantage in the struggle 
between pro-LTTE activists and Tamil dissidents in the diaspora. In the second theme I 
look at the changing forms of political strategies and emerging challenges for political 
activists in keeping up with the new technological advances required for political 
campaigns, lobbying and mobilization strategies. This chapter also captures the tensions 
erupting between the pro-LTTE activists and the dissidents and the struggle to capture 
political advantage through the strategic and tactical use of cyberspace for mobilization. 
These two themes encapsulate the effects of cyberspace and the internet on political 
strategies of Tamil diaspora political activists. They include attributes of resistance or 
the ability to resist dominant networks while tracing the manner in which such dominant 
networks attempt to rearticulate their dominance in cyberspace. The themes also explore 
the problems of envisaging dominant structures in cyberspace. Domination needs to be 
re-thought in cyberspace as existing political structures that are visible in diaspora 
politics could not be superimposed directly onto online politics. 
 
The research further reveals the immediacy of online politics and the intensity of 
political action with the capacity to generate political issues beyond the mere mirroring 
of developments in Sri Lanka and the ethnic conflict. These developments are based on 
political issues originating within the diaspora itself, with cyberspace a key location with 
in which these issues originate. The chapter goes deeper into the emergence of these new 
political issues and looks at empirical evidence of such changes based on interview 
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material from my fieldwork, and explores if significant changes have taken place in the 
realm of online diaspora politics. I introduce a mini case study of the use of online 
technologies by the Zapatista rebels for political purposes. The case study is a compare 
and contrast exercise to identify the use of cyberspace by the Tamil diaspora political 
activists against an organization such as Zapatista which has been the subject of 
extensive academic research concerning the use of the internet for political activism. 
Political strategies discussed in this chapter are further explored in the next chapter on 
cyber conflict.  
 
7.2 Cyberspace: politics and diaspora politics online 
 
The internet’s potential for political participation has been debated for more than a 
decade now (Barber 1997; Browning 1996; Welman 2003). As Chadwick points out the 
issue is no longer whether politics is online, but in what form and with what 
consequences (2004: 1). The notion of cyber-politics is identified as a set of political 
processes which includes many features of traditional politics. It is mainly argued in the 
above literature that traditional political strategies are being rearticulated in new spaces 
and that the emergent set of new type of politics are shaped by the new spatial 
architectures that cyberspace offers.  
 
Cyber politics include an array of new themes which emerged around the 
communication technological revolution before and after the inception of cyberspace. 
These include the notion of informational politics, politics of visibility, new democratic 
spaces and activism, new political mobilization and strategies engaging technologies. 
These themes have a burgeoning literature around them and, in my research with the 
emphasis on diasporic political activists, more can be added to the existing knowledge 
foundations, revealing new insights into the dynamics of cyber politics. The research 
looks at the politicisation of the online sphere in the Tamil political struggle and the 
struggle reflects a struggle for control, coupled with new uses of technologies for 
political ends. These new political spaces and political strategies mediated in cyberspace 
can respond to the needs of newly emergent themes of activism such as radical 




7.3 Empirical analysis 
 
There can be no political analysis of the Tamil diaspora without the LTTE being 
mentioned, as the LTTE has developed such an organic affiliation with the Tamil 
diaspora. As Sriskandarajah points out, without doubt the LTTE has fostered the 
politicization of diaspora life. He points out that the LTTE and its front organizations 
have been very successful in exporting Tamil Eelam to the diaspora and in recruiting 
diaspora Tamils to its liberation project. This has been acomplished primarily by making 
developments in Sri Lanka more proximate to the diaspora (2004:498). 
 
Tamil diaspora politics and the role of the LTTE have been mainly understood as a 
network which is aimed at running a smooth funding mechanics and a significant 
propaganda arm. The Tigers believed that running this sort of dual operation channelled 
their resources to pursue the military means of the conflict, whilst simultaneously 
maintaining the image of a liberation struggle alive in the western arena.  This is 
identified by Fuglerud as the LTTE shaping the very nature of the diasporic imaginary 
by constructing a common identity in exile (Fuglerud 2001:198). My research looks 
beyond this view of LTTE control: it looks at the phenomenon of the rise of Tamil 
dissidents in the diaspora and the struggle that shapes the Tamil diaspora political terrain 
before pro-LTTE and the dissidents. 
 
The complicated nature of the research originated from the constant changes that took 
place in Sri Lankan politics and political developments in the Tamil militancy with 
effects felt through the diaspora during the period of my research. The split in the LTTE 
in 2004 was the earthquake but the after effects were felt beyond the Eastern Province 
where the rebel leader Karuna split with the Northern leadership. The tremors did not 
stop from there with the election of a new president in Sri Lanka in 2005, whom many 
political analysts identified as a nationalist who would withdraw from the Cease Fire 
Agreement (CFA) signed in 2002 February between the government of Sri Lanka and 
the LTTE. The change of Sri Lankan presidency in 2005 saw rapid changes occurring in 
state policies and outlook towards handling the conflict. The LTTE kept pressure on the 
new government with suicide bomb attacks and stepped up some military offensives in 




The new phase of war started in July 20, 2006 with the LTTE closing a key sluice gate 
supplying water for 30,000 families in the Eastern Province in the ‘Mavil aru’ basin. The 
military engagements soon led to the LTTE being totally dislodged from the East within 
a year with the capture of strategic area of Thoppigala (Barons rock) on 11 July 2007. 
The next key development was the Sri Lankan government officially pulling out of the 
Cease Fire Agreement on 2 January 2008.  
 
These developments within the period of my research had a massive impact on the 
landscape of the diaspora politics. This was reflected in the strategic changes the LTTE 
was adopting to maintain its status quo despite the developments in Sri Lanka, while it 
provided the alternative forces which challenge the LTTE an impetus to mobilize. This is 
another reason why I focus particularly on the dissident dimension and the role of 
dissidents in Tamil diaspora politics. The timing of these developments and the 
importance of cyberspace for this intense rivalry plays a significant role in the Tamil 
diaspora political sphere. None of the key academic research on Tamil diaspora activism 
looks at the dissidents as they were not a force in diaspora politics few years ago.  
 
In the next section I focus on unearthing the past and current experiences of my 
respondents on political engagements online, based on their actual political encounters 
and experiences. I outline the changes observed in political practices among the diaspora 
activists and the opportunities and challenges cyberspace has opened up for political 
engagements.  
 
7.4 Two dimensions of online politics 
 
In this section I have identified two key dimensions in the political processes of the 
Tamil diaspora where an online political engagement has created a difference in political 
activities. The first dimension looks at the new ‘political opportunities’ cyberspace has 




7.4.1 Political opportunities 
 
This section looks at the operational value of cyberspace for political activists. The 
identification of opportunities seems to vary between the Tamil dissidents and the pro-
LTTE activists. The importance in this section is locating the nature of cyberspace as a 
medium of politics enhancing the options for political activists and being a site or 
staging ground for politics. My research illuminates this complicated matrix as 
signifying its potential to be incorporated in the study of politics and its ever expanding 
importance from grassroots to mainstream politics. 
 
Raj told me, ‘democratic political operations were made possible by the Internet 
revolution’.  He was referring to the significant rise in dissident activity within the Tamil 
diaspora, and this movement challenged both the LTTE and the Sri Lankan state. 
According to Raj,  
 
The rise of the dissident movement was kick started with the 2002 peace process. 
For the dissidents one of the most important aspects for political action was 
safety and also to be doing politics democratically. We did not want to resort to 
the dirty tactics and politics of violence LTTE was resorting to in the diaspora by 
threatening people and threatening families of activist. But using web the 
dissidents could sometimes challenge the LTTE and it opened up many political 
opportunities from web based journalism to mobilization. These political spaces 
in web space facilitated a democratic process which is positive for the Tamil 
diaspora.  
 
The allusion to the term democracy was discussed in the previous chapter and discussed 
in theoretical frameworks on contemporary frameworks of democracy. In this chapter I 
look at its political significance in the political practices of the Tamil activists. The term 
democracy in the context of cyberspace is used to explain the impact of the internet and 
web technologies on political processes in general. The term e-democracy or digital 
democracy has been a key focus area on research into the political impact of the internet. 
The UK based Hansard Society is a key player in the process for implementing and 
driving E-democracy in Britain. It defines E democracy as: 
 
The concept of e-democracy is associated with efforts to broaden political 
participation by enabling citizens to connect with another and with their 





This simple but commonly used definition of E-democracy looks at the state and its 
linkages with the citizens and the options in making horizontal linkages citizens in civil 
society as well as vertical linkages between civil society and policy makers.  
 
 In a more advanced definition Hacker and Van Dijik analyse it as: 
A collection of attempts to practice democracy without the limits of time, space, 
and other physical conditions, using information and communication technology 
or computer mediated communications instead, as an addition, not a replacement 
for traditional political processes (Hacker and Van Dijiki, 2001:1). 
 
The later definition looks at the utility of cyberspace in expanding democratic political 
practices and attempts to locate it within the traditional spheres of politics. The 
respondents in my fieldwork allude to cyberspace as possessing attributes of a political 
place or site. The existing notions of E-democracy look at the expansion of choices of 
citizens and political participation, which is very relevant in my research as well, but I 
try to look at the way the notion of democracy is constructed in the context of Tamil 
diaspora politics. The dual apprehension of cyberspace as a political medium (utility) 
and a political site does expand the role of internet based politics and the continuous 
speed of evolution of cyberspace against traditional media and communication 
technologies. Thus the impact of cyberspace in political engagements does have 
profound changes in the way politics is done and in the reshaping of political strategies. 
 
Raj, responding to the question ‘Why do you think the net is important? or ‘why has 
Tamil nationalism shifted to cyberspace?’ said, ‘I think after the Zapatista the LTTE has 
used the internet revolution for maximum political actions, as they have the skills, 
expatriate community (diaspora) and the need for propaganda.’ The role of Zapatista in 
popularizing informational politics and the significant differences in online political 
processes withinTamil diaspora web sphere is discussed further as a separate case study 
in this chapter. 
 
I asked Raj ‘What about state and LTTE control and the ability for the net to challenge 
hegemonic discourses?’ Raj’s response was, ‘Well there is a democratization of the field 
as the UK and the Sri Lankan governments are not in control and the diaspora internet 
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revolution is helping to break the state structures as well’ and he went on to say, ‘Net 
politics have surpassed the military technological potential of both the LTTE and the Sri 
Lankan military.’  
 
Raj meant two things. Firstly neither the LTTE or the Sri Lanka Army dictating the 
mode of the battle as cyberspace and the speed or immediacy within which things could 
be changed in cyberspace has changed the pattern of a single entity dominate political 
field. Battle fields have proliferated so there is no longer one theatre of battle. Secondly, 
he pointed out that spaces have emerged that neither the LTTE or state military could 
penetrate as these new democratic spaces in cyberspace could not be targeted by the 
available military machines of the LTTE or the Sri Lankan state. I introduce some 
contradictory claims to this in chapters Four and Eight where I bring out the new types 
of violence spreading into these new safe or democratic spaces and I examine the efforts 
made by political activists to safeguard them; in this context I discuss the use of 
cyberspace in bringing the war not just to the doorstep of diasporans living in London 
but to the heart of their personal spaces such as their family. 
 
Raj identified the configuration of the internet and its use for him as a political activist. 
This is why he was trying to explain its potential to challenge and resist the hegemonic 
powers of the LTTE networks. He also spoke about this providing a space for a 
continuous struggle, ‘cyberspace has become a site of struggle, it may be textual, but 
discussions, writing articles have become a political process and this is a continuous 
struggle. Look at the role UTHR(J).org plays their reports on the situation in Sri Lanka 
on cyberspace has become key critiques of the LTTE. They are not just mere reports the 
texts have become a weapon for us.’ This type of response relates to the current 
understanding of conflict and patterns of war of it being a type of living text. As Gray 
argues, ‘war is a living text, after all, and we are all of us bound into it, of it, even as we 
tell our parts, as it writes our future’ (1997:2). Gray brings out the manner in which war 
is reproduced in new spheres such as cyberspace and electronic networks. His key 
argument is based on the lethality of warfare that manifests itself in these new 
technological spheres. In the context of Tamil diaspora politics, from the media rhetoric 
to actual ground-based warfare, text has become a critical component of war and remains 
 
 217 
a key military asset for propaganda and psychological warfare. The use of texts to 
display the LTTE’s military innovations was discussed in Chapter Five. 
 
With literature on cyber politics often referring to the notion of internet as an 
information medium (Laguerre 2005a; 2005b), I queried my respondents on the value of 
information in political activism. I asked Keeran, if it was the ‘news’ value that made 
him use the internet. Keeran, in his response stressed the fact that, cyberspace has 
become a part of his life and was significant in his political activities. He also elaborated 
on the actual importance of news through web space in the context of the conflict and 
political activism among the diaspora Tamil nationalists.  
 
Keeran’s analysis of the LTTE use of the internet for mobilization provides insights on 
the use of technology, especially media by the LTTE even prior to the inception of 
cyberspace. ‘From the late 80s to 90s it was VHS and CDs but from 1997 it totally 
shifted to the use of cyberspace. Within this time line 1996- 2001 the Tamil spaces in the 
internet were dominated by the LTTE, 2002–2007 the internet saw the LTTE been 
challenged by dissidents.’  
 
Keeran also revealed that the IT revolution in South India in the late 90’s boosted the 
LTTE. He told me some findings from his own online research on the LTTE and the 
Tamil national question, ‘There has been a significant use of internet by Tamil 
diaspora…For example in 2000 when you type Tamil and hit the search button it’s the 
5th significant language with the largest sites, behind English, Hebrew and Chinese. As 
the Dravida movement used lots of technology from India as well, the LTTE is reputed 
for its innovations and also merging with South Indian technologists’. The Sri Lankan 
state was unable to change most of the discursive constructs of the LTTE among the 
Tamil diaspora, especially on concepts such as ‘separate state’, ‘final war’, ‘heroes days’ 
and Keeran told me, ‘the LTTE has demonstrated an ability to challenge or make 
discourses in cyberspace and the government couldn’t even react with evidence based 
responses move on from text based to information visualization which can build 




Keeran brought out examples of the successful use of the internet as a mobilizing 
strategy.  According to him the LTTE managed to connect the Tamil diaspora to the 
LTTE’s major offensives in Sri Lanka using cyberspace as a virtual conduit. He pointed 
out military operations codenamed ‘Unceasing Waves’ in which LTTE fighting 
formations managed to over run major military garrisons in the North and East of Sri 
Lanka. The LTTE’s employment battle tactis such as the wave formations of attacks 
were discussed in Chapters One and Five and the importance of ‘Unceasing Waves’ was 
discussed in Chapter Five. Keeran told me, ‘In the attacks against the armed forces in 
March 2000. It was updated every hour as if all the Tamils were being part of the larger 
battle and this magnified everything.’55 
 
                                                   





Figure 40 LTTE field commanders and Eelam Wars on Eelamweb.com 
 
Keeran was referring to one of the most successful uses of the Internet by the LTTE for 
political goals exclusively in the Tamil diaspora. In politics one of the most important 
aspects of making things public is the visualisation what is political. This factor has been 
extracted by the LTTE to the maximum in such web spheres.   
 
Figure 40, relates to the online web campaigns and the website has specifically focused 
on the wave attacks by the key battle strategy of the LTTE the web site cited is 
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www.Eelamweb.com56, which has been updated with complete information from the 
battle  field. The political significance of this website is its links to all major phases of 
the ‘Unceasing Waves’ battles. These battles have been the definitive phases of military 
confrontations in the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict. More importantly, since 2006 the fourth 
phase of the war is ongoing. This website has managed to produce a link to phase four of 
the conflict thus enabling any interested party, mainly Tamil diasporans, to instantly be 
connected with battlefield information and updates. This is the level of battlefield 
integration the Tamil diaspora the LTTE was able to achieve using the internet, which 
Keeran was trying to explain in the interviews.  
 
Keeran’s view was that such real-time updating of developments was used as a key 
foundation for political mobilization. The ability to harness high levels of battlefield 
integration with the diaspora and mobilize it for political advantages demonstrated the 
control of the LTTE. Keeran who once ran a cyber café said, ‘Now there are more than 
200 websites controlled by the LTTE apart from Tamil and English, they include French, 
Dutch, German, Norwegian language websites’. The LTTE began their web operations 
in 1995, with the launch of Tamilnet but it was re-launched in 1997. In this stage Keeran 
said ‘The Sri Lankan government did not care and did not respond or do anything but the 
LTTE fronts capitalized on them’. States are currently increasingly attempting to 
regulate social and political behaviour online and are monitoring the use of the Internet 
by groups and movements considered to be a threat to political stability (Chadwick 
2006). The Sri Lankan state missed the crucial period of the mid to late 1990s when the 
LTTE began its web operations. 
 
Keeran said it was important for Tamil diaspora political activists to maintain their 
control in the diaspora, as it was vital to keep the community connected to the conflict, 
thus the only medium which provided real time updates within the conflict zone was the 
web. LTTE elements used to have their fund collection mechanisms running at the 
height of major confrontations and to legitimate this, the internet has provided the ideal 
information tool which the LTTE harnessed to synchronise the war effort with the 
                                                   




diaspora politics. This maintained the crucial link, like an umbilical cord intact between 
the LTTE and the Tamil diaspora.  
 
Keeran as a dissident Tamil diaspora activist also noted that, 
 
The importance of web is that you cannot simply operate any political party or 
movement if you don’t know how to operate in cyberspace. Especially for the 
dissidents for example like the Thenee group (the group behind the website 
www.Thenee.com) from Germany, the starting of the website enabled them to 
make connections and also to urge dissidents to come together and Thenee.com 
really demonstrated the power of cyberspace and its political importance when 
the LTTE actually realized the damage it did for them and their web operations 
such as the Tamilnet.com. 
 
Keeran’s allusion to the Thenee group is important in locating the importance of web 
politics in the Tamil diaspora political sphere. The Thenee group now has begun to 
mobilize within Europe and to establish links with other democratic Tamil 
organizations and dissidents. One example is the partnership it has with the Sri 
Lankan Democratic Forum (SLDF). Keeran who constantly maintains links with the 
Thenee group claimed that most of the dissident events in France and Germany are 
now organized by the Thenee group. The emergence of the Thenee group as a 
political force is an important contribution online politics has made in creating 
spaces and facilities of mobilization to dissidents. The Thenee group first emerged as 
a web operation and then transformed into a fully fledged diaspora political unit.  
 
The knowledge of cyberspace is critical for the political movement as the activists could 
not establish their claims anymore unless they had a well entrenched cyber presence. 
This demonstrates that internet politics has moved on from being a mere add-on to 
political action on the ground to a vital foundation of political action and a mandatory 
requirement for any political movement.  
 
Web presence has become an important feature in political action and political processes. 
This has been emphasized by researchers on the importance of maintaining of web 
process and its political implication. Arnold and Plymire’s research on the Cherokee 
Indians reveal that this community has developed a web archive for the preservation of 
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their tradition (2000). Similarly the ‘Maya Project’, launched in Guatemala, maintains a 
web presence to preserve a cultural space for twenty two indigenous cultures (Becker 
and Delgado 1998). The urgency for web presence has become a significant political 
value while providing the critical infrastructure needed for political processes especially 
for minority groups. Both pro-LTTE elements and the dissidents are finding that the 
opportunities cyberspace has given them are politically important and both realize the 
political actions that they take online have real life ramifications. 
 
Rajanayagam, another dissident activist and a very senior figure among the dissidents, 
referring to the use of the internet by the dissidents, said ‘the last few years saw the 
proliferation of non LTTE websites, which included a vast array of political lines 
including moderates, critical of the LTTE websites, and out and out anti LTTE’. While 
acknowledging that LTTE gatherings are mainly organized through cyber mobilization 
tactics, he said that the dissenting community’s political mobilization was spread out 
along the globe. He told me, ‘they made cyberspace one place to hold their political 
discussions  and in the last 6 months this resulted in the ability for the dissidents to 
organize meetings in London, Canada, Berlin, Paris.’ 
 
Dissident Tamil activist Rengan summed up his view on cyberspace and politics of 
Tamil diaspora by claiming ‘all websites operating in the Sri Lankan Tamil web sphere 
were set up for political purposes’. In the discussion of politics of mobilization using 
internet and how things have changed Rengan started off with an interesting revelation. 
He told me of the total suppression of internet use in the areas the LTTE control in Sri 
Lanka, 
LTTE has established total control of internet usage in areas under its control and 
no house can have internet, the facility is available only in public spaces run by 
the LTTE which they had the ability to control, and monitor internet usage. 
 
Rengan was trying to expose the LTTE approach to controlling and dominating any 
political sphere which is under their reign. Rengan took this example to point out the 
LTTE tactics of controlling the political spaces in London. He spoke about the Tiger’s 
rigid control of the media spaces in London and the manner they dealt with anti LTTE 
publications like ‘Thesam’ magazine and the newspaper ‘London voice’. They were 
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totally barred from being sold at any Tamil business in London. Such hurdles were 
politically negotiated through spaces and sites and by transforming such publications 
into internet based operations prior to breaking into the physical world. 
 
In my interview with dissident Tamil activist and journalist Jeyabalan, he provided again 
some factual analysis of the importance of the informational politics of the web for 
political action and activism. For him the importance of cyberspace was the ability to 
declassify or expose the veil of secrecy of the LTTE operations, which was one of its 
key strengths. He pointed out at the same time how the dissidents exposed the state and 
its role in human rights violations and discrimination against Tamils in Sri Lanka. He 
told me, ‘that the net has significant influence on the state and the LTTE and introduced 
two examples to to support his claims. These examples are discussed below and I try to 
look at their significance in the context of online politics. 
 
In June 2007 the Sri Lankan government decided non resident Tamils who were residing 
the City of Colombo should be evicted and sent back to the North within 24 hours. This 
was due to security intelligence warning of Tigers infiltrating the city to attack a high 
level target. The news of this eviction was made into a huge issue by the LTTE fronts, 
with a combination of websites and email lists targeting international governments, civil 
society organizations, and human rights organizations positioned it as a ‘genocidal 
attempt’ by the Sri Lankan state. The effect of the mobilization against the government 
made the state revoke the decision within 24 hours. This, Jeyabalan points out, was a 
successful internet campaign which got results. 
 
In another example, Jeyabalan revealed that during the post Tsunami period, the LTTE 
abducted children from some Tsunami camps in Batticaloa and Ampara districts. 
International agencies such as the UNICEF and Human Rights Watch (HRW) brought 
this matter to light. In these instances the LTTE vehemently denied these allegations 
Then the political head of the LTTE Thamilchelvan claimed:57 
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We were shocked and disappointed when the UNICEF put out the report. 
However, we appointed a special committee under the (LTTE) Peace 
Secretariat to investigate and verify the information in the UNICEF report. 
The committee went to the east and investigated the list of under age persons 
who, according to the UNICEF report, were with us. It found that persons 
whom we had handed back to their parents after we found them to be 
underage, persons who had left the LTTE and had got married and others 
who had gone back to their families were in the UNICEF list as persons who 
were still with the LTTE. We have pointed this out to the UN Secretary 
General with sufficient proof. The committee is continuing to verify the 
UNICEF list despite the practical difficulties on the ground. (2005) 
 
But Jeyabalan pointed out, the LTTE could not be in denial of all the abductions they 
were responsible for, as with the case of the abduction of 23 children in 2006. On 18 
December 2006 LTTE abducted 23 students all under the age of 18 from a tution 
class for GCE Ordinary Level examination in the village of Vinayagapuram in the 
Ampara District. There was a massive web campaign highlighting this event and 
with the local and international media being alerted using emailing campaigns by 
various political activists. The LTTE later had to back track on these claims when the 
story of the mass abduction in the Ampara district came to light and with the massive 
web campaign by dissident organizations. The web demonstrated the importance of 
being able to counter the LTTE and make LTTE change their stance and accept the 
mistakes they made, which even agencies such as UNICEF were incapable of achieving.  
 
According to Jeyabalan, the LTTE earlier denied the story but they later apologized for it 
and put the blame for it on an area commander and released the children to the parents. 
Jeyabalan went on to say, 
 
For the first time in the history of the LTTE, they apologized for a particular 
incident and not even for Rajiv Gandhi’s assassination did they apologize 
publicly. 
 
Jeyabalan insisted that the use of email had huge political significance in his political life 
as well as its impact on the online politics. He pointed out also the unique spatial 
attribute of political spaces emerging in cyberspace. He told me, ‘emailing also has 





Figure 41 LTTE claims responsibility for abduction 
 
Figure 4158 is from the lead story of the Tamilnet.com on 19 December 2006, where the 
LTTE went public in accepting the responsibility for the abductions. The key factor in 
cyber politics is the effect that it has had as a tactical tool, where the LTTE is forced to 
respond by relying upon the internet to counter the political moves made against it. 
 
The next section looks at the same theme but from the view point of pro-LTTE activists, 
give looking at both sides of this diaspora political sphere with help to understand the 
recent tensions within the diaspora political field. Exploring the role of cyberspace in the 
new phases of politics where a clear division within the Tamil diaspora emerges 
concerning the future of Tamil nationalism and the militancy. The workings of two 
political power projects, the obvious conflict for control of diaspora politics both 
ideologically and physically, and the role of cyberspace as a political place as well as a 
political utility, sheds light on the political significance of new technologies.  
                                                   




I will start with Sutha’s take on cyberspace. He told me, 
 
Politically it is a different kind of battle ground, it is not the same political field I 
have experienced in my life. The importance is this is different battle field which 
requires different strategies. This is why we need to be ahead and need to be 
present online. These new requirements do always challenge us to think 
differently on our political strategies.   
 
This is an interesting observation, not only because the notion ‘battle ground’ locates 
cyberspace as a site for political action, but because the moment it is given this 
connotation of place it can be viewed as a political space defined by a set of political 
practices that should be geared to this ‘different battle’. Landzelius attempts to bring out 
this new type of political analysis of the politics of cyberspace involving indigenous 
groups and diaspora movements. She claims that ‘we witness the deployment of 
cyberspace not only as a staging ground, but a virtual battle field for sovereignty in the 
name of ethnicity’ (2006: 14). Sutha refers to the use of cyberspace as a staging ground 
that has the capability to contribute to the military output of the conflict. The importance 
again is the capability of cyberspace to link diasporan activists to mobilize them to work 
together to advance the military position of the LTTE.  
 
This application of the battlefield concept concept cyber politics in the Tamil nationalist 
movement concurs Sutha’s emphasis on the need to be ahead in the game, and this refers 
to the importance of speed as an advantage in cyber politics. As speed is a power 
property in the political battle field this demonstrates of ‘first strike’ capability and a 
capacity to out manoeuvre the enemy. He went on to say, 
 
If I don’t have access to the internet I will be useless as a political activist. The 
internet has made things change fast not just within cyberspace even in political 
tactics we have to keep up with the speeds that have altered the mobilization 
process. I realized when I miss what happening in the internet for a day the next 
day I feel my world has changed. Speed and presence for us has become crucial 
in this new environment 
 
This is a similar observation to dissident activist Keeran and both sides of the Tamil 
political spectrum demonstrate the vital necessity of web presence for political 
 
 227 
mobilization and the effects of real time connections and speed that are critical strategic 
assets for political action. Sutha added that that there can be mobilization despite 
geographic limitations. He seems to be clearly aware of the immediacy and speed which 
cyberspace has created and he is desperately trying to adapt because, as revealed in the 
earlier chapter, his aim was to dominate cyberspace.  
 
Sutha’s intention to capture the political opportunities that cyberspace offers proves that 
web sources are in constant competition with each other for the privilege of providing 
information. They compete for inclusion as well as prominence in all manner of 
information spaces. They also compete to be the leading information source, the source 
that matches the information requested or given at any particular time. The competition 
is particularly fierce for placement in ‘authoritative spaces’ (Rogers: 2004). Rogers 
claims that web politics is capable of becoming information instruments that can 
challenge the versions of political realities that exist in day to day politics. These 
realities are constructed in ‘authoritative spaces’ (2004: 3). In the Tamil diaspora there is 
severe competition between the LTTE, the Sri Lankan state and the Tamil dissident 
group to achieve the status of ‘legitimacy’ as this holds the key in mobilization of Tamil 
diasporans. The notion of legitimacy stands for voice and representation, the sustaining 
of a hegemonic discourse of truth which makes it a significant political struggle.  
 
The cases described above emphasise the fact that political spheres and places of politics 
are shaped through cyberspace and that cyberspace is an important space for politics. 
Sutha kept on hinting this, referring to his own political engagements while he 
emphasized the emergence of a new discipline and new opportunities. Sutha believed 
that cyberspace is a new political site, a new political space, and political processes or 
political activism in the political space of London or in Europe cannot be achieved in the 
same pattern or same format.  
 
Pro-LTTE activist Kumar also said that in political engagements the facility to 
continuously update political developments within the diaspora and Sri Lanka had an 




Another edge is the ability for continuous updates; this helps the diaspora 
community to be up to date on the political developments in Sri Lanka. It helps 
political activists to challenge the Sri Lankan state. With the ability for real time 
update all of us can review our responses and also make us link better 
withinternational agencies. The real time updating is an impact factor in online 
political action along with the ability to get information so quickly is as 
important.  It enables us to formulate quick and effective lobby material. 
 
The added advantage of this updating and verification process is the ability to develop 
good relationships with international organizations which can have an effect on the Sri 
Lankan state: ‘when we use this information on discussions, we develop a better 
network.’ 
 
To sum up the section on political opportunities, it is clear that the ability to use 
cyberspace, and its political significance for diasporas, varies based upon its political 
objectives. For the diaspora Iranians, according to Graham and Khosravi (2002:10 – 11), 
cyberspace was greatly important to understanding the depth and breath of the diaspora 
community as it helped them to reorder certain relationships while making them aware 
of being diasporan and of their duties to the community. Similarly to the pro-LTTE 
networks, the Kurdish diaspora were relying heavily on the internet as they used its safe 
environment to pursue the Kurdish diasporan objective of creating a Kurdish nation state 
(Landzelius 2006: 23). This is similar to the concept of safe space raised by Tamil 
dissidents in my interviews. The political opportunities that cyberspace provided for 
activists had effects on minority communities who make up the marginalised ethnic 
groups. Hala Fattah (2006) brings out the case of Turcomans and Assyrians who live in 
Iraq and use the internet to discursively construct their identity and political significance 
by tracing and sometimes inflating the importance of historic events. Such inflations or 
discursive constructs of history are common in the Tamil nationalist web domains. The 
significance of the Tamil web sphere is its active influence on offline political activities, 
absorbing them online and developing a unique set of dynamics where new political 
issues are hatched online that can affect the offline. This continuous relationship 
between the online and the offline in the Tamil diaspora web sphere makes it more than 
a purely informational medium in the context of the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka. 
 
The political opportunities the Tamil political activists discussed in the interviews have 
some unique features in them as well as certain, more traditional, advantages in politics 
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with the development of communication technologies. A distinct feature from the 
dissidents’ point of view was the internet as a space of politics and a political position or 
place. These, they claim, can generate effects of political power with the potential to be 
used as launch pads into dominated or contested spaces in the Tamil diaspora which the 
LTTE control. The classic example which came was the discourse of nation and the 
LTTE’s representation of the liberation struggle for the Tamil nation. The dissident 
political activists claimed that the use of cyberspace based political strategies enabled 
Tamil diasporans to access different versions of the truth about the struggle and not only 
the LTTE version. They claimed this had a dual impact where the LTTE image was 
challenged and secondly the dissidents had viable justifications for their claims on the 
actual actions of the LTTE, which were extremely difficult to visualize to the diaspora. 
 
In this level of analysis based on the observations of the political activists, it is clear that 
they seem to understand significant changes in politics and political strategies within the 
larger context of Tamil diaspora politics under the influence of cyberspace. The 
observations and interviews focus mainly on the changes of politics due to cyberspace 
opening up a new set of opportunities to these political activists. Thus these 
observations, mainly from Tamil dissidents, can be linked to the earlier responses 
pertaining to the spaces of politics in cyberspace. Though some of the observations are 
linked to more traditional arguments concerning internet driven politics, such as 
information distribution, propaganda and networking, there seem to be unique insights 
into processes of democratization and power relationship in new spaces of politics. 
 
 
7.4.2 Political strategies 
 
This section looks at the shaping of political strategies of Tamil diaspora activists based 
on the impact of the internet. I try to engage the changes of political strategies that 
activists brought out in my interviews including experiences which they claimed were 
triggered because of politics or political use of cyberspace. This section is focused on the 
practical methodologies of political activists in their day to day political practices in 




Raj pointed out, ‘the web operation for Tamil politics is very significant. Look at the 
tamilnation.com of Satyendra which is a massive archive of information and not just that 
a cultural, historical archive…’ He highlighted the notion of information and the 
uniqueness of the internet was the way it could order, arrange and store information and 
the ability to use it for tactical and strategic reasons. The notion of information politics 
was first developed by Manuel Castells (2004). His analysis was based on how 
governments functioned and performed not through classic government – citizen 
exchanges and deliberations but rather through the mediations of the press and 
broadcasting media. This was elaborated in his seminal Power of Identity (2004). 
 
Raj was talking of strategic shifts in the political practices of the LTTE especially the 
strategies of maintaining fear among the diaspora. The LTTE is able to politically 
pressurize Tamil diasporans by using cyberspace as a gateway to launch its strikes on 
dissenting Tamils both in the diaspora and Sri Lanka. This is similar to Richard Grusin’s 
(2004) recent discussion on the use of information politics for strategic reasons. He used 
the term ‘premediation’ to conceptualize the most extreme form of informational 
politics, where officially planned events, such as war, are ‘pre–screened’ so that viewers 
may become accustomed to the realities ahead. This type of information politics is close 
to certain web politics of the LTTE, where they had pre fabricated stories of strikes 
concerning targets which are later actualized. This LTTE strategy will be discussed at 
length in the chapter on Web Sphere Analysis.  
 
 




Figure 4259 is from an article from the LTTE front operated Neruppu.org , which 
appeared on 11 March 2008, The person depicted is Kumar Sathisaran (alias Shanthan), 
an area leader of Tamil party TMVP (Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal) with two images 
positioned either side of his picture naming him as being wanted and offering a reward. 
The TMVP is the political front of the former paramilitary group popularly known as the 
Karuna group, named after the Eastern commander who split with the LTTE in 2004. 
Shanthan was murdered on 21 May 2008. Many dissidents spoke of the LTTE strategy 
of identifying their targets and describing them on web sites prior to the actual killing. 
This is a classic example of the LTTE use of cyberspace and the shaping of political 
strategies on par with its militant practices and its insidious use of cyber tactics as tool of 
political intimidation. 
 
The LTTE is attempting to shape the political identity of the diaspora Tamils as Tamils 
of the Eelam nation which it is trying to establish. Tamil dissidents by contrast are 
pointing out their successful infiltration and exposure of secretive political operations of 
the LTTE. Their deployments in cyberspace were successful in attacking the LTTE and 
making the LTTE respond. This makes it hard for the LTTE to be secretive. For the 
LTTE the notion of secrecy contains two fundamental meanings. First, the operational 
efficiency for LTTE transnational network to function without any problems and 
secondly, it enables their ideological dominance over the diaspora, which includes the 
ability to maintain a single voice and feed the diaspora with one dimension of 
information particular to the struggle. Jeyadevan points out both these dimensions of 
secrecy were, to an extent, shattered through the web based political operations of the 
dissidents. D.B.S Jeyaraj, the Toronto-based journalist, was one of the pioneers exposing 
the LTTE, and his website Transcurrents.com, plays a significant role in exposing the 
LTTE. Jeyaraj was physically assaulted even prior to his use of cyberspace but he seems 
to have increased his readership and challenges to the LTTE with the use of the internet. 
The LTTE traditionally projected themselves being in possession of an invincible war 
machine. Among the diaspora such standpoints were challenged with information 
reaching the diaspora community concerning the deaths of LTTE leaders and military 
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defeats. ‘These have a major impact on the LTTE’ Jeyadevan claimed. The LTTE 
international operations were subjected to crack-downs by the host states of the 
diasporas as well. These crack-downs in USA, Australia and France dented the LTTE’s 
international operations. The dissidents claimed that some information of the LTTE 
secrets were exposed prior to this online and that such information helped successful 
raids on LTTE rings operating within the diaspora communities. 
 
Jeyadevan suggested another example where by the LTTE’s secrecy and the actual facts 
behind their propaganda operations among the diaspora community were exposed. He 
claimed, ‘the best time for attacking the pro-LTTE fronts is on the Heroes day 
celebrations. We expose the reality behind the Heroes Day celebration and the LTTE 
operations. We have campaigned online and proven that these Heroes day activities in 
London are a violation of the Terrorism Act.’ The Heroes Day or Great Warriors Day 
popularly know-in Tamil as ‘Maaveerar naal’, is a day inaugurated by the Tiger leader 
on Nov 27, 1989 to commemorate fallen Tiger cadres in battle. Now the event is more of 
a diaspora mobilizing event for the LTTE and a mode of maintaining the notion of 
‘battle’, the ‘Tiger’ and ‘struggle for homeland’ alive. The zenith of this is a huge 
cultural pageant organized in diaspora hubs which depict heroic acts of tiger cadres and 
different methods of raising funds in the name of the homeland. 
 





Figure 44 An introduction Heroes Day  
 
The above two figures are from the websites tamilnathan.com60 and Eelamweb.com61, 
Figures 43 and 44  depicts a national Heroes Day celebration event in the Tamil 
diaspora, which is visualizing the graves of the dead LTTE fighters, whilst the second 
explains briefly what National Heroes day means within the Eelamist discourse. The 
web sites are powerful sites for actualizing the events strongly linked to the conflict, 
while the images are helping to mobilize the diaspora community for the support of the 
LTTE.  
 
Jeyadevan points out the numerous political opportunities and strategic maneuvers 
cyberspace has offered them as dissident Tamil activists. He identifies this trend as, ‘a 
whole new mechanism for political action’. He provided insights into their campaign of 
exposing LTTE activities in London; in this case he referred to how the dissidents using 
the web managed to expose a funding operation run for the LTTE through a Hindu 
temple in Colindale. Jeyadevan said, ‘We used an email campaign to expose this and we 
targeted the local MP Andrew Dismore, and he had to respond to it, and within two 
months the temple was raided by the police’. Email campaigns have grown in 
significance and have become a strategic tool rather than a purely tactical asset in 
political activism. Jordan and Taylor (2004) emphasize the connection email has to 
actual political processes and its prolific impact at times where information becomes a 
danger to the life of the person who possesses it. This was quite similar to the 
                                                   
60 http://www.tamilnaatham.com/advert/20051030/heroes_day/ 
 





experiences of dissidents who were subjected to intimidation and harassment for 
possessing information that was harmful to the LTTE but eventually were exposed 
through the web. Jordan and Taylor claim, ‘when the writing comes from a besieged 
community that is in revolt then individuals must take personal risk to make sure the 
information spread. Once the information reaches the internet it explodes’ (2004: 95). 
Here Jeyadevan was pointing out the fragility of information and its transformation into 
robust political issues. This is the strategic importance of information and its 
solidification in cyberspace.  
 
Sutha told me, ‘working electronically is a force multiplier as you pool resources.’ He 
was first referring to his newspaper and the ability to expand the publishing and 
circulation operation globally and in real time. He said it is re-printed in other diaspora 
centres, with a mere switching of formats suitable to Tamil diaspora communities in 
other states. He was stressing the notion of speed, immediacy which he identified as 
properties of cyberspace which facilitated information dissemination. He tried to use the 
term ‘force multiplier’ to highlight these technological aspects. I asked him further to 
explain the term force multiplier, as it’s a recurrent term in literature on concerning 
advantages of the internet. He told me, ‘I transfer the template of the paper to the guy in 
Sydney. He changes the advertisements and reproduces it in real time and our reach has 
expanded significantly since our cyber operations began.’ In an attempt to determine if 
Sutha was trying to bring out the communication aspect and the development of the 
technology I asked if he was outlining the development of cyberspace as a 
communication tool, his response was, 
 
No, it’s much more than communication, and also politically it is a new way of 
doing things, but not a new way of doing old things. We have resorted to 
political strategies with the changes internet brought forward such as the 
increasing demand to be alert, the speed and presence as I keep emphasizing 
these things affect the way we do politics now. 
 
Political actors are increasingly attempting to use the internet to enhance their presence 
and legitimate their activities in ways which are genuinely new but still have affinities 
with the older media strategies (Jordan and Taylor 2004). I was probing into what 
political activists like Sutha felt about this. He elaborated on what he meant by saying, 
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‘it is a new form of doing politics, and it’s a new form of democracy’. The notion of the 
political necessity of the web is another factor which Sutha emphasized in his evaluation 
of the web and its impact on him personally, where he said it was a totally new thing. 
Not being present in cyberspace would be a drawback in maintaining his political project 
and, in particular, maintaining the dominance of the LTTE ideology would become 
impossible. Sutha, to back up his claim concerning cyberspace offering new kind of 
politics, told me, ‘it was all about new disciplines and new opportunities’.   
 
Sutha’s key perception of cyberspace was its role as a new kind of battlefield demanding 
innovative political strategies to cope with the challenges that it offers. He told me, ‘the 
hegemony of ideas is never complete and we want to battle for ideas and resist ideas that 
counter our ideology in cyberspace’. This is parallel to the idea of Tamilness and the 
notion of Tamil nation that the LTTE was trying to create within the diaspora. Cheran 
(2001) theorises that the new Tamilness which is created especially in the context of 
diaspora as a nationalist project spearheaded by the LTTE ideology. He claims that it 
comes in the background of attempts to reterritorialize Tamilness, where transnational 
Tamilness is created as a consciouness of the heroic Tamil race or ‘puli thamil’ (Tamil 
Tiger) which is contrasted in the earlier interpretation of the victim Tamil diaspora. This 
is the political ideology reflected in the notion of the ‘battle for ideas’ which Sutha was 
illuminating. The LTTE constantly strives to maintain a continuous support network for 
its military project within the diaspora, and thus events like Heroes Day celebrations 
became critical points for harmonising support and loyalty for the tiger project.  
 
In my interview with the pro-LTTE activist Kumar, he highlighted a new shift in 
strategic decision-making to do with political mobilization strategies. The political 
process shifts to cyberspace and integrates strategies of mobilization with online 
technologies. Kumar revealed that prior to planning campaigns for mobilization or for 
lobbying against the Sri Lankan state he would look at how political processes now work 
in the web and plan accordingly. He told me, 
 
It also helps us to shape our campaign and my organization focus on what is 
required to be done to respond to the Sri Lankan state immediately. Now we 
observe what’s happening online and we try to analyse which web site is 
important and how we can encounter the government and challenge the Sri 
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Lankan leadership. To understand the emerging political trends we first observe 
how web sites and internet is used and then we design our own strategies to 
counter the political strategies of Sri Lanka and pro-Sinhala activists. 
 
In this context, Kumar was providing a fresh insight into developing political strategies 
on the web. He was explaining how the pro-LTTE activists had moved on from the 
strategy of simply hosting information in the web looking at the web as a more dynamic 
source and site of political activity. Thus what Kumar here stressed was the important 
need to understand political shifts in cyberspace by drawing out political strategies. Such 
reasoning points to the fact that political strategies applied within the diaspora are 
constantly changing because of the extensive use of the web and its effect on politics 
within the diaspora community and in the international context.  
 
The Current literature on political mobilization online from Jordan (2004) to Chadwick 
(2006) is focusing on the online political strategies adopted by activists. Kumar 
emphasises a contradictory view to this. According to him his organization adopts online 
political strategies after observing the forms of political processes that take place on the 
web. Thus what he is arguing is that they have moved on from the static political 
strategies that are used on the web to strategies that are responding to dynamics of the 
web. What Kumar is pointing out, both operationally and philosophically, is a new way 
of doing things on the web. As Sutha pointed out earlier ‘it is a new way of doing things, 
not doing old things in a new way.’ 
 
Especially since new dimensions in cyber politics are opening up and they are not mirror 
images of the social and political relationships nurtured offline, they bring with them 
opportunities and challenges to political activists. In the case of the Sri Lankan Tamil 
diaspora, political engagements span both macro and micro political spheres, As 
Laguerre points out, ‘to say that the networks and circuits of virtual diasporic spaces are 
not neutral this is simply to recognize that a principal component of their effect is 
political-political especially in the sense that virtual diasporas affect the politics of their 
home nations, as well as participating in the politics of host nation’ (2005: 135). Thus 
virtual diasporas help make national politics transnational, complicating the politics of 
both the homeland and host land. Interestingly though Laguerre does not venture deep 
into explaining these complications, is it clear that through the new political issues 
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emerging and the immediacy they create the Tamil diasporan political scene has been 
considerably complicated.  
 
 
Figure 45 Tamilaffairs.com countering LTTE web information 
 
 
Figure 46 Tamilaffairs.com questions LTTE’s credibility  
 
The above two figures (4562 & 4663) are from an anti LTTE website Tamilaffairs.com, 
countering a key strength of the LTTE in the diaspora. This ability to expose and 
magnify using images of the failure of the pro-LTTE fronts to mobilize carries a 
significant political edge for the dissidents. The dissidents although in the minority in the 
diaspora political realm are finding ways of balancing their own physical limitations in 
                                                   
62 http://Tamilaffairs.com/node/384 (accessed 27 November 2007) 
63 http://Tamilaffairs.com/node/464 (accessed 27 November 2007) 
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terms of public demonstration by using web operations while attributing the same 
weaknesses to the LTTE. The article on the failed protest at Watford Council carries a 
further punch by stating that the 22 protestors mainly came from a few families 
including ‘the baby brigade of 4’. The term ‘baby-brigade’ alludes to the controversial 
child soldiers and children-only fighting units which make up many of the rank and file 
in the LTTE. Many dissidents and even pro-LTTE members told me that mass emailing 
and targeted emailing strategies some times worked better than demonstrations and 
protest campaigns. 
 
This kind of adoption of new strategies shifting from mass demonstrations to mass 
emailing, is interesting in the political mobilization of diasporans. Cyberspace strategies 
are taking place, where the demonstration strategy is exhausted. A decade or two ago, 
solidarity movements or liberation movements protesting in spaces such as Trafalgar 
Square had a political impact or were a symbol of political strength in mobilizing 
crowds. Cyberspace has become equally important site for political mobilization and its 
symbolic political position is sometimes preferred over the traditional rationale of street. 
The mass emailing campaigns are one such effort of mobilization and making both the 
LTTE’s and the dissident’s voice heard. 
 
Both Jeyadevan and Kumar, coming from totally opposite positions on the political 
spectrum, had interesting views on the notion of mass emailing. Jeyadevan pointed out 
more than mass rallies, emails forwarded to officials in UN, members of EU and other 
related organizations seem to have had a better impact on political actions and in terms 
of challenging the LTTE. Kumar elaborating on his day to day activities told me, ‘we are 
able to hit multiple targets and carry out multiple hits’. Kumar was highlighting the 
strength of email as a tool for lobbying and its ability to target a desired group. Kumar 
stressed it was important to design email campaigns to target an important audience and 
by such precision email campaigns he stressed it was much more likely to achieve the 
desired effect for the sender. Bringing out an example of how his organization prepares 
email campaigns, Kumar revealed the emailing campaigns of his organization are sent to 
1412 members in their emailing list. Each member has his or her own list of fifty more 
members across Europe. This forwarding from the original 1412 members to their own 
50 greatly multiplies the targets. This method of coordination has made their 
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mobilization tactics successful. Passive emailing strategies are based on educating their 
targets rather than actively pushing for mobilzation, a classic example are the emails sent 
by the SLDF to its members. 
 
In Kumar’s words active emailing‘enables us to make natural linkages’. He brought out 
a set of examples which he saw were related to his understanding of the political impact 
of web strategies. He claimed that ‘Emailing strategy, has significantly altered our 
political mobilization strategies, and campaigns. In particular, we used them for lobbying 
to establish the P-TOMS mechanisms.’ The P-TOMS or ‘Post Tsunami Operational 
Management Structure’ (also known as Joint Mechanism / North and East Relief Board) 
was a structure which was introduced after the Tsunami for the government and the 
LTTE to find a workable framework in which to share aid provided for post-Tsunami 
reconstruction and development. The operational apparatus of the P-TOMS was a 
committee or series of committees with a very limited mandate.  
 
Sri Lankan society was highly divided on the proposition of the structure as it was felt 
that the State was recgonzing the LTTE as a de facto and legitimate system of 
government. There was tremendous international pressure on the government to 
establish the mechanism. Kumar claimed that such pressure was exerted on Sri Lanka 
with their email strategy of contacting the right person and organizations which could 
influence the Sri Lankan state. 
 
Kumar’s point was, as he described in his own words, ‘emailing has made us develop 
new strategies and tactical responses to address the international community and 
lobbying individuals are very important in our operations, and we need to get to the right 
person’. The emailing strategies of Kumar’s organization have been developed precision 
targets and have achieved on the ability to reach across time zones and especially a 
facility to respond to queries. 
 
It is interesting to see the evolution of the e-mail and its political impact, from its mere 
inception as a mere innovation made by a software engineer installed a communication 
protocol for sharing information across the internet’s predecessor Arpanet (Jordan 2004). 
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In analyzing the discussion about emailing as a political strategy and the developments 
of it, I am exploring the use of email as a technology and as an active and passive 
political utility. The reason that I am breaking it down into active and passive forms, is 
that the active emailing strategy is planned and targeted and it is packaged in a way that 
is dissimilar to be used as a communication or propaganda tool. The active emailing 
campaigns involve a political will and a political execution to achieve political goals.  
 
‘We now email all members of the human rights commission, and NGOs which have 
consultative status within the UN human rights commission’. Kumar further said 
referring to the most recent and successful campaign to pressurize the Sri Lankan 
president when he toured United States in September last year. As Kumar revealed ‘For 
example in the recent visit of President Mahinda Rajapaksa to Washington we were able 
to lobby human rights and related organizations and Senators64, even before he was in 
USA, we had the groups mobilized.’ The Sri Lankan President was actually confronted 
with these issues and he had to respond and make certain changes in the government’s 
real world operations as well. These campaigns targeted Senators and important 
members in human rights monitoring sub committees in the Congress as well as in the 
senate. These included targeted email campaigns to Senators such as Barbara Boxer, 
Patrick Leahy, Thad Cochran and the current President Barack Obama. They also 
targeted top officials working for Senator Hillary Clinton and former President Bill 
Clinton. The Sri Lankan office of the President had to manage these issues on his first 
visit to Washington after being elected president and thus the President had to speak of 
his plans for a political solution and to elaborate on the safeguards applied for protecting 
the right of the Tamil people65.  
 
As a prelude to concluding this section it will be interesting to revisit a problem posed by 
Castells, does the internet play a purely instrumental role in expressing social protests 
and political conflicts? Or is there a transformation of the rules of the socio political 
game in cyberspace that ultimately affects the game itself – namely the forms of 
movements and political actors (2001: 137)? My research responses from the activists 
point out, especially in the diasporic political sphere, that there are significant changes in 
                                                   
64 Letter to Senator Barbara Boxer 
http://www.congress.org/congressorg/bio/userletter/?letter_id=1619014621  
65 Sources from the President office of  Sri Lanka 
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the game and in the spatial architecture of political action. These changes in the form of 
doing politics and the need for strategic shifts in political processes are influenced based 
upon the need to politicize cyberspace and to dominate it to achieve political objectives. 
It also demonstrates that cyberspace is not just influenced by developments in actual 
political theatres but have the capacity to influence political activities outside of it, 
including the physical political activities and processes. 
 
The political engagements that are discussed here demonstrate that there are a number of 
new political issues generated because of web politics among the Tamil diasporans. The 
number of issues, political exchanges and political stakeholders are further analysed in 
the context of the conflict later in the next chapter. The final section of the chapter 
engages with case study of Zapatista politics and its use of the internet for political 
mobilization and the similarities and differences with the Tamil diaspora political 
engagement online.  
 
7.5 Revisiting Zapatista effect 
 
I look briefly at the use of internet by the Zapatista movement as it is the most 
researched and published event alluding to the potential of cyberspace. I try to establish 
the similarities and differences from the Tamil diasporan web engagement by comparing 
Zapatista’s use of online politics. Manuel Castells, defines the Zapatista as ‘the first 
informational guerrilla movement’ (Castells 2004: 82). They have been the darlings of 
the hacker communities, internet activists and on inspiration to millions who supported 
the anti globalization movement and the protests in Seattle against the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) in 1999, which is also itself another case study for many analysts 
of the online mobilization strategies of political and social movements. 
 
The origins of the Zapatista movement lie in Fuerzas de Liberacion National (FLN), 
which has created as a Marxist Maoist movement responding to a massacre of students 
in Tlatelolco in 1968 (McDonald 2006: 114). The organization takes its name from 
Emiliano Zapata, the revolutionary leader of the peasant army of the 1910 Mexican 
Revolution (Belausteguigoitia 2006: 98). The Mexican conflict between the indigenous 
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people and the Mexico state points towards deep historical roots, dating back to the 
Spanish conquest in the 16th century and the principle source of tension cited by 
researcher’s (McDonald 2006; Olsen 2005) concerns the struggle over the distribution 
and possession of land. The event that globalized the focus on Mexico and the Zapatista 
was its new year’s uprising in 1994. This took place within the context of the Mexican 
government issuing a decree abolishing the land use rights of the Indians in the 
Lacandon region in Mexico.  
 
The movement has been identified as the model for modern social movements and a first 
instance of net warfare (Ronfeldt et all 1997). Clever (1998), a key intellectual ally of the 
Zapatistas and a researcher on modern social movements and the internet, identifies the 
key effect of the Zapatista’s online activity to be the popularization of the movement 
illuminated the ability of a grassroots movement to trigger international discussion, 
while linking such struggles to a global audience, by passing the restrictions of the 
nation state with ease. Schultz (1998) identifies the strength of the Zapatista ‘social 
networking capacity’ being how it made them less dependent on their military structure 
for challenging the Mexican state.  
 
The Zapatista insurgency triggered a transnational social movement emerging in the 
global order to counter globally defined threats and the shrinking of national political 
action spaces (Garrido and Halavais 2004: 171). This demonstrated the Zapatista’s 
ability to challenge structures of limitation, the spirit of resistance. The impact of this 
uprising, according to Routledge, is that first it de-centres analytical focus away from an 
exclusivist concern with the machinations of the state. Second, it enables us to 
investigate how different types of social movements challenge state centered notions of 
hegemony, consent and power and contest the colonization of the ‘political’ by the state 
(1997: 241).  
 
The Zapatista effect, in this context, has had consequences including in the broadening 
of the political geography to encompass of more radical understanding of the political; 
and understanding of how place is central to particular terrains of resistance and the 
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creation and articulation of alternative forms of knowledge. It has demonstrated the 
ability to identify and resist state hegemony and to effectively challenge it. 
 
There is significant hype about the role of internet in the Zapatista uprising, with some 
researchers claiming that there was a misleading myth built around this use of the 
internet (May 2002: 86). The use of information communication technologies by the 
Zapatista is an interesting case study in itself in terms of political mobilization and 
analyzing strategies concerning new social and political movements. The Zapatista, with 
the aid of their international allies, used the internet to highlight their cause for the 
establishment of a democratic state for the indigenous people in Chiapas, Mexico. 
Positioning themselves as championing democracy, freedom and justice, they emerge as 
the facilitating force for indigenous autonomy and self-determination in Mexico. They 
have successfully deployed online politics as a transnational leverage tool to influence 
the Mexican government. Castells discusses their ability to build a network of 
international solidarity groups that ‘literally encircled the Mexican government’ (Castells 
1997: 83) using computer networks, the La Neta  developed in 1993 with the aid of the 
Catholic Church. Olsen (2005) locates their use of the internet as a transnational 
positioning tool and traces the development of an informational infrastructure network. 
Clever named it ‘the Zapatista effect’ (Clever 1998). The Zapatista internet strategy, 
relying on its international alliances, was to boost grassroots political activism and to 
incorporate technological functions using computer technologies within the internet’s 
networked environment for mass action political participation. Jordan and Taylor (2004) 
identify some of the purely net based strategies used by Zapatista and later on the anti 
globalization movement as ‘Hacktivisms’. 
 
My research points to new dimensions of cyber politics and online political 
mobilization; I will contrast some general themes which emerged in my research 
with existing observations on Zapatista web politics. The Chiapas rebel online 
networks were built as an operations unit to gain transnational solidarity and 
participation. Thus their online network was used more as propaganda and an 
informational tool. The Sri Lankan Tamil diasporan network is different in certain 
aspects to that of the Zapatista web operations. It is working to unite Sri Lankan 
Tamils spread out in the globe, to establish solidarity networks and to develop 
political strategies in the name of a homeland. Pro-LTTE web operations focused on 
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countering state propaganda, organizing diaspora events throughout the globe in 
support of the LTTE, influencing power states and stake holders in the UN and 
European Union. The dissident operations meanwhile mobilized support networks 
across the world and began exposing the LTTE operations and challenging LTTE 
domination. The LTTE made sure the web enabled the diaspora community to 
increasingly become an interactive stake holder in the conflict. With the conflict 
evolving, the LTTE viewed the web presence as a symbol of domination over rival 
organizations and in their struggle the LTTE identified cyberspace as a space or 
political location that needs to be controlled, as is demonstrated by Sutha in his 
responses. This dominative approach led to the LTTE using web sites to target and 
attack political activists, thus converting web operations into offensive roles 
attacking rival political activists. Thus the political engagements of the Tamil diaspora 
online were diverse and had multiple objectives and levels of operations which made it 
different to those of the Zapatisa. 
 
The Zapatista are not relying heavily on mobilizing their own people through online 
mobilization. They are mainly relying on external participation. The Tamil diaspora 
political space in the websphere, on the other hand, is active with mobilizing and 
engaging with Tamils both in the diaspora and in Sri Lanka, serving as a lobby space 
whilst wooing sympathizers. This is a critical difference of the LTTE as the Zapatistas 
engineered a strategic intervention of a number of different communities, a kind of 
mobilization of external actors. The Zapatistas were not using cyberspace as a political 
location for political activities. There is virtually no literature concerning internal 
political mobilization of the Zapatista. Instead the internet is used simply as a passage 
linking the relevant external audiences. 
 
The Zapatista uprising was a virtual attack on the state and their limited military uprising 
was more of an attempt to highlight grievances than an active military campaign. In 
contrast the LTTE attacks on the state are unleashed as a strategic maneuver in a struggle 
against the state with a clear political objective of carving out an actual homeland in Sri 
Lanka. The Zapatista military campaign has virtually died down since its uprising on 1 
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January 1994; the LTTE from 1994 has improved its military campaign thus the effect of 
the shaping of web politics is based on this factor of the conflict in Sri Lanka 
 
Chadwick points out that the main aspect of the Zapatista uprising and consequent 
internet dialogues and cyber campaigns crystallizes the changing nature of political 
action in an increasingly internet-mediated, transnational environment (2006: 126). The 
rise of a marginalized minority movement and its transformation into a political force 
and access to the internet is a key revelation of the Zapatista case study. The significance 
of Tamil diasporan politics online is its expansion of the capillary existence of sites of 
politics and multiple sites for resistance of hegemonies, as was revealed in the 
dissidents’ effort at countering LTTE web operations. Rather than focusing just on the 
diasporan networks, but also by interviewing significant political activists, I could 
expose the impact cyber political initiatives had on individuals and their adaptations for 
politics and their own political behaviour. My research, while revisiting the strengths of 
online networking, shows that cyber campaigns expose the nature of differences within 
political relationships and opportunities in cyber politics. It also examines an aspect 
which many cyber political researches on Zapatista and other social movements have 
missed out. The key focus is on the ability to resist dominant hegemonic interests though 
cyberspace and e-mobilizations which are dissimilar to the Zapatista initiatives. I bring 
out examples of the use of cyberspace by hegemonic interests to break such resistance 
through the unleashing of cyber violence that can penetrate any physical barrier. My 
research also exposes the ability to incite fear in the personal spaces of political activists 
and the counter cyber violence that derives from such tactics. My research points to these 




The chapter examined the impact of the internet in political mobilization of the Tamil 
diaspora political activists based on my fieldwork data. I introduced two themes of 
political processes which broadly explored political developments in diaspora politics in 
relation to the use of cyberspace for political activism. The two themes of ‘political 
opportunities’ and ‘political strategies’ investigated the diverse responses of my 
respondents concerning the political use and impact of cyberspace in their experience. I 
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examined both these themes through comparing and contrasting the views of the pro-
LTTE lobby and the dissidents separately and summing up each theme so as to identify 
the dynamic features of diaspora politics that emanate from the struggle between the two 
groups. 
 
The respondents highlighted the importance of the internet for political activities. These 
included the increase of political opportunities, the speed of cyber political processes, 
and the need to adapt to the new conditions and challenges that cyberspace offers. The 
chapter discussed the manner in which these new configurations in cyberspace translate 
into actual political practices. It also highlighted how the respondents have personally 
adapted to challenging demands offered within the realm of cyber politics and the 
utilizing of its potentials for achieving political goals. The dissidents elaborated 
extensively on its use to challenge the political practices of the LTTE, while the pro-
LTTE respondents demonstrated how interested they were in developments in 
cyberspace, and what tactical and strategic changes they have adopted both personally as 
political activists and as a political movement to enhance their political potential and to 
achieve their political goals. These political dynamics and the shape of Tamil diaspora 
political engagements are contrasted with a mini case-study of the Zapatista movement 
and the existing knowledge of online politics.  
 
The chapter also explored the diverse range of political strategies deployed in the Tamil 
diaspora through the use of the internet for politics. Tamil diaspora politics was 
traditionally attached to the politics of the homeland and its dominant political discourse 
has not changed even though it is a spatially dispersed phenomenon. This is expressed in 
terms of a ‘diaspora homeland nexus’ and ‘diaspora circulation' in academic literature. In 
exploring further the notion of the opening of spaces of politics and the struggle for 
politicising and controlling political spaces in cyberspace, I observe the diaspora dealing 
with new types of political objectives and political goals which are not necessarily based 
on attachment to the politics of the homeland. This is mainly because of the expansion of 
the political spaces in which diasporans could locate themselves, and the increased 
opportunities for political participation that could not be contained, especially for the 




What came out of the study was that with the spaces of politics becoming diversified, 
political mobilization and the strategies of Tamil diasporan activists have significantly 
altered. There were clear signs that the political field or space, as examined in the earlier 
chapter has diversified and single political messages or domination have to be changed. 
Although the LTTE still has significant control, they have been unable to prevent rival 
political forces from extensively using internet as a staging ground. This is the manner in 
which the LTTE has responded to the use of cyberspace for politics by innovatively 
adapting its political strategies online to counter the dissidents and the Sri Lankan state. 
The interviews revealed that political issues pertaining to diasporans transform into 
immediate political priorities that both dissidents and the LTTE had to address due to the 
political activists positioning themselves in cyberspace and actively engaging in political 
processes that genuinely impossible without the internet. Thus cyberspace and the notion 
of political engagements within it should be investigated further in order to explore the 
new dimensions that political practices online facilitate. These responses affect the way 
we understand the overall impact of cyberspace on political activism. My argument is 
not that cyberspace has totally changed the trajectory of the politics in the Tamil 
diaspora, which still mirrors developments in Sri Lanka, but it has significantly altered 
the political agenda being drafted, so that it is not totally relying on homeland politics. 
The internet, with its inherent dynamic of creating multiple spaces for political 
engagements and making political activists aware of issues raised in cyberspace, has 
made it imperative to respond to web generated issues. These will be further explored in 
the next chapter where changes into political strategies and new types of political 









This chapter looks at attributes of the conflict taking shape in cyberspace and its capacity 
to create fear and intimidation, in turn generating impacts on political activists and their 
action. The chapter deals with the effects of these new types of cyber violence and their 
impact on the Tamil diaspora political sphere. The chapter also discusses these new 
forms of violence and conflict unleashed in cyberspace, comparing and contrasting with 
existing research on concepts such as cyber terrorism and cyber conflict. The Sri Lankan 
ethnic conflict, especially with the significant diaspora population and the use of 
cyberspace for political purposes, has seen the occurrence of cyber-conflict and cyber-
terrorism within it. In my interviews with political activists what emerged was a new 
dimension to the understanding of cyber conflict and cyber terrorism that is different 
from current theories on the subject. The previous chapter outlines some changes in the 
politics and political processes among the Tamil diaspora political activists with the use 
of cyberspace for political purposes.  
 
Current literature has analysed the cyber conflict and terrorism dimension according to 
definitions of cyber-terrorism, mainly developed to determine levels of threats and based 
around aspects of global scale terrorism and the mobilization of terrorist organizations. 
The current definitions of all forms of cyber conflicts are still based on the notion of the 
‘internet as communication medium, or conduit’ (Gray 1999; Ronfeldt and Arquila 
2001; Hoskins and Loughlin 2009; Vatis 2001), not on dynamics emerging from the 
relationships it develops or identifying it as source or staging ground for political action. 
This literature focuses on hack attacks66, web defacements or propaganda warfare, which 
in a way is looking at the technological advancement of conflict tools used in cyberspace 
and its utility in political movements. My research identifies the forms of these conflict 
                                                   
66 The term ‘hack/hacker’ was coined in 1960’s at MIT. The meaning has evolved according to Taylor, 
from the highly skilled but playful activity of academic computer programmers searching for the most 
elegant programming solution to being increasingly associated with its present day connotation of illicit 
computer intrusion (Taylor 1999: 13–14). Today it is used in the context of cyber security and even in 




tools in the Tamil diaspora web sphere, and also identifies insidious and more violent 
uses of cyberspace for the purpose of attacks on individuals, rather than the political 
movements they represent, to deter them from their political actions. My research shows 
that cyberspace can be used to subjugate minority resistance movements. I present both 
the use of cyberspace for resistance and domination in this chapter, which looks at 
minority resistance and the counter attacks launched by dominant groups to single out 
and intimidate organizations and agents who challenge them. I argue that my research 
findings outline the existence of ‘micro frameworks’ of cyber terrorism that have not 
been explored or captured in the existing literature on the subject and which I feel should 
be an integral component of analysis into the use of cyberspace for political struggles, 
given the impact that it has on the lives of political activists. 
 
This chapter traces the significant changes of political engagements in cyberspace in the 
context of the Sri Lankan conflict as the pattern of the cyber conflict has undergone a 
transformation. These changes are tracked through the introduction of two phases in the 
cyber conflict. Before proceeding with the analysis of the phases and changes in the 
patterns of conflict produced in cyberspace, I will look briefly at the notion of cyber 
conflict. At the end of my own analysis based on my fieldwork findings, I discuss what 
can be added to the notion of cyber conflict.  
 
8.2 Cyber conflict and Cyber terrorism: A short analysis 
 
The concepts of ‘Cyber conflict’ and ‘cyber war’ mainly came out of security studies 
literature on information warfare and the use of communication technology in battle 
theatres. In 1999, through the work Countering the New Terrorism, Lesser, Hoffman, 
Arquilla, Ronfeldt, Zanini and Jenkins introduced the concept of Cyberterrorism. They 
were focusing on the networked nature of the internet and its role in the rise of network 
based warriors. Developing this concept, Arquilla and Ronfeldt pointed out: ‘These 
protagonists are likely to consist of dispersed small groups who communicate, co-
ordinate and conduct their campaigns in an internetted manner, without a precise central 
command’ (2001: 45). Researchers uncovered the rapid rise of the use of cyber warfare, 
mainly against state targets, as cyberattacks were escalating in volume, sophistication 
and they were becoming highly coordinated (Vatis 2001). The Estonian case stands as a 
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robust example for states using the techniques of cyberspace to launch attacks against 
hostile states. The attacks on the Estonian government in May 2007 on its banking, 
media, and police sites were triggered as a protest against the Estonian government's 
removal of a Soviet-era memorial located in the center of the country's capital. The 
Estonians sought the help of NATO experts in cyber security to cope with the extreme 
level of attacks allegedly emanating from Russia under the Kremlin’s directions67.  
 
Gardner (2009) points out that the attacks on Estonia are an example of the power of 
cyber warfare as it can destabilize a country’s economy and its vital assets.  In fact, he 
calls this attack as the first real cyber war. Karatzogiani (2009) claims: the reason the 
‘Estonian case has been coined the “first cyberconflict or cyberwar” is because a nation’s 
infrastructure was targeted in its entirety, in an orchestrated, unprecedented and 
sustained manner’ (2009: 6). This clearly parallels one of the most recent definitions of 
cyber war in the context of political science made by Karatzogiani (2004; 2006) who 
defines cyber conflict as referring to conflicts of the real world spilling over in 
cyberspace.   
 
Typical of cyberattacks is the use by opposing parties of either Information 
Technology as such or IT as a weapon – for example, worms, Distributed Denial 
of Service attacks (DDoS), Domain Name Service attacks (DNS) or 
unauthorized intrusions - to attack the other side. (Karatzogiani 2006: 94) 
 
This politics of conflict in cyberspace is based on the political importance of identifying 
threats to information communication bases where, in cyber security jargon, such threats 
are identified mainly as threats to ‘critical infrastructure’68. In a recent analysis of cyber 
conflict Karatzogiani goes beyond the technological determinants of cyber conflict. She 
identified two categories important in the analysis of cyber conflicts. The first category 
according to Karatzogiani is identified as the ‘socio political’ dimension, where activists 
on global issues like the green movement and the anti-globalization movement use 
                                                   
67 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/may/17/topstories3.russia  
 
68 United States initiated the efforts of Critical infrastructure protection, this builds on the recommendations 
of the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection. In October 1997 the Commission 
issued its report, calling for a national effort to assure the security of the United States' increasingly 
vulnerable and interconnected infrastructures, such as telecommunications, banking and finance, energy, 




cyberspace to pressurise international organizations. Her second dimension is struggles 
between two ethnic or religious groups that fight it out in cyberspace (2004: 46). She 
also acknowledged there is a blurring between the two categories. The main drawback in 
her work is that the threats assessed, and conflicts observed, are focused on 
technological utility. This is important as far as understanding the impact of technology 
on cyber conflict dynamics is concerned, but her observations lacked an analysis of the 
micro impacts of such conflict on political actors. She focused at larger stakeholders 
such as states, international organizations and national militaries and so her analysis does 
not tend to engage with actual political activists and their experiences in contexts such as 
diaspora politics.  
 
The focus on concepts such as ‘cyber terror’ and ‘cyber conflict’ in my thesis came out 
mainly because of the use of these terms by my respondents to describe their experiences 
and reveal the dimensions of cyber politics in the Tamil diaspora political sphere. The 
dissident political activists in particular were constantly referring to the use of the 
internet by the LTTE to terrorise them. Jeyadevan , Nallu, Keeran, Jeyabalan, Rengan all 
used terms such as ‘cyber terror’, ‘cyber terrorist’, ‘cyber war’ in explaining the use of 
cyberspace for political purposes by the LTTE and its effect on their political actions and 
their personal lives. My research captures the effects of cyber politics and the use of 
conflict tools on political activists and their practices. This enabled me to capture a wider 
picture concerning the effect of cyberspace on political activists and their use of 
cyberspace for political purposes.  
 
There are also multiple uses of the web for terrorism, from cyber planning to email 
bombs, as the evidence that terrorists used the Internet to plan their operations for 9/11 
suggests. When NATO forces recovered computers from al-Qaeda suspects in 
Afghanistan there were detailed plans of terror attacks and evidence that the suspects 
were using encrypted messages through the internet for communication with their cells 
in USA and UK. These incidents indicate that the Internet is being used as a 
‘cyberplanning’ tool for terrorists (Thomas 2003). Thus cyberplanning is considered a 
more important internet tool by some cyber strategists than the much feared cyber-





Cyber engagements in the Sri Lankan context started off in the mid 1990s and the most 
significant portal which opened up was the launch of pro-LTTE or pro Tamil nationalist 
Tamilnet.com in 1997. Cyber engagements through diaspora political activists were 
mostly limited to the pro-LTTE operations network, which was established prior to the 
cyber networks. Cyber engagements started parallel to the third stage of the Eelam War, 
which was also significant in terms of the technological advancement of the warfare; the 
third Eelam war phase was the most technologically advanced campaigns for both the 
Sri Lankan government and the LTTE. The LTTE knew it could thrive on the net as it 
could be used anonymously or as a shell game to hide identities. Moreover, online 
encryption services offered encryption keys that were very difficult to break.  
 
8.3 New dimensions of Cyber terrorism  
 
The constant reshaping of the political space, both by traditional Tamil activists and new 
agents looking for an enabling political space to enter, have resulted in significant 
changes to the Tamil diasporic political sphere online. This space is now evolving 
through a multiplicity of political actors. The ground conditions in Sri Lanka are still 
playing a major role in deciding the political terms of cyber activity but the cyber 
politics itself are creating conditions which affect changes within the Tamil diaspora 
community because of online engagements between the pro-LTTE diaspora activist and 
the dissidents. These findings in my research question and reiterate the need to rethink 
previous literature and notions of network power in cyberspace, online political 
mobilization and cyber terrorism.  
 
According to Dorothy Denning, a leading academic and researcher, cyber terrorism is:  
Generally understood to refer to highly damaging computer-based attacks or 
threats of attack by non-state actors against information systems when 
conducted to intimidate or coerce governments or societies in pursuit of goals 
that are political or social. It is the convergence of terrorism with cyberspace, 
where cyberspace becomes the means of conducting the terrorist act. Rather 
than committing acts of violence against persons or physical property, the 
cyber-terrorist commits acts of destruction and disruption against digital 




This definition is more technological based and is still aligned with the macro thinking 
of protecting critical infrastructure, which is the main focus of all cyber terrorism 
studies. The notion of cyber terrorism in the current context is mostly about identifying 
potential threats to a set of identified targets which are linked to massive information 
systems hardware.  
 
Denning further goes on to identify the qualities of such a terrorist act:  ‘To fall in the 
domain of cyber-terror, a cyber attack should be sufficiently destructive or disruptive to 
generate fear comparable to that from physical acts of terrorism, and it must be 
conducted for political and social reasons.’ (2007: 125) In this context the ongoing 
engagements on cyberspace which will be discussed later in the chapter points to the 
need to rethink and recast the definition of cyber terrorism and its application in micro 
political engagements. The theories on cyber security and cyber terrorism are overtly 
focused on threats to information systems and seem to have missed out the damage and 
threats it poses to individuals at very personal levels. Still it is perceived primarily as a 
terrorist weapon targeting technology facilities, as Erbschloe point out:  
 
Remarkably, terrorists are being bred and trained to be technologically savvy and 
to attack, disrupt, damage and perhaps even destroy technology infrastructures 
and computer-based economic activities. They are the biggest threat to the 
information infrastructure and the new digital economy  
(Erbschloe 2001: 37). 
 
I claim that in my research what I reveal are the micro versions of cyber conflicts and the 
use of cyber terror. Recent theories and analyses on information warfare and concepts 
such as ‘future of conflict’ are based on the theories of Heidi and Alvin Toffler (1980). 
These theories emerge from the demise of the importance attached to concepts like 
territory and population as denominators in the shaping of the social.  These concepts are 
replaced by the idea that human capital and the possession of information are important 
factors in the constitution of the society. Based on this assertion the theorists believe that 
information will become the key source of wealth and power in the near future.  The key 
objective of information warfare is to acquire control over information as it is seen as a 




Even in the backdrop of the 9/11 attacks, the newly formed US Department of Homeland 
Security was aware of importance of cyber terrorism as the department ran a huge cyber 
terror simulation in November 2003 to improve its readiness. Still the focus was on 
attacks on computer, banking and utilities and it simulated physical and computer attacks 
on banks, power companies and the oil and gas industry (Karatzogiani 2006: 100). Cyber 
terrorism and cyber attack theorists and practitioners are looking at macro level battle, 
like Mulveron who observes various scenarios in the People’s Liberation Army in the 
Information Age to asses the capabilities of the US and China in information battles 
(Mulveron and Yang 1999: 182). The literature which engages with political activism 
still focuses on the state centric discourse and a terrorism targeting state interest. Jerry 
Everard (2000), in his work Virtual States, looks at the threat posed by underdeveloped 
states and non state actors using cyber attacks on Western or developed states. Based on 
the findings from my fieldwork as presented in the next section, I argue that the existing 
theoretical frameworks of cyber security and information warfare under the aegis of 
cyber politics fail to capture the micro political engagements in cyberspace and the 
effects of such engagements when terrorism is unleashed on those spheres. The cyber 
conflict I exposed through the analysis of Tamil diasporan political engagements is also 
a power struggle based on political objectives. These engagements reveal cyber conflict 
is not purely about attacking an adversary’s computer, but is also about attacking the 
personal space of political activists, their identity or and even the ‘will for activism’.  
 
8.4 Virtual conflict zone 
 
In analysing my research conducted prior to the doctoral research, and in the fieldwork 
for the doctoral research, there emerged an interesting pattern of cyber political 
engagements among the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora. The combined research revealed 
that the cyber conflict developments could be understood in two phases. To understand 
the distinct rupture in the paradigm of political engagements in cyberspace from 1994–
2006, one should analyse the spatial context of the engagements. Tamilnet.com was 
launched in 1995 and re-launched in 1997 with the LTTE dominating web engagements 
and the main contestation between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan state run web sites. In 
2002, the dissident website Thenee.com was launched and from 2002 onwards the web 
conflict became more complicated as it involved political engagement between the pro-
LTTE elements, the dissidents and the Sri Lankan state. This two phased approach helps 
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to illuminate the transformation of Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora online engagements and 
the effect it has had on Tamil diasporan politics in general. In analyzing the two phases 
between 1994 – 2001 and 2001 – 2006, I try to bring out the reasons why my 
respondents identified these strategies as terror tactics and contrast them with existing 
literature on cyber conflict and cyber terrorism. 
 
The entrance into cyber engagements, by political activists from the diaspora, was 
limited mostly to the pro-LTTE operations network, which was established prior to the 
cyber networks. The LTTE unveiled two military tactics heralding the use of advanced 
technology in warfare. To begin with, they used Soviet-made, shoulder-launched 
surface-to-air missiles to down aircraft belonging to the Sri Lankan Air Force. Secondly, 
Tigers used modified speed boats, designed parallel to the F 117 stealth fighter69 in body 
architecture, to ram Naval gunboats and approach them evading radar (because of its 
unique design the boat was able to achieve speed similar to a wave piercer and stealth) 
(Davis 2001).  
 
The mid 1990s saw the Sri Lankan government spend millions of dollars on obtaining 
heavy weapons such as, main battle tanks (MBTs), armoured personnel carriers (APCs), 
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), supersonic fighter aircrafts, advanced helicopter 
gunships, Super Dvora gunboats and electronic surveillance equipment (Kelegama 1999: 
75). All these signified a technological leap in the context of the war. These 
developments were coinciding with the emergence of political engagements in 






                                                   
69 The F-117A Nighthawk is operating with the United States Air Force, is the world's first operational 
aircraft designed to exploit low-observable stealth technology. The unique design of the single-seat F-117A 
provides exceptional combat capabilities. In 1999 The Jane’s Defence Review unveiled the LTTE in 
experimenting with a new speed boat, which it claims evades radar and is used to ram into Sri Lankan 
Naval vessels by suicide cadres of the Black sea tiger wing. 
(http://www.janes.com/security/international_security/news/jir/jir010307_2_n.shtml) 
 
70 http://www.army.lk/operations01.php?take=22  
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8.4.1 Phase I 1994 – 2001 
 
This phase parallels the conflict in Sri Lanka where the LTTE objective was domination 
over place and the acquisition of geographic mass from the control of the Sri Lankan 
state. This battle to dominate and control geographic spaces for political and military 
gains shaped and influenced politics in cyberspace. The Sri Lankan state became 
involved in the massive militarization of places where the LTTE threat was large, while 
the LTTE strategically made assaults on military positions and garrisons, converting the 
captured land masses under the reign of the Eelam and marking the territorial borders of 
these captured areas as a de facto Tamil state. The same conflict and political 
engagements parallel to the ground condition transferred to cyberspace. In this context, 
the key feature from 1994–2001 in cyber engagements were that both the LTTE and the 
Sri Lankan state were competing for control of the web sphere. In the coordinated and 
controlled websites (tamilet.com, eelam.com. eelamweb.com, tamilnation.org) of both 
the LTTE and the state, one can see that the tussle in these web engagements was mainly 
to represent the achievements of the Eelam nation or the continuity of a sovereign state. 
The LTTE wanted to maintain its fundamental ideology that it had as an organization. 
Their simple theory was to dominate and control any structure, institution, ideology. 
They used the same strategy of speed and shock and awe effects in taking over political 
spaces in cyberspace as well. In response, the state had one primary objective: to 
maintain its presence and champion its discourse of a unitary, undivided Sri Lanka 
forced to eradicate terrorism. 
 
The LTTE cyber attacks were mostly carried out from multiple international locations by 
groups from the mainstream Tamil diaspora who were directly involved and others who 
were sympathetic to the cause. The actions of the sympathy groups can be analysed as 
propaganda warfare. The attacks were mainly directed against government sites that 
were of strategic importance to the LTTE and the capability to launch such attacks was a 
psychological advantage the LTTE gained over the government and the Sri Lankan 
military. According to Erbschloe, because of the ease of access to multiple computer 





One incident was the launch of the Sri Lanka Army website on January 1st 2001 
followed by a pro-LTTE website Eelamnation.com, which on the very next day launched 
a home page text, ‘In an attempt to vie with Tamil websites all over the world depicting 
the local warring scene, Sri Lankan Army personnel are in the process of launching an 
army website to provide updated news from the battlefield, but not with much success 
though, admitted their commander-in-chief’71. On the same day the army website 
suffered several blackouts, which officials said was a server initiation error. However my 
pre-doctoral research revealed that Sri Lankan army officials traced it to a coordinated 
attack by hackers in the Tamil diaspora aligned to the LTTE. In 2002 the army website 
home page was hacked into and a skull replaced the normal interface. 
 
In the 1990s, the Sri Lankan army website (www.slarmy.org, later www.army.lk ), was 
not the prime target of hackers. Instead it was the website www.realityinsrilanka.com. 
(Figure 47) This site was manned by the Psyops (Psychological Operations Unit) 
division of the Sri Lanka army.72 The army never admits that the website is hosted by 
them, nor claimed any responsibility to its contents. From the year of hosting in 1997, 
simultaneous to the launch of Tamilnet.com, the website has been subject several times 
to hack attacks, e-mail bombs73 and sometimes the virtual shut down of the server. 
Nevertheless, the website survived for a few years and was made an important link in 
many other websites hosted by the Sinhala diaspora globally.  
 
                                                   
71 This was first hand information gathered in an interview with the pioneer of Web operations in the Sri 
Lankan military, Brigadier Sanath Karunaratne in 2003.  
72 The psychological operation was uncovered through series of discussions with senior army officials of 
the Sri Lanka Army. In military terms  “Psychological Operations are:  Planned operations to convey 
selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective 
reasoning, and ultimately the behaviour of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. 
The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behaviour favorable 
to the originator's objectives” (http://www.iwar.org.uk/psyops/)   
 
73 e-mail bombing is a practice when massive number of emails are send to an email address or email 




Figure 47 Homepage of www.realityofsri lanka.com.  
 
PRIU, The Policy Research and Information Unit website, the official website of the Sri 
Lankan government, which was hosted purely for government information services, had 
also been targeted in 2004. The hack attack was considered to be of non lethal effect. 
However the point of concern for the government was the ability of the attackers to 
penetrate state of the art counter measures that were online.74 PRIU was one (at that time) 
of the few websites in Sri Lanka that were very concerned about security and constantly 
upgraded with the help of professionals. The site also has experienced constant mail 
bombings in the form of hate mails directed towards the President of Sri Lanka. The 
PRIU officials said that they are now not taking chances and are gearing up to face cyber 
terrorist threats by installing state of the art security measures. 
 
In a quite separate initiative, the Sri Lankan government has waged an underground 
cyber warfare campaign against prominent LTTE websites, including LTTE fronts and 
websites sympathetic to the LTTE. The Sinhala diaspora has also waged a similar 
campaign. In the late 1990s the Sri Lankan policy makers on military and defense affairs 
saw Tamilnet.com as a hostile site which had global reach and was a mouthpiece of the 
LTTE. However it was identified quite late, as cyber attacks were not perceived as 
                                                   
74 The attacks on the PRIU were revealed through research on the operations of the PRIU and in depth 




considerable threats by the military or defense officials. The effect this web site had on 
the conflict and the changes it brought about in the web are discussed below. 
 
Serious cyber engagements started off in the mid 1990s and the most significant portal 
was the launch of the pro-LTTE or pro Tamil nationalist Tamilnet.com in 1997. The 
website Tamilnet.com pioneered the use of the web in the context of the Sri Lankan 
conflict and one of its key audiences was the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora. Tamilnet to 
date is an influential web site and key information portal for many who are interested in 
day-to-day developments in the conflict zone. Tamilnet’s importance is not merely its 
role in functioning as an information portal. According to Whitaker (2007), 
Tamilnet.com primarily started to counter the organization University Teachers for 
Human Rights (Jaffna) [UTHR(J)]’ which emerged as a group to monitor human rights 
abuses during the earlier years of the conflict. UTHR accused the LTTE of playing a 
significant role in these abuses as well as the government. The LTTE’s first response to 
them was assassination of one of the founders of UTHR(J), Dr. Rajini Thiranagama in 
1989. The assassination of Dr. Thiranagama made the group go underground and flee Sri 
Lanka. They still managed, with the aid of their local contacts to keep on churning out 
reports of the situation in Jaffna and elsewhere for the diaspora community and the 
LTTE was not happy with the international coverage UTHR received. Whitaker claims 
that ‘TamilNet was originally created to provide an alternative English- language voice 
to counter the popularity of the UTHR(J) among the Western press’ (2007: 121). The 
UTHR(J) currently operates a website but this came much later than Tamilnet.com.  
 
Tamilnet.com became a priority target on the Sri Lankan government's hit list within a 
few years of its operation. Because the government lacked expertise to carry out a hack 
attack on the site, it sent a covert team to the United States to hire hackers to attack 
Tamilnet.com. Though initially this was a success, Tamilnet.com recovered and through 
the advanced security measures provided by the web host it was secured. The late 
Sivaram Darmeratnam, alias Taraki, who was the chief editor of Tamilnet.com, told me 
about the use of hackers to disrupt its services in an interview prior to the research for 
my doctoral thesis. He traced the two-pronged strategy of the state to contain the 
operations of Tamilnet and using technological expertise to wage cyber warfare. The 
first strategy was physical intimidation of the staff operating in Sri Lanka. The military 
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made several raids on Taraki’s house. They began monitoring his telephone calls and 
blocking his dial up connection making it impossible for Taraki to work. Secondly, 
Taraki revealed an interesting plot where the military was advising government security 
officials on hiring hackers from USA to attack the website. Taraki claimed that his email 
accounts were hijacked and, through phone line tapping, email intercepts were carried 
out by the DMI (Directorate of Military Intelligence) Sri Lanka. In April 2005 the chief 
editor of the website Sivaram Darmeratnam was abducted and killed and his murder trial 
has never been concluded. 
 
In early June 2007, Tamilnet.com became totally inaccessible in Sri Lanka, and 
speculation was rife that Sri Lankan military intelligence was behind the blocking of the 
servers. On 20 June 2007, in a weekly government press conference, government 
defence spokesperson Minister Keheliya Rambukwella was questioned by a journalist on 
the alleged state involvement in denying access to Tamilnet. The minister denied the 
allegation, but went on to say on record ‘I would love to hire hackers to disable 
Tamilnet’.75 What the minister didn’t know was that what he wished was actually put 
into practice by previous governments in anticipation of the future threat from Tamilnet 
to the Sri Lankan state. It appears the Minister was not aware of earlier attempts to take 
out Tamilnet. 
 
Tamilnet.com itself has been the focus of much research. Whitaker subtly brings out the 
intentions of the creators of Tamilnet. According to him:  
 
Their cyber-insurgency worked by sneaking their own perspective –through what 
stories they chose to report – into considerations of geopolitical and Sri Lankan 
elite, and thus shifting how the war was reported in the western press and 
debated by the various governments involved in the struggle between Sri 
Lankans dueling nationalist hegemonies (2006: 266). 
 
The significance of Whitaker’s analysis is his intepretation of Tamilnet as part of the 
larger process of the Tamil insurgency. He looks at the informational dynamic of 
Tamilnet.com, the role Tamilnet.com played and its influence on Tamil political 
                                                   
75http://www.smh.com.au/news/Technology/Sri-Lanka-under-fire-over-Internet-




activists. Whitaker highlights the importance of Tamilnet.com in the context of the 
conflict and the shaping of political processes parallel to the opening up of the web space 
and its use for political purposes. Tamilnet.com was not just a pioneer Sri Lankan Tamil 
news service provider, it also triggered the process of the Tamil diasporic space being 
mapped in cyberspace.  
 
At first cyber attacks, or the use of cyberspace as a military tool, were mainly limited to 
attacks on Sri Lankan Government websites and for propaganda battles and counter 
propaganda efforts. It was also a psychological battle tactic especially by the LTTE to 
target the Sri Lankan armed forces. The next phase explores the evolution of the cyber 
conflict and new political objectives behind such moves and I argue that some of these 
objectives are different from the ones that were adopted in phase I. 
 
8.4.2 Phase II 2001 – 2007 
 
This section looks at the shaping of cyber conflict as a consequence of changing 
strategies deployed by Tamil diasporan activists and the Sri Lankan state in cyberspace, 
and how the changing nature of cyberspace affected these changes. My analysis of this 
phase is based on my interviews with Tamil diasporan political activists. This phase also 
has distinct characteristics against the earlier phase analysed above. I trace the rupture in 
the strategy of holding and controlling cyber political spaces, both by the Sri Lankan 
state and the LTTE, as practised and contested in the mid 1990s. This paradigm change 
demonstrated the dislocation of the central axis connecting the political terrain in the 
Tamil diaspora to the conflict zone. It also changed the potential of a single organization 
or ideology to dominate cyberspace in a political engagement. The struggle in 
cyberspace in Phase One was an exercise in dominating each and every web site and 
portal relating to the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict. LTTE web operations attempted to 
increase the number of websites active in an attempt to overwhelm the state and 
challenge the use of web space by the Sri Lankan state. The LTTE operations invested in 
new servers to increase the storage space to handle extensive web traffic. The LTTE 
approach to web politics was driven by the state-making objectives of the organization. 
In Phase Two I bring out the changes that took place in the Tamil diaspora political field, 
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with the rise of dissident Tamil activists and where the LTTE had to respond and adapt 
to the challenges posed by these new groups. The emergence of dissident web operations 
has significantly altered the conflict zone, which had moved cyber attacks between the 
state and the LTTE. It has led to the constant reshaping of the political space, both by the 
involvement of traditional Tamil activists, and also by attracting new political agents 
seeking an enabling political space. 
 
The end of the millennium saw the Phase One cyber war reaching its peak and it was the 
beginning of the end, with this phase coinciding with certain key developments in the 
political realm. These included the rifts emerging within the LTTE, which culminated in 
a split in 2004, and the emerging of a powerful dissident Tamil political activism among 
the diaspora. These new political activists identify themselves as the dissidents or 
dissenting voice of the Tamil people, purely because they oppose the LTTE as the sole 
representative of the Tamil people. The LTTE never compromised on its role of being 
the single representative of the Tamil people and it used any means possible to maintain 
this, even resorting to extreme violence by eliminating its own people or any other party 
that challenged it. The dissidents have managed to break through this well-fortified 
political space and to challenge the LTTE hegemony. Also the rise of the dissident 
movement has seen the adaptation of strategies by the LTTE especially in cyberspace. 
This implosion in the Tamil political space, which emerged from the Tamil diasporic 
political space, has taken the cyber conflict away from the traditional Sri Lankan state 
vs. LTTE struggle, adding a whole new dimension to it and radically altering the spatial 
configuration of political engagements in cyberspace.  
 
Nallu made an interesting observation about the cyber political engagement, which many 
other respondents highlighted in all my discussions. The discussion emerged in the 
context of her involvement and observation of the role of the internet in Tamil diasporic 
politics. She said, ‘it is important, no questions about it, people are hooked to it, and 
there is a pattern among every political activist with their use of the internet.’ She 
continued, ‘for example, as dissenting political activists we are very concerned about the 
publications on LTTE websites, such as Nitharsanam, if our names are mentioned in the 




As this was a very interesting and a very new development in the cyber engagement 
dimension, I probed her response deeper, ‘What do you mean by ‘careful’? and her 
response was, ‘we need to be watchful, always look one over the shoulder, and fix alarm 
on the house I will fix a gate if I don’t have one and I don't have an alarm, I am going to 
do it soon.’ And I asked her ‘so does that mean this is a serious threat?’  
 
Yes, it is an obvious power that the net has created, it can control our thinking 
and it is influencing the thinking and they are using cyber terrorism on us. This is 
cyber terrorism, as internet is used by many of us for our organization and 
networking purposes. The LTTE is striking terror in this sphere, they are trying 
to get us off our politics. It is scaring many activists as the LTTE are not just 
targeting them but their families and suddenly seeing your self targeted on 
cyberspace is scary as we have become so linked with it. 
 
This response from Nallu was shocking, as the threat and fear factor, far from being 
virtual, seemed very real for these political activists. In the new literature on theories of 
cyber terrorism, Thomas introduces the notion of ‘cyber fear’. According to him:  
 
The Internet produces an atmosphere of virtual fear or virtual life. People are 
afraid of things that are invisible and things they don't understand. The virtual 
threat of computer attacks appears to be one of those things. Cyberfear is 
generated by the fact that what a computer attack could do (bring down airliners, 
ruin critical infrastructure, destroy the stock market, reveal Pentagon planning 
secrets, etc.) is too often associated with what will happen. News reports would 
lead one to believe that hundreds or thousands of people are still active in the al 
Qaeda network on a daily basis just because al Qaeda says so. It is clear that the 
Internet empowers small groups and makes them appear much more capable than 
they might actually be, even turning bluster into a type of virtual fear (Thomas 
2003). 
 
The existing notion of cyber fear as brought out in the above definition does not 
sufficiently capture the fears of individuals mediated through cyber engagements or 
effects cyber space has on lives of individuals. In this chapter I attempt to locate this 
micro analysis of cyber fear emerging in the context of violence on Tamil diasporic web 
space and the individual reactions and responses to such violence. Gabriel Weimann, an 
expert on terrorism studies and researcher on cyber terrorism, points out in a report titled 
WWW.terror.net: How Modern Terrorism Uses the Internet (2004) that there are eight 
different ways in which terrorists currently use the Internet. These are psychological 
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warfare, publicity and propaganda, data mining, fundraising, recruitment and 
mobilization, networking, information sharing, and planning and coordination. First, 
these eight points concerning the use of cyberspace for terrorist activities are made on 
the assertion that cyberspace is a communication medium. The importance of cyberspace 
in this context is the ability for it to be deployed as a weapon because of the large 
spectrum of targets that can be reached using cyberspace. Secondly the frameworks or 
structures of analysis that Weimann (2004) introduces are looking at global trends of 
terrorism and not micro power struggles or political violence. What I mean by micro 
struggles are cases where individuals are subjected to intimidation and personalized 
forms of attacks made through cyber space, which are effective in psychologically 
threatening them to change their lifestyles. I argue such forms of online violence are not 
captured in theoretical framings of Weinmann (2004) or Denning (2001) introduced to 
explain cyberterrorim. In my analysis of the use of cyber space both as a medium of 
instigating violence and a weapon of violence, I look specifically at diasporan politics 
and political actors and their comprehension of the effect of cyberspace on their political 
life and practices. These are the people who feel the actual impact, and even without 
academic knowledge of the earlier meaning of the term ‘cyber terrorism’ they used it to 
express this impact on them. Cyber conflict in the context of the Sri Lankan Tamil 
diaspora reveals that, while cyberspace provides democratic political spaces, it 
simultaneously produces the rise of new forms of terrorism in cyberspace as a reaction to 
such openings. This is all part of the hegemonic and counter hegemonic power struggle, 
with cyberspace suddenly becoming the site of the struggle as well as the medium 
through which the violence is unleashed. 
 
Keeran, who has experienced and observed cyber engagements, revealed he has 
witnessed many incidents where cyber attacks were used. The most recent according to 
him was ‘Tamil Nadu-based Tamil paper Thinamalar’ was attacked and this is cyber 
terrorism (5 may 2007)” And he said, ‘the cyber war has being raging for some time and 
people do not notice it. Www.yarl.com a pro-LTTE paper was attacked. Such attacks are 
becoming more frequent. Cyber terrorist attacks are also targeting individuals not just 




Rengan also commented on the increased personalized attacks on political activists and 
how this has had a tremendous effect on political mobilization. He also lamenting the 
fact that there was no possible way to curtail attacks directed against him and on 
democratic politicians such as ‘Anandasangaree’. The personalized attacks included 
doctored pictures and videos of individuals which Rengan said have had a tremendous 
effect, ‘because the internet now gives the facility to self broadcast the use of images, 
video has increased and with LTTE sympathisers using such images and videos it has 
become a kind of power over their rival. This power has become critical in political 
engagements and we have to respond’.  
 
Rengan also brought out an example of the effects of such targeted online attacks on a 
fellow dissident political activist. ‘These direct threats and the warnings published in the 
Tiger websites were alarming. Bazeer was a Sri Lankan Muslim political activist 
constantly attacked by the LTTE websites. He was introduced in chapter Four as many 
dissident activist mentioned him as being a victim of online campaigns launched by the 
LTTE. The campaign against Sayed Bazeer unleashed by the pro-LTTE websites targets 
him personally and also brands him as a Jihadist, an instigator and propagator of Islamic 
fundamentalism in Sri Lanka (see Figure 28). These campaigns have had serious 
consequence in Bazeer’s life and for his daily movements.  
 
 
Figure 48 Neruppu.org attacking Bazeer 
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Figure 4876 is one example of the attacks on Bazeer; the caption from the Neruppu.org 
website has images of Hizbollah fighters and Osama Bin Laden and Bazeer’s image in 
the middle. Many pro-LTTE websites identify Bazeer as a ‘fundamentalist’, ‘Jihadist’, 
‘Islamic fundamentalist’ and claim he is linked to fundamentalist movements. This was 
pointed not only by Rengan, but also by Jeyadevan and Jeyabalan as well, when they 
were trying to show me what they meant by cyber terrorism and its relation to the use of 
web by the LTTE. 
 
Rengan said ‘I have information of how the LTTE use computer viruses and other cyber 
attacks on dissident websites disrupting the services of these websites. Another cyber 
attack tactic of the pro-Tiger groups is using methods of disrupting the anti-LTTE web 
operations by duplicating dissident websites. The LTTE made duplicates of all major 
dissident websites such the Thenee.com, Vizhippu.org and Neruppu.com.’ The LTTE 
has resorted to duplicate websites of dissidents, this was a major tactic to deter visitors to 
dissident web sites. One such example is the dissident website www.neruppu.com and 
the LTTE duplicated www.neruppu.org. One can be deceived by these duplicate sites 
especially when searching for them on a search engine such as Yahoo or Google. Some 
of these duplicated sites included Thenee.com and Asiantribue.com . 
 
Jeyabalan, pointed out why personalized attacks were becoming a popular strategy: ‘The 
LTTE relied more on their web operations for targeting individuals as websites are 
difficult to take to court, even Tamilnet.com has its front operation in USA but the server 
is in Norway so they are safe from any legal challenges. LTTE websites operate mainly 
from Norway, Switzerland, London and Australia’. Thus his argument is that state 
centric legal structures are not always capable of adapting to the multiple spatial changes 
cyberspace takes. Thus regulating internet has been a significant issue.  
 
Jeyadevan is responsible for the dissident web counter-attacks on many pro-LTTE 
operations; the mini case study on him in Chapter Four clearly brought this out. I will 
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engage with his political strategies in coping with these attacks in this chapter. My 
online research analysis pointed out that Jeyadevan is the single most targeted person in 
the Tamil diaspora by the Tiger cyber attacks. In the interview with Jeyadevan, he 
provided a very informative outline of his operations as well as the attacks made against 
him, ‘The LTTE campaign is spearheaded by Nitharsanam, run by Sethupuram. What 
the LTTE was doing, was targeting people and this is what I call web terrorism, and in 
fact I wrote about cyber terrorists working for Tigers’. The name Nitharsanam came out 
in all discussions I had with political activists from the dissident group. In an informal 
interview a senior Tamil journalist attached to a leading British news service said, ‘even 
I have suffered from Nitharsanam.com and I am scared about it’. Nitharsanam, literally 
meaning ‘Reality in Truth’, emerged in LTTE controlled Sri Lanka as a specialised unit 
of media men and women in the Tiger ranks, who were sent to the front lines as 
cameramen and women. The website Nitharsanam.com, allegedly functioning under the 
direct control of the LTTE intelligence wing from its inception, seems now to be 
responding more to political issues in the diaspora by targeting dissident diasporans and 
responding to counter moves by the dissidents. The Tigers or LTTE front organizations 
in UK are known and political activists are quite aware of their capabilities. Some 
dissident activists fear Nitharsanam.com more than confronting LTTE activists in the 
open. They seem to be terrified of being attacked by Nitharsanam.com.  
 
Jeyadevan pointed out why the LTTE had to resort to tactics of ‘web terrorism’ as the 
dissident politicians came out against them,  
 
The cyber network had the ability to influence the Tamil community and it has 
had a huge effect. The problems cyber networks create for the LTTE is, because 
they are able to expose the LTTE activities done in in secrecy. The LTTE also 
ruthlessly controlled diaspora as their own territory but with the political space 
being opened up through cyber mobilization resulted in the LTTE’s secret 
regime came under constant attacks from dissidents. They now fear their greatest 
weakness is being exposed. The dissident web sites have been able to help the 
Tamil diaspora community to realize the LTTE lies and people are questioning 
them. The HRW report on diaspora funding of the conflict exposed the LTTE. 
Many dissidents who were interviewed in the HRW report were introduced to 
HRW through emails as many were afraid to come out but cyberspace enabled 




The LTTE international networks and operations are under attack from dissident 
activists locating themselves in cyberspace and in loose partnerships or alliances with 
other dissidents. The Human Rights Watch report which Jeyadevan was referring to was 
titled ‘Funding the Final War’ and was released on 14 March 2006. This report was 
compiled of research carried out of exposing LTTE and pro-LTTE operation within 
Tamil diaspora centres. The report mainly exposed the manner in which the above 
groups forced Tamil diaspora members to give money to the LTTE and the 
consequences people faced when they failed to provide the money. This detailed report 
had a wide ranging impact on the LTTE international operations from media exposures 
to the arrests of several key LTTE figures in many Western countries. 
 
What cyberspace is providing is not just a tool for networking but a type of  political site 
that can be used to resist the LTTE. Jeyadevan points out ‘There is a shift from 
terrorizing to doing other political campaigns by the LTTE websites, as there is no one in 
control of websites’. There is no centre in this web space, thus it is an ideal setting for 
what Deleuze (2004) calls ‘nomadic resistance’. This is how the dissidents are fighting 
back the LTTE domination and terror tactics.  
 




Figure 4977 is from a www.neruppu.org and pro-LTTE website which is accusing 
dissident political activist Jeyadevan of having an illicit affair. These measures adopted 
by the LTTE to counter dissidents are having significant effects on the lives of political 
activists.  
 
Cyber enthusiasts, mainly using Deleuze’s notion of de-territorialization, attempt to 
position cyberspace as a liberating space away from state control or state ideology. As 
Wray argues, ‘resistant forces on the Internet, those engaged in resistant Internet use like 
the electronic civil disobedience acts described above, are operating within the 
remaining uncolonized, deterritorialized, smooth spaces that still exist in cyberspace’ 
(1998). My argument is that cyberspace has created complexities in the way political 
control and conflict is situated, it is not the mere simple proximities and parameters of 
conflict zones that have changed.   
 
Enthusiasts such as Wray (1998) speak of the ability of cyberspace to be used by 
resistance or minoritarian organizations. Their fundamental argument for treating 
cyberspace as an important tool for resistance movements is based on the de-
territorialized nature of cyberspace and its inherent architecture of creating multiple 
spaces, making it difficult for one organization to dominate politically. The opportunities 
in cyberspace are multiple and the ability to shift locations is easier. The arguments 
concerning the ability of minority movements or grassroots movements to resist 
hegemonic powers in cyberspace are not totally flawed, as the Zapatista case points. 
However, the focus on cyber space as a space for resistance movements needs to be 
backed up by more empirical evidence. My own research points to the opportunities 
dominant organizations have harnessed using cyberspace to crush or counter these 
resisitance movements. For example, the dissidents who are targeted by pro-LTTE web 
operations using personalised web attacks, and the fear they generate, point out that this 
de-territorialized cyberspace is not as liberating as enthusiasts maintain.  
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The attacks on Tamil dissidents over cyberspace do demonstrate that organized 
hegemonic interests could also use it to resist counter hegemonic movements. Jeyadevan 
told me, 
 
LTTE threatened me with numerous emails, and one email included a threat 
from the feared Intelligence wing leader of the LTTE, ‘Pottu Amman’, whose 
cadres have pursued dissenting Tamils across the world and carried out 
assassinations. Lots of websites had pictures of me, my family, my house and it 
was a call for harm to me. My house was firebombed. This campaign is 
spearheaded by Nitharsanam.com, the website run by Sethu from Norway and is 
guided by the LTTE intelligence wing. Web sites run under the pro-LTTE 
operations then carried the publications from Nitharsanam. They are Nerrupu.org 
and villipu.com. 
 
For example Tamileditors.com published photos of Jeyadevan and actor Ross Kemp and 
said that Kemp was an assassin who Jeyadevan used to kill a Tamil activist. 
‘Tamileditors.com a website funded by pro-LTTE fronts, had pictures of me with Ross 
Kemp, I was involved with him to help him in making a documentary on gang violence. 
The website put pictures of me with him and said I conspired to kill a Tamil political 
activist implying Ross Kemp as the hit man’, (Figure 5078) Jeyadevan revealed. The 
threats on him had increased significantly recently, ‘I had cyber threats, I had to change 
email addresses, change email service provider under instruction of the police from NTL 
to BT.’ Jeyadevan revealed. He also said, ‘The strength of the LTTE web operations was 
that they had infiltrated web providers like Godaddy where most of their sites are 
registered.’ Jeyadevan pointed out many of the LTTE and pro-LTTE websites were 
hosted by a web hosting company called Godaddy, and he personally wrote to the 
company explaining the motives of the LTTE websites but the company did not respond. 
He claims that the LTTE has cultivated good ties with Godaddy to maintain undisrupted 
web services.  
 
                                                   





Figure 50 Jeyadevan with Presenter Ross Kemp.  
     
Jeyadevan and other dissident politicians and political activists have resorted to what 
they call a counter attack on these websites and on the cyber political space the LTTE 
dominates. This triggered a cyber conflict with its facets contributing to redefining 
notions of cyber conflict and cyber terrorism. Jeyadevan has embarked on a campaign to 
take on Nitharsanam.com and other LTTE websites and used the same personalized 
attack the LTTE launched on him against pro-LTTE political activists. Jeyadevan is 
involved in setting up websites and contributing to anti LTTE websites.  He said, ‘as 
they lose the edge of take over and control, we are able to challenge their authority’.  
 
Jeyadevan has pursued cyber attacks on individuals who are part of the LTTE front 
organizations and has made every effort to curb LTTE websites by taking legal 
challenges to websites based in Norway and by informing diplomatic sources. Jeyadevan 
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said some of the LTTE websites were hosted mainly by companies like Godaddy but 
most of the servers of these companies are based in the Norway. The Norwegian cyber 
laws were not strict enough, Jeyadevan claimed, and this enabled the LTTE web 
operations to flourish. This prompted him to contact Norwegian officials in an effort to 
curtail LTTE web activities. He has pursued Nitharsanam.com, and even contacted 
Australian authorities, as the Nitharsanam.com and another tiger website villipu.com had 
a registration linked to Australia. Jeyadevan said ‘we will give a good attack any time we 
find them. Like a declaration of war he said, ‘we will do it anytime to nail down the 
LTTE cyber terrorists like Sethus, Seevaratnam. We have silenced quite a few LTTE 
guys’ (Figure 51). In these attacks he told me, ‘LTTE television networks were hit, pro-
LTTE Councillors were targeted, where they couldn’t sustain the attacks and now being 
sidelined or self exiled.’ The dissident web attacks have been capable of isolating LTTE 
activists, ‘LTTE is marginalized and it is finding it very hard to come back’ He further 
said. 
 
Figure 51 Sethupuram and Thamilchelvan 
 
Figure 5179 shows the counter attack on LTTE activists that Jeyadevan was talking 
about. The picture is of the webmaster of Nitharsanam.com Sethupuram on the left and 
the late LTTE political leader S.P. Thamilchelvan on the right. These pictures are used 
by sites such as Tamilaffairs.com to counter claims by Sethupuram that he is an 
independent journalist and not part of the LTTE. 
 
Pro-LTTE activist Kumar also pointed out that ‘The impact of the “fear factor” in web 
operations has a far reaching impact on the families of political activities.’ The LTTE 
fronts were also aware of the impact of this evolving conflict and the effects it had on 
their activists. Cyber-terrorism literature looks at the use of computer based attacks on 
states or organizations and the key purpose of the attackers. These are to force or 
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intimidate their victims to give into political, social, ideological or religious goals the 
attackers believe in (Denning 2001). These attacks are mostly intended to hit critical 
infrastructures such as electricity grids, aviation controls, waste management centres or 
nuclear power plants belonging to states or large scale organizations. The important 
point I am raising in this chapter is the existence of forms of cyber attacks lower in scale 
compared to the attacks on critical infrastructures. These lower scale attacks are 
personalised and take place in the context of day to day political activities. The attacks 
on critical infrastructures are mostly anticipated forms of attacks but the forms of 
personalized attacks are more real and have taken place though few have been reported, 
as highlighted in this chapter. The impact of these attacks as shown in this chapter can be 
devastating to some individuals, which effect changes in lifestyles and political activism 
of political agents. The exposure of these micro layers of online violence is important to 
understanding the changes taking place in the politics of Tamil diaspora activism and it 
also has important ramifications for future analysis of concepts such as cyber-terrorism 




This chapter raised questions about the working of cyber conflict and cyber terrorism in 
the context of Tamil diaspora online politics. The key point of focus was the constant use 
of terms such as cyber terrorism and cyber fear by many respondents from the Tamil 
dissidents. I look at the reasons leading political activists use of such terms in the context 
of cyber politics and political strategies online in the Tamil diaspora. I try to argue that 
the existing frameworks and literature miss out the effects of online violence on political 
agents as their key emphasis is on macro effects, such as on communication networks 
and the infrastructures of societies that are vulnerable to be targeted through cyber 
attacks. 
 
The chapter is linked to the previous two chapters, where I revealed that political 
strategies and political processes within the Tamil diaspora are changing to a certain, 
extent with activists using cyberspace as a site for politics as well as a technological 
utility for politics. This chapter looked at a key dimension of the manifestation of 
conflict and struggle in such cyber environments and the shift of violence to cyberspace. 
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Violence and subjugation is a hallmark of the LTTE’s political practices in Tamil 
diasporan political sphere. In this chapter I examined such trends of violence 
rearticulating in cyberspace and the effect that this violence generated in cyberspace has 
on the lives and political decision making of the activists in diaspora politics. These 
findings question and reiterate the need to rethink previous literature and notions of 
network power in cyberspace, online political mobilization and cyber terrorism. I argue 
that ‘micro frameworks’ of cyber terrorism can be identified from my research and need 
to be integrated into the study of cyber terror and cyber conflict in cyber politics.  
 
Apart from the theoretical analysis of cyberspace and its political possibilities and 
providing a framework to understand political engagements in cyberspace, the interviews 
provided insight into notions of political mobilization and mobilization strategies. 
Another important contribution is to the existing knowledge on cyber security and cyber 
terrorism, dominated by the military strategies of the United States and the threats it see 
arising from the wide integration of the world through internet and communication 
technologies.  
 
In the context of the Tamil diaspora politics online I traced the pattern of the changing 
nature of the use of cyberspace. The initial role of the internet was purely functioning as 
an information medium concerning the developments in Sri Lanka for the benefit of the 
diaspora community. I investigated the changes of this initial role of the internet from 
2000s onward into a more interactive political site and a dynamic space for Tamil 
diaspora politics, capable of generating significant changes in political priorities and 
issues within the Tamil diaspora. The violence unleashed on the dissidents by the LTTE 
using cyberspace had the ability to violate many spaces the dissidents thought were safe. 
These threats and intimidations against the Tamil dissidents, unleashed in and through 
cyberspace, proved that the political dimension of cyberspace is not a clear force 
multiplier for one key group but is rather a complicated political tool. I make this claim 
because the political strategies adopted by both pro-LTTE and dissident groups to 
counter each other were facilitated through the internet. Thus cyberspace has not 
provided a clear advantage for one type of group. This was also revealed in my online 
research into changes of web sites and web based strategies in Chapters Four and Five. 
Findings introduced in this chapter significantly contribute not just to understanding the 
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changes in Tamil diaspora politics and the spatiality of political engagements. It points 
out that concepts such as cyber conflict and cyber terrorism that are discussed mainly in 
macro political and security frameworks are in fact more complicated than the simplified 
normative breakdowns offered from such theories. As the Head of Mi2g, a pioneer 
organization in global risk management, D.K. Matai has pointed out Cyber-conflicts can 
act as a ‘barometer’ of real life conflicts and can reveal the nature and the conflicts of the 
participating groups (Karatzogiani 196: 2004). In my argument, I show that they are not 
mere barometers, but that they have the dynamic capability to shift certain trajectories of 





This thesis has explored the use of cyberspace by Tamil diaspora political activists, 
based on their personal experiences of using the internet for political purposes and the 
impact cyberspace had on their political processes. I sought to explore the experiences of 
the Tamil political activists who form the leadership and decision making units within 
the Tamil diasporan political sphere. These political activists’ experiences explain the 
reasons why cyberspace has become an integral part of their political lives and political 
strategies as they form the vanguard of political activism in the Tamil diaspora. 
 
I presented the process of research carried out to explore and evaluate the impact of 
cyberspace in the lives of political activists. This thesis contains the details of fieldwork 
I undertook in London where I interviewed Tamil diaspora political activists from both 
dissident and pro-LTTE perspectives. It was an important period for research which saw 
rapid changes in the context of the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict and its effect on the 
political shaping of diaspora politics. 
 
The research is also unique in the context of Tamil diaspora politics as I have focused 
much attention on Tamil dissident activism. The reasons this focus on the dissidents and 
the rapid political changes which featured my research period were explained in the 
introduction as well as at different stages of my thesis. In most past research on Tamil 
diaspora from Fuglerud (2001) and McDowell (1996) to Gunaratne (1999), and from the 
disciplines of anthropology to security studies, the politics of the Tamil diaspora have 
been dominated by a focus on LTTE operations and LTTE led fronts in the Tamil 
diaspora. Investigation into the forms of dissident politics that challenge the LTTE from 
within the Tamil community introduces a different dimension to the existing political 
arena. Moreover, the intensity of activism and the expansion of the types of actors within 
the last few years has made the Tamil diaspora political field a very active and vibrant 
area for research.  
 
The findings in the research bring out thematic arguments, varying from theoretical 
issues such as ‘power’ and ‘space’, to political practices of online political strategies and 
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the shaping and framing of politics online. This thesis was structured in a manner to 
respond to three key questions I raised at the beginning. The first question was: ‘how can 
I research the impact of cyberspace on the politics of Tamil diaspora?’ This was 
addressed in Section One where I introduced a comprehensive research framework 
designed for data collection and analysis of my fieldwork interviews and research 
conducted online. The online research component was important in driving my research 
project and the analysis in my thesis. Section Two of the thesis contains the online 
research components and it is linked to Section Three where I present the offline 
interviews with my respondents. The offline and online data are fused to analyse 
individual thematic issues generated in each separate section whilst maintaining the key 
arguments of power, space and politics that run throughout. In Section One, to cope with 
the challenge of designing a research framework for analysing online content, I used 
Web Sphere Analysis as the preferred methodology. 
 
Web Sphere Analysis was used as an effective research framework to understand and 
study online action. By studying web objects it is possible to partially, or to a certain 
extent, discover reasons for online action. These web objects include texts, web links, 
and web site structures as these represent the motives of web producers as well as the 
importance of the political project behind it. Web Sphere Analysis is an immensely 
important tool for social researchers on online political action as it incorporates a wide 
range of stake holders from web producers, web hosts and users. Research frameworks 
need to have the capacity to capture all these parties in action to understand the forms of 
action that takes place 
 
Section Two of my thesis attempts to respond to the question: ‘what significance does 
the internet have in the political strategies of Tamil diaspora activists and the LTTE as an 
organization and to what extent does it define their political actions?’ In my research, 
Web Sphere Analysis enabled the capturing and organizing of web sites and also framed 
dynamics in the Tamil diaspora web sites. As introduced in my analysis, there has not 
been sufficient research into the web dynamics of the Tamil diaspora politics, apart from 
research into popular web sites such as Tamilnet.com or a limited number of pro-LTTE 
web sites (Ranganathan 2002, Wayland 2004, Whitaker 2007). Thanks to the dynamic 
boundary setting framework of the Web Sphere Analysis, all sites that clustered around 
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Tamil diasporan political engagements were able to be captured and analysed as an 
aggregate to closely examine the role each web site was playing in the political field. 
These helped develop my analysis and my arguments both conceptually and politically 
as presented in sections two and three in the thesis.  
 
Web Sphere Analysis captured the deployment of key and dominant web sites like 
Tamilnet.com, tamilcanadian.com, pathivu.com, and puthinam.com. These web sites 
used their reach to make sure the ceaseless control of the diaspora rests with the LTTE, 
while Nitharsanam.com targeted dissidents and anti LTTE elements, with 
tamilnation.org providing the knowledge structure to justify the existence of Tamil 
Eelam. It also featured the ability to analyse inter website and cross actor connections in 
web politics with the classic example highlighted in Chapter Five where the hack attack 
on pro-LTTE Eelamnation.com website was quickly broadcasted via sangam.org as a 
damage control exercise. These websites were functioning as nodes of a hegemonic 
project, and these dynamics were clearly analysed as the web sphere framework had the 
capacity to include the linking process of web politics and the ability to look at multiple 
web sites linked to the same context.  
 
This research framework was introduced to provide a two dimensional view to my 
research, combining the point of view of political activists and the web content to which 
that they were referring. It situates my arguments in coherent form as the structure of the 
arguments depended on analysing diverse sets of data from interviews and different web 
content. Section Three includes three key chapters based on my fieldwork research 
findings and this section responds to the third question I raised in the Introduction to the 
thesis. The question was, ‘what are the political consequences of using the internet in 
diaspora activism and why is it politically different?’. Section Three is made out of 
chapters that are based on the interview data from my fieldwork. The interviews 
generated three key themes which looked at the political consequences of cyber space in 
diaspora politics and what difference it made to the political strategies of activists. The 
split within the LTTE in 2004 produced a new set of opportunities for political activists 
in the Tamil Diaspora. There was a surge of Diaspora political activity spearheaded by 
the dissidents and this translated as online political processes during this time. My thesis 
captures the tensions between pro LTTE and dissidents where changes in the political 
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sphere were reflected in online political activities. It also shows how certain online 
political rivalries and engagements contributed to changing offline conditions and forms 
of politics. These were discussed in Chapters Six, Seven and Eight. The working of 
power and the importance of spaces for politics formed one theme that was discussed in 
Chapter Six. The changes in the political strategies of Tamil diaspora activists are the 
second theme and it was discussed in Chapter Seven. Finally the notion of cyber 
terrorism and its political implications on diaspora politics were discussed in Chapter 
Eight. 
 
A key discussion in Chapter Six is the shaping and functioning of power and its effects 
in comprehending of the notion of space and its political implications. The central 
argument which comes out of my thesis is based on the tensions and struggles between 
the pro-LTTE / LTTE political activists and the dissident Tamil diaspora activists to 
dominate political spaces of Tamil diaspora politics. These spaces include the struggle to 
reach out to the diaspora community, lobby activities, publication and propaganda work 
and the mobilizing of activists to get the views out in the public of the two different 
groups.  In other words, this thesis unfolds the tensions between hegemonic and counter 
hegemonic movements in the context of Tamil diaspora politics. Based on this central 
conflict, it exposes the different approaches and understandings of cyberspace and its 
political significance. Thus I argue throughout that these tensions create diverse 
approaches to politics of cyberspace and preferred practices in internet politics, which 
are reflected in the themes that I have engaged in Section Two of the thesis.  
 
My argument is not simply focused on the workings of this struggle in cyberspace, it 
exposes the complicated nature of cyberspace and its real life effects through both the 
eyes of diasporan activists and the context of web content. In particular, it demonstrates 
the diversity generated when political struggle takes place in cyberspace with rival 
factions approaching cyberspace based on contradictory interpretations of its purpose in 
politics. The outcome of such complicated political struggles, as my thesis proves, has a 
direct impact on shaping political priorities within the struggle and on the lives of the 
political actors and political agencies involved. These political priorities were introduced 
by the respondents through ideas such as ‘presence is important’, ‘no politics if you are 
not in cyberspace’ and ‘no political group can do politics without the internet’. So, we 
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see that it spawned political issues that do not have relevance to the ethnic conflict on the 
ground and, also, that it intensifies the internal struggle between the pro-LTTE and the 
dissident activists. The cases of Jeyadevan, the attacks on Bazeer and the targeting of 
activists’ families show that home grown conflicts (in England) are of importance, as 
well as the Tamil liberation struggle that dominated traditional diaspora political 
mobilization. In particular, the LTTE was under pressure to maintain the conflict 
connected to the diaspora and simultaneously they were forced to respond to dissident 
challenges. I captured such events in my Web Sphere Analysis. We have seen that even 
at critical times, such as the EU ban on the LTTE and Tiger air attacks in Colombo, the 
pro-LTTE web sites attacked dissidents while attempting to maintain the momentum of 
the LTTE’s successes in Sri Lanka. 
 
These tensions brought out new dimensions to diaspora political activism and 
highlighted the contradictions, antagonisms and, at the same time, the yearnings of 
political activists such as the dissidents who were looking for political spaces to operate. 
For some political activists, mainly belonging to the dissidents, cyberspace represented 
‘a space’, ‘democratic and safe’ to be involved in politics. The LTTE countering the web 
operations of the dissidents, marked the switching of strategies in online politics from 
merely being a propaganda political priority to an activist priority. This change of 
strategy is discussed in Chapters Four, Seven and Eight, where I bring out examples of 
websites both from pro-LTTE and dissident sides, having discussions, debates and 
images of political activists and even challenging them on their political positions. 
Nitharsanam.com picked on many dissident political activists both in the diaspora and in 
Sri Lanka. The dissident website Tamilaffairs.com challenged many pro-LTTE political 
activists. This is an important observation made in my research on the implications of 
online politics on Tamil diaspora political activism.  
 
These tensions have paved way for, as my thesis claims, new political priorities among 
diaspora politicians that may have not been possible or even important political issues 
were not for the use of cyberspace for political purposes. They manifest in political 
struggles that do not necessarily reflect the traditional Tamil diaspora politics based on 
the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka. In this way ‘power’ became a central core concept in 
analysing the data based on the interviews. The theme of power is a central conceptual 
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issue as the realization and conceptualization of power is at the heart of the contradiction 
between the two Tamil diaspora political groups involved in my thesis. For the LTTE, 
cyberspace is yet another space to control and dominate, while the dissidents view it as 
more than an information space, but a space enabling them to challenge, resist and even 
dominate the LTTE. This tension, and its transition into a struggle, make cyberspace a 
site or playing field of antagonisms, where conflict between two contradictory forces has 
contributed to new political priorities within the Tamil diaspora sphere.  
 
The pro-LTTE activists insisted on the need to be ‘present’ in cyberspace and on the 
need to ‘shape or set the field’ in cyberspace. They were simply speaking the code of 
dominating cyberspace, practices which the LTTE ardently believe keeps hegemonic 
discourse about national struggle and nationhood intact. In my Web Sphere Analysis, 
based on the web storm around the EU ban, the LTTE websites consistently projected 
one message, which was the image of unprecedented support from the Tamil diaspora 
globally for the LTTE and its objectives. The websites managed to project domination 
by pulling together events throughout the globe supporting the LTTE on the face of a 
single web page. By doing this they expected to achieve a seamless control on the 
diaspora. This was constructing the hegemonic truth, as Foucault pointed out, ‘relations 
of power cannot themselves be established, consolidated nor implemented without the 
production, accumulation, circulation and functioning of a discourse’ (1980:93). 
 
Lukes’s radical view on power, and his concept of insidious power, is relevant to some 
observations made by respondents based on their experiences of the way power 
functions in cyberspace. The respondents highlighted the capability of the web to change 
people’s lifestyles and modes of political practice. This was highlighted by Keeran, 
Nallu, Jeyadevan and Jeyabalan, which is why I related such ‘insidious’ use of the 
internet technologies to Lukes’ analysis of the third dimension of power. I used the 
Foucauldian conception of power to analyse discursive constructions such as the LTTE’s 
hegemonic notion of Eelam.  
 
For the dissident the internet offers opportunities for breaking down political 
hierarchies, such as the LTTE discourse of Eelam and its claim to be the sole 
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representative of Tamil people in Sri Lanka. If the LTTE ideology worked by 
constructing the notion of Tamil Eelam and embedding it in their struggle, the 
dissidents are utilizing cyber space to challenge and resist this discourse and 
attempting to de-link the struggle for Tamil rights from the LTTEs own struggle. 
Thus dissidents are resisting the LTTEs claims to being the sole power broker in the 
Tamil diaspora political sphere. The dissidents use cyberspace are to challenge the 
institutional establishments which reflect the material conditions of the LTTE’s 
Tamil nationalist discourse such as LTTE-front offices, LTTE agents and LTTE 
propaganda operations.  
 
Activists such as Nallu and Jeyabalan pointed out that the internet enabled them to 
challenge the authority of the LTTE. They claimed cyberspace was used as a 
mobilization space which could not be controlled by the LTTE. Jeyabalan used terms 
such as ‘resistance’ and ‘indirect power’ to describe his success as a dissident journalist 
in bringing up the alternative voice of the dissidents. Keeran’s claim in Chapter Six of 
cyberspace as a ‘decentralized power zone’ points to the importance it has in political 
processes of the dissidents to challenge the centralized political authority of the LTTE in 
the diaspora communities. Keeran’s reference to the role of the dissident website 
Thenee.com introduced in both Chapters Four and Six is an example of the challenges 
made to the LTTE. The achievements made by Thenee.com is clear in the graph present 
in Chapter Five which visualizes the linkages Thenee.com has developed with other 
important websites that include international media and civil society organizations. 
 
My thesis is not merely about the LTTE’s hegemony and its construction and 
preservation of this hegemonic discourse online. I explore what drove the dissidents into 
extensive use of the web. The analysis into both the pro-LTTE and the dissident use of 
the web illuminated the double sense in which cyberspace was experienced by these 
activists, projecting it as a medium to politicise and a space/site to be politically active 
in. Pro-LTTE activist Sutha pointed out the importance of being present and setting the 
field in cyberspace, dissident activist Keeran pointed out if one has to be in politics, he 
has to be present in cyberspace. Though these two activists represent two rival groups 
both of them see cyberspace not merely as a medium of communication but as a political 
space that by needs to be occupied and dominated. This is why I argue cyberspace is not 
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only perceived but experienced by diaspora activists as an important political space, thus 
motivating them to politicise this space using their own political ideologies in order to 
dominate it. 
 
The claim that cyberspace is a political site or space made by dissident political activists 
calls for a unique way of looking at cyberspace in the context of politics. Cyber 
enthusiasts have made earlier claims of cyberspace as being a ‘place’, but the strength of 
this thesis is that the claim is based on the actual experiences of political activists.  A 
cross generation of Tamil activists were represented, from people who were Tamil 
activists more than a decade before the inception of cyberspace to those whose political 
careers have coincided with the growth of cyberspace and its use for political 
mobilization.  
 
From a theoretical perspective, cyberspace has become a site for activists endowing them 
with political agency for political mobilization and political organization. These new 
opportunities included launching political campaigns which, if not for the existence of 
cyberspace, would have been virtually impossible. This can be a controversial argument 
to make but it is supported by the fieldwork. Some of the respondents referred to the 
distinct configuration of these spaces, claiming they were ‘safe’ and ‘democratic’. As 
Amin, et al argue ‘we have to recognize that politics consist of multiple spaces in which 
need, desire and corresponding disagreement are registered’ (2005: 811). My thesis 
illuminates the dual notions of political space and spaces for politics. Spaces for politics 
were highlighted through the responses of the political activists, who elaborated on the 
political opportunities that cyberspace opened up where political mobilization, 
communication and organization were made easy. While the idea of political space was 
important, in some interviews it denoted a qualitatively different political terrain, where 
unique political strategies were required for political engagements and a political space 
could generate political effects.    
 
Though the thesis is not championing the outright claim that qualitatively different 
political spaces are created and maintained in cyberspace, I argue that at certain 
moments of political engagements, cyberspace can be used and embraced as a ‘political 
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space’ or a location that enables political action. I claim that these political engagements 
have the generative power to create real world political impacts, as proven by both the 
dissidents’ successful challenges to the LTTE, and also by the LTTE using the internet 
as an ambush point to target dissidents who perceive themselves to safe in London in a 
liberal political environment. Furthermore the fact that LTTE fronts have increasingly 
started to respond to attacks on their hegemonic discourse about the Tamil homeland and 
the military conflict made through online challenges is a sign of taking the internet very 
seriously and trying to deal with it differently. The LTTE fronts not only responded, but 
they have attempted to expand the Tamil diasporan web sphere with a large number of 
web sites supporting the Eelam cause. This thesis also uncovered that the responses 
made by the pro-LTTE activists to challenges made to them online are not limited to 
challenging the counter discourse but to challenging the individuals behind the dissident 
web challenges. The classic example is the unprecedented number of web attacks carried 
out against R. Jeyadevan where the LTTE has gone to the extremes of registering 
websites in the name of Jeyadevan and publishing anti Jeyadevan material as methods of 
intimidation. 
 
This is why in the central argument of this thesis I claim that the tensions between the 
pro-LTTE and the dissident groups shape the different approaches to their web politics. 
The LTTE approaches the web as a space that can be controlled and which needs to be 
contained, while the dissidents use cyberspace as a place to be located in, and also as a 
space for political opportunities once restricted in the physical realm because of the 
LTTE dominance. I also argue such tensions possess the inherent capability to generate 
new political issues. These political challenges and counter challenges between the 
LTTE and the dissidents have made both groups view cyberspace as an important site of 
power struggle as it has introduced new challenges for political strategies – in particular 
‘time’ and ‘speed’ have become important in political action. 
 
These two themes, of the working of ‘power’ and the perception of ‘space’ in relation to 
cyberspace, and the contrasting approaches to cyber politics based on these themes thus 
took my thesis to explore the dimension of the political within diasporan politics. 
‘Power’ and ‘space’ were critical notions which defined the actions of political activists 
and made them embrace certain forms of cyber politics.  This made it important to 
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investigate the cumulative impact of cyberspace and the processes of cyber politics on 
their political actions. These included the definitions of political priorities and the 
adoption of political strategies.  
 
 
For some political activists the experience of being located in cyberspace is similar to 
being in a physical location important for political action; this is shown in the analysis of 
interview data. The struggle to secure political advantages both strategically and 
tactically through the use of cyberspace and to deploy in cyberspace has also intensified 
web rivalry among the two groups. This rivalry is central to understanding the dynamics 
of changing political strategies within Tamil diaspora politics as uncovered in Chapter 
Seven. My analysis of this theme grapples with political processes in the Tamil diaspora 
political sphere and the effects of cyberspace and online technologies in shaping and 
constructing political strategies. I argue that this theme plays a definitive role in the lives 
of political activists in shaping their activism online, which was discussed in Section 
Three. 
 
Chapter Seven brought out the second theme that emerged within the broader topic of 
the political use of cyberspace for Tamil diaspora politics and I introduced it under the 
broader analysis of the politics of cyberspace in a two dimensional approach. The first 
dimension was identified as ‘political opportunities’, which considered the dimensions 
of cyber politics through the eyes of Tamil diaspora political activists. The second 
dimension was the notion ‘political strategies’, which went beyond the question of what 
political opportunities cyberspace opened. It was concerned with the new political 
strategies the activists have had to adopt to suit political engagements online and what 
effects the internet has generated in the sphere of Tamil diaspora politics. 
 
The two dimensions in which political use of cyberspace is discussed provide an 
integrated view of the effects of cyberspace and internet on the political strategies of 
Tamil diaspora political activists. The attributes of resistance, or the ability to resist 
dominant networks, are identified, while contrary to some theories of minority resistance 
to hegemonic networks, I uncover the manner in which such dominant networks attempt 
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to rearticulate their dominance in cyberspace. This brings out the complicated nature of 
cyber dynamics which is not as simple and straightforwardly libertarian as people such 
as Clever (1998), and Levy (2001) claim. From the point of view of the LTTE, I also 
look at the problems of envisaging dominant structures in cyberspace. Their strategies of 
active email campaigns, hyper linking large numbers of web sites and delivering a single 
political message are attempts to impose mechanisms of surveillance in cyberspace and 
suggest a reshaping of strategies to match the fluidity of the cyber environment. This 
demonstrated that a hegemonic project has to re-think political strategies in cyberspace 
because existing political structures that are visible in diaspora politics could not be 
superimposed directly onto online politics. The research looked at the politicisation of 
the online sphere in the Tamil political struggle for control, coupled with new uses of 
technologies for political ends. 
 
The re-articulation of new political strategies online and the constant struggle between 
the rival political groups in designing strategies for online politics has opened up a more 
sinister dimension to the politics of cyberspace. I argue that political struggles between 
the activists played out in cyberspace had profound real life effect on their lives. This 
was the third theme of my thesis and a surprising revelation which came out through my 
fieldwork and online research. 
 
Cyberspace and politics of cyberspace in this context, with the images of power and 
images of terror I have engaged in both Chapters Five and Eight, highlight the 
importance of political symbols as well as individual agents. This is not a new thing. As 
Latour claims, revisiting Thomas Hobbes’ instruction to the engraver who created the 
front piece of the Leviathan ‘a simple look at them clearly proves that the “body – 
politik” is not only made of people! They are thick with things…’ (2005:16). Through 
my research I argue that the embedded images in Tamil websites of weapons, military 
assets, night clubs, vehicles, houses, businesses, pornographic material, animated images 
of weapons depicting threats have become part of the new cyber political dimension. 
These images prior to the use of cyberspace were not used extensively and did not reach 
such a massive audience. However, they have become the forefront of a political struggle 
to maintain and assert control, and are political tools wielded for counter hegemonic 
campaigns.  This makes the point that even the computer screen space has political 
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implications and is more complicated than just rhetoric in politics. The images lumped 
together in these sites have narrowed down the battlefield into the personal spaces of 
political activists, their children, husbands and wives. Diasporan political activists are 
thrown into a situation where terror and fear have become so close and so personal so as 
to make them feel unsafe even in the safest place, thats ‘home’. I argue these terror 
tactics are important because they make the existing arguments on cyber terror obsolete 
and challenge its dependence on macro spheres such as state initiatives, the protection of 
critical infrastructure and gearing for transnational terrorism through online initiatives. 
My findings bring out the need to change the analytical lenses in studying concepts such 
as cyber conflict and cyber terrorism.  
 
I started to uncover a shift in the web politics in Tamil diaspora when I contrasted my 
findings, both from the fieldwork and online research, with my pre-PhD research into 
Tamil diaspora politics online. In my earlier research on web politics in the context of 
the Sri Lankan conflict, my respondents spoke about information sharing and web 
propaganda but I saw a marked difference in my interviews for the PhD. Many political 
activists I interviewed used terms such as ‘need to be present’, ‘need to be aware of 
speed’ and ‘need to be part of web’. There is an interesting paradigm of political 
engagement in the Tamil diaspora that parallels increased interactivity in the web. The 
web has become more than a medium.While its use as a medium of information was 
stressed simultaneously activists were referring to it as a site or place for political action. 
 
The web platforms used for online engagements have undergone marked advances since 
mid 2002 and these advances have made the web more interactive, with more political 
websites being hosted on platforms such as blogs.  Structurally, the ability to interact, 
and the level of interaction, has increased remarkably compared to web use in 1995 – 
2002 in the Sri Lankan context. This is the background on which I carried out my web 
research. Many sites I analysed such as Nitharsanam.com, Tamilaffairs.com, 
vizhippu.net and Thenee.com were based on the blog platforms. These platforms enabled 
not just readership but a massive interaction between the site producers, readers and 
political actors and issues featured in these blogs. This is a key reason why the websites 
began to generate considerable influence on the issues that were discussed and the actors 
who were in the centre of them. This is a fundamental reason why the post 2005 period 
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saw a surge in web activity and related offline responses to web generated political 
issues. 
 
Moreover, the ability to explore both the online research components in each section and 
its successful integration with offline research is an important hallmark of having clear 
units of analysis generated through Web Sphere Analysis. The importance of Web 
Sphere Analysis in this research is its ability to be used in comparative analysis. Thus the 
web sphere or web storms I brought out can, in future research, be compared to future 
web storms to derive greater insight into the working of cyberspace in political 
engagements and political activism. Also the micro facets of the sites that are captured in 
a web sphere such as web links, shape, text content, images, and technological upgrades 
can be used for comparison with the future web spheres if they are well archived. 
 
Finally my thesis brought out the complicated nature of cyber politics and the effects of 
the use of the internet for politics on Tamil diasporan politics, where the effects were felt 
on individuals, their families, their friends and their colleagues. The internet’s generative 
power in some instances could take the attention of political activists away from the 
political issues they were fighting for, whilst turning personal political confrontations 
with public affairs. Such was the case of Jeyadevan, which is important because the 
personal political rivalries involved in the case forced the LTTE to enter a type of 
politics they deemed as not suitable for an organization such as themselves involved in a 
liberation struggle. The research pointed to the political importance of cyberspace where 
political activists, unlike in the context of the anti globalization movement, the 
Zapatistas, or the anti war movement, were more interactive. This interactivity led Tamil 
diaspora political activists to believe that the internet was more than a medium of 
communication or networking facility but a site or place where political action can be 
staged with the capability of making change or resulting in real world effects. I discuss 
the role of concepts of power, space and political strategy in the context of political 
engagements online in micro political struggles. My thesis opens up the wider debates of 
spatial importance of cyberspace, and implications it has on democracy, security and 
power. The thesis points out the importance of ‘presence’ in cyberspace and its link with 
cyber political engagements, which advances the theoretical frameworks of cyber 
politics currently focusing explicitly on the importance of being a medium of 
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informational politics, technological utility and networking capability. The thesis 
contributes to the study of cyber conflict and terrorism, exposing the impact cyber 
politics can have on lives of individual agents which is an area not explored in the 
current discourse of cyber conflict. Finally my research looks at the political 
implications cyberspace had on Tamil diaspora political activism by tracing the shifting 
political strategies and use of cyber politics to change the political landscape of Tamils 




Glossary of Terms 
 
Blog / Web Log: A type of web page with minimal external editing used to provide 
online commentary and enabling people to interact on the web page with feedback on 
content.  
 
Browser: Any software that is used to explore various types of Internet resources.  
 
Countermeasure: Action or device that reduces vulnerability to attack of a computer  
system.  
 
Cracking: the process of trying to overcome a internet or computer security measure 
 
Cyberspace: The electronic space created by computers connected together in  networks 
to form the Internet. 
  
Domain: A domain name is the unique name that identifies an Internet site 
 
Download:  is the method by which users access and save software or other files to their 
own computers from a remote computer.  
 
Denial of service (DoS): an internet borne attack targeting a system to be unable to fulfil 
its intended function.  
 
Email bomb: An email containing active data sent purposely to cause damage to the 
recipient's computer.  
 
Encryption: A way of coding the information in a file or e-mail message which is 
unreadable in the event of interception. 
 
Fire Wall: Combination of hardware and software separating a Network into two or 




Hit: A single request from a web browser for a single item from a web server. 
 
Hacker: A person who breaks into computer systems for the purpose of stealing or 
destroying data.  
 
Hacking: The process of bypassing the security systems on a computer system or 
network. 
 
Home Page: The starting point of a Web presentation offering direct links to the 
different sections of the site.  
 
Host: A host is any computer directly connected to a network that acts as a repository 
for services available for other computers  
 
Information security: A system of procedures and policies designed to protect and 
control information and information infrastructures.   
 
Network: A system of computers interconnected in order to share information. 
 
Real Time: Events simulated by a computer at the same speed that they would occur in 
real life. 
 
Search Engine:  A web based system for searching information available on the Web.  
 
Server: is a computer that handles requests for data, e-mail, file transfers, and other 
network services from other computers.  
 
Upload: Transferring data from a one computer to another computer or to a server.  
 
Virus: A computer program designed to make copies of it and spread itself from one 
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